

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

B E T W E E N :

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
1985, R.S.C. c.C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF
INDALEX LIMITED, INDALEX HOLDINGS (B.C.) LTD., 6326765 CANADA INC. and
NOVAR INC.

Applicants

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES

(Motion by retirees re: Deemed Trust, returnable August 28, 2009)

August 20, 2009

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of the Retirement Plan for Executive Employees
of Indalex Canada and Associated Companies

TO: ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

**ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
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IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT
OF INDALEX LIMITED, INDALEX HOLDINGS (B.C.) LTD.,
6326765 CANADA INC. and NOVAR INC.

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4.	<i>Filing Requirements and Procedure on Full or Partial Wind Up of a Pension Plan</i> , FSCO Policy Bulletin W100-102, December 9, 2004.
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TAB 1

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2009 CarswellOnt 4494

Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)

Elaine Nolan, George Phillips, Elisabeth Ruccia, Paul Carter, R.A. Varney and Bill Fitz, being members of the DCA Employees Pension Committee representing certain of the members and former members of the Pension Plan for the Employees of Kerry (Canada) Inc., Appellants v. Kerry (Canada) Inc. and Superintendent of Financial Services, Respondents and Association of Canadian Pension Management and Canadian Labour Congress, Interveners

Supreme Court of Canada

Abella J., Binnie J., Charron J., Deschamps J., Fish J., LeBel J., Rothstein J.

Heard: November 18, 2008

Judgment: August 7, 2009

Docket: 32205

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Proceedings: affirming *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2007), (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8249, 60 C.C.P.B. 67, (sub nom. *DCA Employees Pension Committee v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 282 D.L.R. (4th) 227, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ont.)*) 225 O.A.C. 163, (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 86 O.R. (3d) 1, 2007 CarswellOnt 3493, 2007 ONCA 416, 32 E.T.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.); reversing *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 1503, 52 C.C.P.B. 1, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services & Kerry (Canada) Inc.*) 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8190, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)*) 209 O.A.C. 21 (Ont. Div. Ct.); reversing in part *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1536, 41 C.C.P.B. 65, 2004 CarswellOnt 8896 (F.S. Trib.); reversing in part *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2004), 42 C.C.P.B. 119, 2004 CarswellOnt 8903, 2004 CarswellOnt 4226 (F.S. Trib.); reversing in part *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 8904, 2004 CarswellOnt 5477, 44 C.C.P.B. 156 (F.S. Trib.); additional reasons to *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2004), 42 C.C.P.B. 119, 2004 CarswellOnt 8903, 2004 CarswellOnt 4226 (F.S. Trib.); reversing *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 3284, 54 C.C.P.B. 112, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)*) 213 O.A.C. 271 (Ont. Div. Ct.); additional reasons to *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2006), 2006 CarswellOnt 1503, 52 C.C.P.B. 1, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services & Kerry (Canada) Inc.*) 2006 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8190, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)*) 209 O.A.C. 21 (Ont.

2009 SCC 39

Div. Ct.)

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Steven Barrett, for Intervener, Canadian Labour Congress

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Estates and Trusts; Public; Civil Practice and Procedure

Pensions --- Administration of pension plans -- Winding-up of plan -- Partial wind-ups

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Amendment in 2000 introduced defined contribution component -- Those who did not elect to convert remained as members of defined benefit component of Plan ("Part 1 Members") -- All new employees and pre-2000 Plan members who exercised conversion option were termed "Part 2 Members" -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. had taken contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal held that provisions of 2000 Plan permitting cross-subsidization were inconsistent with terms of trust agreement but that conflict could be resolved by amending 2000 Plan -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of Part 1 Members -- Tribunal found that shortcomings in disclosure process were insufficient to constitute grounds on which Superintendent could refuse to register 2000 Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- Tribunal's decision was reasonable and ought to stand -- Nothing in original Plan and trust documents prohibited taking of contribution holidays -- Members of pension plan had no entitlement to actuarial surplus in ongoing pension plan -- Where trust funds may be used for payment of plan expenses for services required by plan, distinction between whether services were provided by settlor or third party was artificial -- Only consideration was whether funds could be used to pay expenses and legitimacy and reasonableness of costs incurred -- To extent that expenses at issue were bona fide expenses necessary to administration of pension plan, it should not matter whether expenses were owed to third party or to employer itself -- No reason in principle why employer should be obliged to contract out such services.

Pensions --- Surplus funds -- Use of surplus -- Employer's "contribution holiday"

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Amendment in 2000 introduced defined contribution component -- Those who did not elect to convert remained as members of defined benefit component of Plan ("Part 1 Members") -- All new employees and pre-2000 Plan members who exercised conversion option were termed "Part 2 Members" -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. had taken contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal

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held that provisions of 2000 Plan permitting cross-subsidization were inconsistent with terms of trust agreement but that conflict could be resolved by amending 2000 Plan -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of Part 1 Members -- Tribunal found that shortcomings in disclosure process were insufficient to constitute grounds on which Superintendent could refuse to register 2000 Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- Tribunal's decision was reasonable and ought to stand -- Nothing in original Plan and trust documents prohibited taking of contribution holidays -- Members of pension plan had no entitlement to actuarial surplus in ongoing pension plan -- Clause required company to contribute such amounts as would provide for employees' retirement incomes -- Actuarial discretion was clearly called for, as clause did not specify how these amounts would be determined, nor did it preclude amounts from being zero -- Section 14(b) of Plan text provided for contributions that would cover members' future retirement benefits -- It required exercise of actuarial discretion, as it did not fix annual contributions and therefore did not preclude contribution holidays -- Tribunal's decision to allow contribution holidays in respect of defined contribution component of pension plan, once appropriate retroactive amendments were made, was not unreasonable -- It was not unreasonable for tribunal to conclude that Plan allowed for designation of defined contribution members, who were company employees, as beneficiaries of trust.

Pensions --- Surplus funds -- Use of surplus -- Miscellaneous

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Amendment in 2000 introduced defined contribution component -- Those who did not elect to convert remained as members of defined benefit component of Plan ("Part 1 Members") -- All new employees and pre-2000 Plan members who exercised conversion option were termed "Part 2 Members" -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. had taken contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal held that provisions of 2000 Plan permitting cross-subsidization were inconsistent with terms of trust agreement but that conflict could be resolved by amending 2000 Plan -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of Part 1 Members -- Tribunal found that shortcomings in disclosure process were insufficient to constitute grounds on which Superintendent could refuse to register 2000 Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- Tribunal's decision was reasonable and ought to stand -- Nothing in original Plan and trust documents prohibited taking of contribution holidays -- Members of pension plan had no entitlement to actuarial surplus in ongoing pension plan -- Where trust funds may be used for payment of plan expenses for services required by plan, distinction between whether services were provided by settlor or third party was artificial -- Only consideration was whether funds could be used to pay expenses and legitimacy and reasonableness of costs incurred -- To extent that expenses at issue were bona fide expenses necessary to administration of pension plan, it should not matter whether expenses were owed to third party or to employer itself -- No reason in principle why employer should be obliged to contract out such services.

Pensions --- Regulatory bodies -- Jurisdiction and powers

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Funding was through company and employee contributions constituted as trust -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. took contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million respecting its funding obligations, and money from fund had paid approximately \$850,000 of Plan expenses from 1985 to 2002 -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged

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irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of defined benefits members of Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- No justification to interfere with costs ruling that costs should be payable by committee in favour of K Inc. -- K Inc. was successful, it did not have to pay into fund to cover expenses at issue and may take contribution holidays -- There was no reason to penalize it by reducing fund surplus and thereby reducing its opportunity for contribution holidays -- Case was adversarial in nature -- Committee was not bringing litigation on behalf of all beneficiaries -- Benefits committee claimed were only for defined benefits members of Plan.

Pensions --- Regulatory bodies -- Costs

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Funding was through company and employee contributions constituted as trust -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. took contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million respecting its funding obligations, and money from fund had paid approximately \$850,000 of Plan expenses from 1985 to 2002 -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of defined benefits members of Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- No justification to interfere with costs ruling that costs should be payable by committee in favour of K Inc. -- K Inc. was successful, it did not have to pay into fund to cover expenses at issue and may take contribution holidays -- There was no reason to penalize it by reducing fund surplus and thereby reducing its opportunity for contribution holidays -- Case was adversarial in nature -- Committee was not bringing litigation on behalf of all beneficiaries -- Benefits committee claimed were only for defined benefits members of Plan.

Pensions --- Practice in pension actions -- Costs

C Ltd. created defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") in 1954 -- Funding was through company and employee contributions constituted as trust -- Separate trust agreement was entered into in relation to fund -- C Ltd. became D Inc., and K Inc. was successor to D Inc. -- Administration of Plan was by means of retirement committee -- Fund was in surplus position -- Between 1985 and 2001, K Inc. took contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million respecting its funding obligations, and money from fund had paid approximately \$850,000 of Plan expenses from 1985 to 2002 -- Following 2000 amendment, committee asked Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in administration of Plan -- K Inc. and committee sought hearings on Superintendent's proposed orders -- Tribunal held that K Inc. was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of defined benefits members of Plan -- Committee appealed to Divisional Court -- Tribunal's decisions were largely overturned -- K Inc. appealed -- Committee cross-appealed -- Appeal was allowed and cross-appeal was dismissed -- Committee appealed -- Appeal dismissed -- No justification to interfere with costs ruling that costs should be payable by committee in favour of K Inc. -- K Inc. was successful, it did not have to pay into fund to cover expenses at issue and may take contribution holidays -- There was no reason to penalize it by reducing fund surplus and thereby reducing its opportunity for contribution holidays -- Case was adversarial in nature -- Committee was not bringing litigation on behalf of all beneficiaries -- Benefits committee claimed were only for defined benefits members of Plan.

Régimes de retraite --- Administration des régimes de retraite -- Liquidation du régime -- Liquidations partielles

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C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Régime a été modifié en 2000 de manière à instaurer un volet à cotisations déterminées -- Employés qui n'ont pas opté pour la conversion restaient des participants du volet initial à prestations déterminées du régime (« participants de la partie 1 ») -- Tout nouvel employé et tous les participants au régime initial ayant opté pour la conversion ont été désignés comme étant les « participants de la partie 2 » -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K inc s'est accordée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que les dispositions du régime de 2000 permettant l'interfinancement ne respectaient pas les termes de la convention de fiducie mais que cette situation pouvait être corrigée en modifiant le régime de 2000 -- Tribunal a conclu que K inc avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants de la partie 1 -- Tribunal a conclu que les lacunes dans le processus de divulgation ne constituaient pas un motif pour lequel le surintendant pouvait refuser d'enregistrer le régime de 2000 -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Décision du tribunal était raisonnable et devait être maintenue -- Ni le régime initial et ni la convention de fiducie interdisait que des périodes d'exonération soient prises -- Participants au régime de retraite n'avaient pas droit au surplus actuariel dans le régime en vigueur -- Lorsque les fonds en fiducie peuvent être utilisés pour payer les frais afférents aux services nécessaires au régime, la distinction entre les services fournis par le constituant et ceux fournis par un tiers est artificielle -- Seule question était de savoir si les frais pouvaient être payés à même la caisse et si les frais engagés étaient légitimes et raisonnables -- Dans la mesure où les frais en question étaient légitimes et nécessaires à l'administration du régime de retraite, il importait peu que les frais soient dus à un tiers ou à l'employeur -- Il n'y avait aucune raison, en principe, d'obliger l'employeur de recourir à la sous-traitance.

Régimes de retraite --- Sommes excédentaires -- Utilisation de l'excédent -- « Périodes d'exonération de cotisations » de l'employeur

C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Régime a été modifié en 2000 de manière à instaurer un volet à cotisations déterminées -- Employés qui n'ont pas opté pour la conversion restaient des participants du volet initial à prestations déterminées du régime (« participants de la partie 1 ») -- Tout nouvel employé et tous les participants au régime initial ayant opté pour la conversion ont été désignés comme étant les « participants de la partie 2 » -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K inc s'est accordée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que les dispositions du régime de 2000 permettant l'interfinancement ne respectaient pas les termes de la convention de fiducie mais que cette situation pouvait être corrigée en modifiant le régime de 2000 -- Tribunal a conclu que K inc avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants de la partie 1 -- Tribunal a conclu que les lacunes dans le processus de divulgation ne constituaient pas un motif pour lequel le surintendant pouvait refuser d'enregistrer le régime de 2000 -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Décision du tribunal était raisonnable et devait être maintenue -- Ni le régime initial et ni la convention de fiducie interdisait que des périodes d'exonération soient prises -- Participants au régime de retraite n'avaient pas droit au surplus actuariel dans le régime en vigueur -- Disposition obligeait la société à cotiser les sommes garantissant le revenu de retraite des employés -- Intervention dis-

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crétionnaire de l'actuaire était clairement requise puisque la disposition ne précisait pas la façon dont ces sommes seraient établies et n'empêchait pas que ces sommes soient nulles -- Article 14b) du régime de retraite prévoyait des cotisations qui couvriraient les futures prestations de retraite des participants -- Il nécessitait l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'un actuaire puisqu'il n'établissait pas les cotisations annuelles et, par conséquent, n'interdisait pas les suspensions de cotisations -- Décision du tribunal d'autoriser les suspensions de cotisations au volet à cotisations déterminées du régime de retraite, une fois les modifications rétroactives apportées, n'était pas déraisonnable -- Conclusion du tribunal à l'effet que le régime permettait que les participants au volet du régime à cotisations déterminées, lesquels étaient des employés de la compagnie, soient désignés comme étant des bénéficiaires de la fiducie n'était pas déraisonnable.

Régimes de retraite --- Sommes excédentaires -- Utilisation de l'excédent -- Divers

C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Régime a été modifié en 2000 de manière à instaurer un volet à cotisations déterminées -- Employés qui n'ont pas opté pour la conversion restaient des participants du volet initial à prestations déterminées du régime (« participants de la partie 1 ») -- Tout nouvel employé et tous les participants au régime initial ayant opté pour la conversion ont été désignés comme étant les « participants de la partie 2 » -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K inc s'est accordée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que les dispositions du régime de 2000 permettant l'interfinancement ne respectaient pas les termes de la convention de fiducie mais que cette situation pouvait être corrigée en modifiant le régime de 2000 -- Tribunal a conclu que K inc avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants de la partie 1 -- Tribunal a conclu que les lacunes dans le processus de divulgation ne constituaient pas un motif pour lequel le surintendant pouvait refuser d'enregistrer le régime de 2000 -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Décision du tribunal était raisonnable et devait être maintenue -- Ni le régime initial et ni la convention de fiducie interdisait que des périodes d'exonération soient prises -- Participants au régime de retraite n'avaient pas droit au surplus actuariel dans le régime en vigueur -- Lorsque les fonds en fiducie peuvent être utilisés pour payer les frais afférents aux services nécessaires au régime, la distinction entre les services fournis par le constituant et ceux fournis par un tiers est artificielle -- Seule question était de savoir si les frais pouvaient être payés à même la caisse et si les frais engagés étaient légitimes et raisonnables -- Dans la mesure où les frais en question étaient légitimes et nécessaires à l'administration du régime de retraite, il importait peu que les frais soient dus à un tiers ou à l'employeur -- Il n'y avait aucune raison, en principe, d'obliger l'employeur de recourir à la sous-traitance.

Régimes de retraite --- Organismes de réglementation -- Compétence et pouvoirs

C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Financement se faisait au moyen de cotisations versées par la société et les employés et constituées en fiducie -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K Inc s'est octroyée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ relativement à ses obligations de financement et environ 850 000 \$ ont été prélevés sur la caisse pour couvrir les frais relatifs au régime entre 1985 et 2002 -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que l'employeur avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes

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d'exonération relativement aux participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans la décision portant que les frais devraient être payés par le comité à K inc -- K inc a obtenu gain de cause, elle n'avait pas à cotiser à la caisse pour couvrir les frais en question et il pouvait recourir aux suspensions de cotisations -- Il n'existait aucune raison de la pénaliser en réduisant l'excédent de la caisse et, par conséquent, en réduisant ses possibilités de suspendre ses cotisations -- Litige était de nature contradictoire -- Comité n'intentait pas le recours pour le compte de tous les bénéficiaires -- Comité ne présentait sa réclamation que pour les participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime.

Régimes de retraite --- Organismes de réglementation -- Frais

C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Financement se faisait au moyen de cotisations versées par la société et les employés et constituées en fiducie -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K Inc s'est octroyée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ relativement à ses obligations de financement et environ 850 000 \$ ont été prélevés sur la caisse pour couvrir les frais relatifs au régime entre 1985 et 2002 -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que l'employeur avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans la décision portant que les frais devraient être payés par le comité à K inc -- K inc a obtenu gain de cause, elle n'avait pas à cotiser à la caisse pour couvrir les frais en question et il pouvait recourir aux suspensions de cotisations -- Il n'existait aucune raison de la pénaliser en réduisant l'excédent de la caisse et, par conséquent, en réduisant ses possibilités de suspendre ses cotisations -- Litige était de nature contradictoire -- Comité n'intentait pas le recours pour le compte de tous les bénéficiaires -- Comité ne présentait sa réclamation que pour les participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime.

Régimes de retraite --- Procédure dans le cadre d'actions relatives à des régimes de retraite -- Frais

C Ltée a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en 1954 -- Financement se faisait au moyen de cotisations versées par la société et les employés et constituées en fiducie -- Convention de fiducie a été conclue relativement à la caisse -- C Ltée est devenue D inc et K inc lui a succédé -- Administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite -- Caisse était excédentaire -- Entre 1985 et 2001, K Inc s'est octroyée des périodes d'exonération de cotisations représentant environ 1,5 M\$ relativement à ses obligations de financement et environ 850 000 \$ ont été prélevés sur la caisse pour couvrir les frais relatifs au régime entre 1985 et 2002 -- Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime -- K inc et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant -- Tribunal a conclu que l'employeur avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime -- Comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire -- Décisions du tribunal ont été largement infirmées -- K Inc a interjeté appel -- Comité a interjeté un appel incident -- Appel a été accueilli et l'appel incident a été rejeté -- Comité a formé un pourvoi -- Pourvoi rejeté -- Il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans la décision portant que les frais devraient être payés par le comité à K inc -- K inc a obtenu gain de cause, elle n'avait pas à cotiser à la caisse pour couvrir les frais en question et il pouvait recourir aux suspensions de cotisations -- Il n'existait aucune raison de la pénaliser en réduisant l'excédent de la caisse et, par conséquent, en réduisant ses possibilités de suspendre ses cotisations -- Litige était

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de nature contradictoire -- Comité n'intentait pas le recours pour le compte de tous les bénéficiaires -- Comité ne présentait sa réclamation que pour les participants du volet à prestations déterminées du régime.

The employer created a defined benefit pension plan ("Plan") for employees. Administration of the Plan was by means of a retirement committee. The fund was in surplus position. An amendment in 2000 introduced a defined contribution component. Those who did not elect to convert remained as members of the defined benefit component of the Plan ("Part 1 Members"). All new employees and pre-2000 Plan members who exercised the conversion option were termed "Part 2 Members". Between 1985 and 2001, the employer had taken contribution holidays of approximately \$1.5 million.

Following the 2000 amendment, the committee asked the Superintendent of Financial Services to investigate alleged irregularities in the administration of the Plan. The employer and the committee sought hearings on the Superintendent's proposed orders. The tribunal held that the provisions of the 2000 Plan permitting cross-subsidization were inconsistent with the terms of the trust agreement but that the conflict could be resolved by amending the 2000 Plan. The tribunal held that the employer was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of Part 1 Members. The tribunal found that the shortcomings in the disclosure process were insufficient to constitute grounds on which the Superintendent could refuse to register the 2000 Plan.

The committee appealed to the Divisional Court and the tribunal's decisions were largely overturned. The employer successfully appealed. The committee appealed that decision.

Held: The appeal was dismissed.

Per Rothstein J. (Binnie, Deschamps, Abella, Charron JJ. concurring): The tribunal's decision was reasonable and ought to stand. Nothing in the original Plan and trust documents prohibited the taking of contribution holidays. Members of the pension plan had no entitlement to actuarial surplus in the ongoing pension plan.

It was not unreasonable for the tribunal to conclude that the Plan allowed for the designation of defined contribution members, who were company employees, as beneficiaries of the trust.

There was no justification to interfere with the cost ruling that costs should be payable by the committee in favour of the employer. The employer was successful, it did not have to pay into the fund to cover the expenses at issue, and it may take contribution holidays. There was no reason to penalize it by reducing the fund surplus and thereby reducing the employer's opportunity for contribution holidays. The case was adversarial in nature. The committee was not bringing litigation on behalf of all beneficiaries. The benefits that the committee claimed were only for the Part 1 Members.

Per LeBel J. (dissenting in part) (Fish J. concurring): The appeal should be allowed in part, the tribunal's decision on contribution holidays quashed, and the Superintendent should be directed to refuse registration of the amendments that purported to permit the employer's use of the fund surplus. The amendments to the Plan purporting to authorize these payments were not permitted by the legislation and were in breach of the exclusive benefit provisions of the Plan documentation and the relevant principles of trust law. The tribunal's conclusion that these defects could be cured by a retroactive designation of defined contribution members as fund beneficiaries was unreasonable, and the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the tribunal's conclusion on this point.

L'employeur a mis sur pied un régime de retraite à prestations déterminées (« régime ») en faveur des employés. L'administration du régime était assurée par un comité de retraite. La caisse était excédentaire. Le régime a été modifié en 2000 de manière à instaurer un volet à cotisations déterminées. Les employés qui n'ont pas opté pour la

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conversion restaient des participants du volet initial à prestations déterminées du régime (« participants de la partie 1 »). Tout nouvel employé et tous les participants au régime initial ayant opté pour la conversion ont été désignés comme étant les « participants de la partie 2 ». Entre 1985 et 2001, l'employeur s'est accordé des périodes d'exonération de cotisation représentant environ 1,5 M\$.

Après les modifications de 2000, le comité a demandé au surintendant des services financiers d'enquêter sur de possibles irrégularités dans l'administration du régime. L'employeur et le comité ont demandé la tenue d'une audience au sujet des avis de proposition du surintendant. Le tribunal a conclu que les dispositions du régime de 2000 permettant l'interfinancement ne respectaient pas les termes de la convention de fiducie mais que cette situation pouvait être corrigée en modifiant le régime de 2000. Le tribunal a conclu que l'employeur avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération relativement aux participants de la partie 1. Le tribunal a conclu que les lacunes dans le processus de divulgation ne constituaient pas un motif pour lequel le surintendant pouvait refuser d'enregistrer le régime de 2000.

Le comité a interjeté appel auprès de la Cour divisionnaire et les décision du tribunal ont été en grande partie infirmées. L'employeur a interjeté appel avec succès. Le comité a formé un pourvoi à l'encontre de cette décision.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été rejeté.

Rothstein, J. (Binnie, Deschamps, Abella, Charron, JJ., souscrivant à son opinion) : La décision du tribunal était raisonnable et devait être maintenue. Ni le régime initial ni la convention de fiducie interdisait que des périodes d'exonération soient prises. Les participants au régime de retraite n'avaient pas droit au surplus actuariel dans le régime en vigueur.

La conclusion du tribunal à l'effet que le régime permettait que les participants au volet du régime à cotisations déterminées, lesquels étaient des employés de la compagnie, soient désignés comme étant des bénéficiaires de la fiducie n'était pas déraisonnable.

Il n'y avait aucune raison d'intervenir dans la décision portant que les frais devaient être payés par le comité à l'employeur. L'employeur a obtenu gain de cause, il n'avait pas à cotiser à la caisse pour couvrir les frais en question et il pouvait recourir aux suspensions de cotisations. Il n'existait aucune raison de le pénaliser en réduisant l'excédent de la caisse et, par conséquent, en réduisant ses possibilités de suspendre ses cotisations. Le litige était de nature contradictoire. Le comité n'intentait le recours pour le compte de tous les bénéficiaires. Le comité ne présentait sa réclamation que pour les participants de la partie 1.

LeBel, J. (dissident en partie) (Fish, J., souscrivant à son opinion) : Le pourvoi devrait être accueilli en partie, la décision du tribunal sur les suspensions de cotisation annulée et le surintendant devrait être enjoint de refuser d'enregistrer des modifications visant à permettre à l'employeur de faire usage des surplus de la caisse. Les modifications apportées au régime visant à autoriser ces paiements n'étaient pas permises par la loi et violaient les dispositions relatives au bénéfice exclusif prévues dans les documents du régime ainsi que les principes applicables en matière de droit des fiducies. La conclusion du tribunal qu'une désignation rétroactive des participants au régime à cotisations déterminées à titre de bénéficiaires de la fiducie permettrait de corriger ces déficiences était déraisonnable et la Cour d'appel a commis une erreur en confirmant la conclusion du Tribunal sur ce point.

Cases considered by Rothstein J.:

Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 179 O.A.C. 196, 38 C.C.P.B. 1, 2003 CarswellOnt 4879 (Ont. C.A.) -- considered

Barclays Bank Plc v. Holmes (2000), [2000] Pens. L.R. 339, [2001] O.P.L.R. 37 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Bentall Corp. v. Canada Trust Co. (1996), 13 C.C.P.B. 77, 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181, 1996 CarswellBC 1797, 15 E.T.R. (2d) 274, [1997] 4 W.W.R. 414 (B.C. S.C.) -- referred to

Buckton, Re (1907), [1907] 2 Ch. 406 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2008), 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8313, 71 C.C.P.B. 21, 241 O.A.C. 245, 2008 ONCA 690, 2008 CarswellOnt 5954, 299 D.L.R. (4th) 277 (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. (2004), 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8090, 24 B.C.L.R. (4th) 85, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 18, 6 E.T.R. (3d) 236, 2004 BCCA 80, 2004 CarswellBC 325, 193 B.C.A.C. 258, 316 W.A.C. 258, [2004] 5 W.W.R. 10, 39 C.C.P.B. 247 (B.C. C.A.) -- considered

Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. (2006), 2006 SCC 28, 2006 CarswellBC 1530, 2006 CarswellBC 1531, 54 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2006] 8 W.W.R. 583, 349 N.R. 324, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973, 226 B.C.A.C. 25, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 26 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 373 W.A.C. 25, 52 C.C.P.B. 161 (S.C.C.) -- distinguished

C.A.S.A.W., Local 1 v. Alcan Smelters & Chemicals Ltd. (2001), 2001 CarswellBC 887, 2001 BCCA 303, 198 D.L.R. (4th) 504, 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 29, (sub nom. Canadian Assn. of Smelter & Allied Workers, Local 1 v. Alcan Smelters & Chemicals Ltd.) 152 B.C.A.C. 117, (sub nom. Canadian Assn. of Smelter & Allied Workers, Local 1 v. Alcan Smelters & Chemicals Ltd.) 250 W.A.C. 117, 27 C.C.P.B. 209 (B.C. C.A.) -- referred to

C.U.P.E., Local 1000 v. Ontario Hydro (1989), (sub nom. C.U.P.E. - C.L.C., Local 1000 v. Ontario Hydro) 58 D.L.R. (4th) 552, 26 C.C.E.L. 67, (sub nom. C.U.P.E. - C.L.C., Local 1000 v. Ontario Hydro) 68 O.R. (2d) 620, 1989 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8078, (sub nom. C.U.P.E. - C.L.C., Ontario Hydro Employees Union, Local 1000 v. Ontario Hydro) 33 O.A.C. 63, 1989 CarswellOnt 754 (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Châteauneuf c. TSCO of Canada Ltd. (1995), 1995 CarswellQue 277, 6 C.C.P.B. 1, 68 Q.A.C. 1, (sub nom. TSCO of Canada Ltd. c. Châteauneuf) [1995] R.J.Q. 637, 124 D.L.R. (4th) 308, (sub nom. TSCO of Canada Ltd. c. Châteauneuf) 1995 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8218 (headnote only) (Que. C.A.) -- referred to

GenCorp Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 497, 114 O.A.C. 170, 1998 CarswellOnt 1036, 39 O.R. (3d) 38, 37 C.C.E.L. (2d) 69, 17 C.C.P.B. 268, 1998 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8336 (headnote only) (Ont. C.A.) -- considered

Hockin v. Bank of British Columbia (1995), 10 C.C.E.L. (2d) 157, 7 C.C.P.B. 197, 1995 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8209, 123 D.L.R. (4th) 538, 57 B.C.A.C. 255, 94 W.A.C. 255, 1995 CarswellBC 45, 3 B.C.L.R. (3d) 193 (B.C. C.A.) -- considered

Huang v. Telus Corp. Pension Plan (Trustees of) (2005), 2005 CarswellAlta 93, 41 Alta. L.R. (4th) 107, (sub nom. Huang v. Drinkwater) 372 A.R. 336, [2005] 9 W.W.R. 51, 2005 ABQB 40, 44 C.C.P.B. 100, 13 E.T.R. (3d) 233, 2005 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8147 (Alta. Q.B.) -- referred to

Kemble v. Hicks (No.2) (1999), [1999] O.P.L.R. 1, [1999] Pens. L.R. 287 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 8900, 2004 CarswellOnt 8901 (F.S. Trib.) -- referred to

Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2007), 282 D.L.R. (4th) 625, 62 C.C.P.B. 34, (sub nom. Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee) 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8259, 2007 CarswellOnt 5511, 2007 ONCA 605, 35 E.T.R. (3d) 18, (sub nom. Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ont.)) 229 O.A.C. 82 (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Lennon v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2007), 63 C.C.P.B. 245, 2007 CarswellOnt 7071, 231 O.A.C. 83, 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8268, 87 O.R. (3d) 736 (Ont. Div. Ct.) -- considered

Lockheed Corp. v. Spink (1986), 116 S.Ct. 1783, 64 U.S.L.W. 4430, 517 U.S. 882, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) -- considered

MacKinnon v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board) (2007), 62 C.C.E.L. (3d) 191, 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8274, 88 O.R. (3d) 269, 64 C.C.P.B. 1, 232 O.A.C. 3, 2007 CarswellOnt 8041, 2007 ONCA 874, 288 D.L.R. (4th) 688, 42 B.L.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Metropolitan Toronto Pension Plan (Trustees of) v. Toronto (City) (2003), 168 O.A.C. 19, 34 M.P.L.R. (3d) 249, 48 E.T.R. (2d) 243, 2003 CarswellOnt 253, 2003 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8499 (note), (sub nom. Markle v. Toronto (City)) 223 D.L.R. (4th) 459, (sub nom. Markle v. Toronto (City)) 63 O.R. (3d) 321, 34 C.C.P.B. 70 (Ont. C.A.) -- distinguished

Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 45 B.L.R. (3d) 161, 41 C.C.P.B. 106, 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8112, 242 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 324 N.R. 259, 189 O.A.C. 201, 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152, 75 O.R. (3d) 479 (note), 2004 CarswellOnt 3172, 2004 CarswellOnt 3173, 2004 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) -- followed

National Grid Co. Plc v. Mayes (2001), [2001] UKHL 20, [2001] 2 All E.R. 417 (U.K. H.L.) -- considered

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65 (S.C.C.) -- followed

Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2003), 37 R.F.L. (5th) 420, 169 O.A.C. 101, 2003 CarswellOnt 659, 36 C.C.P.B. 154 (Ont. Div. Ct.) -- referred to

Patrick v. Telus Communications Inc. (2005), 2005 BCCA 592, 2005 CarswellBC 2882, 49 C.C.P.B. 297, 49 B.C.L.R. (4th) 74, 219 B.C.A.C. 179, 361 W.A.C. 179, 2005 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8176 (B.C. C.A.) -- referred to

Patrick v. Telus Communications Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellBC 1219, 2008 BCCA 246, [2008] 8 W.W.R.

579, 55 C.P.C. (6th) 209, 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8301, 431 W.A.C. 277, 256 B.C.A.C. 277, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 506, 69 C.C.P.B. 166, 82 B.C.L.R. (4th) 297 (B.C. C.A.) -- considered

Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. (1994), (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 155 A.R. 81, (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 73 W.A.C. 81, 1994 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8173, 1994 CarswellAlta 138, [1995] O.P.L.R. 283, 1994 CarswellAlta 746, 3 C.C.P.B. 1, 20 Alta. L.R. (3d) 225, (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 168 N.R. 81, [1994] 8 W.W.R. 305, 3 E.T.R. (2d) 1, 4 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 611, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 631 (S.C.C.) -- considered

Smith v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc. (2008), 2008 CarswellNS 629, 2008 NSCA 107, 867 A.P.R. 274, 271 N.S.R. (2d) 274, 71 C.C.P.B. 161, 2008 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8319, 44 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 303 D.L.R. (4th) 486 (N.S. C.A.) -- considered

Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2006), 53 C.C.P.B. 154, 2006 CarswellOnt 3095, 24 E.T.R. (3d) 253 (Ont. S.C.J.) -- considered

Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 64, 2007 CarswellOnt 4866, 61 C.C.P.B. 171, 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8254 (Ont. S.C.J.) -- considered

Trent University v. T.U.F.A. (1997), (sub nom. Trent University Faculty Assn. v. Trent University) 35 O.R. (3d) 375, (sub nom. Trent University Faculty Assn. v. Trent University) 102 O.A.C. 346, 1997 CarswellOnt 2899, 4 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Trent University Faculty Assn. v. Trent University) 150 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 15 C.C.P.B. 202, (sub nom. Trent University Faculty Association v. Trent University) 1997 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8322 (headnote only) (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Turner v. Andrews (2001), [2001] 3 W.W.R. 620, 26 C.C.P.B. 313, 38 E.T.R. (2d) 126, 2001 CarswellBC 224, 2001 BCCA 76, 2001 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8424 (note), 85 B.C.L.R. (3d) 53, 147 B.C.A.C. 305, 241 W.A.C. 305, (sub nom. Turner v. Telecommunication Workers Pension Plan) 197 D.L.R. (4th) 533 (B.C. C.A.) -- considered

White v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) Pension Committee (2007), 2007 NSCA 22, 2007 CarswellNS 68, 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8234, 252 N.S.R. (2d) 39, 804 A.P.R. 39, 59 C.C.P.B. 1 (N.S. C.A.) -- considered

Cases considered by *LeBel J.*:

Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 2003 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8492, 48 E.T.R. (2d) 170, 2003 CarswellOnt 268, 34 C.C.P.B. 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) -- considered

Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc. (2003), 179 O.A.C. 196, 38 C.C.P.B. 1, 2003 CarswellOnt 4879 (Ont. C.A.) -- considered

Barclays Bank Plc v. Holmes (2000), [2000] Pens. L.R. 339, [2001] O.P.L.R. 37 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society (1992), 44 C.C.E.L. 1, 11 O.R. (3d) 449, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 326, 1992 CarswellOnt 960, 1992 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8140 (Ont. Gen. Div.) -- considered

Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society (1994), 1994 CarswellOnt 643, 16 O.R. (3d) 761, 1 C.C.P.B. 209, 69 O.A.C. 269, 2 C.C.E.L. (2d) 94, 110 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 2 E.T.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) -- referred to

Baxter v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 43 C.C.P.B. 1, 192 O.A.C. 293, 2004 CarswellOnt 5062, 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8133 (Ont. Div. Ct.) -- considered

Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. (2001), 10 B.L.R. (3d) 13, 36 E.T.R. (2d) 10, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 257, 2001 BCCA 16, 2001 CarswellBC 40, 2001 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8378 (note), [2001] 3 W.W.R. 56, 83 B.C.L.R. (3d) 261, 26 C.C.P.B. 47, 148 B.C.A.C. 263, 243 W.A.C. 263 (B.C. C.A.) -- considered

Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc. (2006), 2006 SCC 28, 2006 CarswellBC 1530, 2006 CarswellBC 1531, 54 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2006] 8 W.W.R. 583, 349 N.R. 324, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973, 226 B.C.A.C. 25, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 26 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 373 W.A.C. 25, 52 C.C.P.B. 161 (S.C.C.) -- considered

Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. (1990), [1990] 1 W.L.R. 589, [1991] 2 All E.R. 597 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Kemble v. Hicks (No.2) (1999), [1999] O.P.L.R. 1, [1999] Pens. L.R. 287 (Eng. Ch. Div.) -- considered

Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2008), [2008] 1 S.C.R. xi (note), 2008 CarswellOnt 423, 2008 CarswellOnt 424, (sub nom. Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ont.)) 385 N.R. 380 (note) (S.C.C.) -- referred to

Lennon v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2007), 63 C.C.P.B. 245, 2007 CarswellOnt 7071, 231 O.A.C. 83, 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8268, 87 O.R. (3d) 736 (Ont. Div. Ct.) -- considered

New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 372 N.R. 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, D.T.E. 2008T-223, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, 2008 SCC 9, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65 (S.C.C.) -- followed

Police Retirees of Ontario Inc. v. Ontario (Municipal Employees' Retirement Board) (1999), 22 C.C.P.B. 49, 107 O.T.C. 321, 1999 CarswellOnt 3167 (Ont. S.C.J.) -- considered

Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. (1994), (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 155 A.R. 81, (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 73 W.A.C. 81, 1994 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8173, 1994 CarswellAlta 138, [1995] O.P.L.R. 283, 1994 CarswellAlta 746, 3 C.C.P.B. 1, 20 Alta. L.R. (3d) 225, (sub nom. Stearns Catalytic Pension Plans, Re) 168 N.R. 81, [1994] 8 W.W.R. 305, 3 E.T.R. (2d) 1, 4 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 611, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 631 (S.C.C.) -- followed

Sulpetro Ltd. Retirement Plan Fund (Trustee of) v. Sulpetro Ltd. (Receiver of) (1990), 1990 CarswellAlta 37, 104 A.R. 215, 66 D.L.R. (4th) 271, [1990] 4 W.W.R. 173, 36 E.T.R. 299, 73 Alta. L.R. (2d) 44 (Alta. C.A.) -- considered

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Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co. (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 64, 2007 CarswellOnt 4866, 61 C.C.P.B. 171, 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8254 (Ont. S.C.J.) -- considered

Statutes considered by *Rothstein J.*:

Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 28

Generally -- referred to

s. 24 -- considered

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally -- referred to

s. 13(2) -- referred to

s. 87(1) -- considered

s. 87(2) -- considered

s. 89(9) -- considered

Trustee Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23

s. 6(b) -- considered

s. 27(3) -- considered

Statutes considered by *LeBel J.*:

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

Generally -- referred to

s. 13(2) -- considered

s. 19 -- referred to

s. 34 -- considered

s. 81(1) -- considered

s. 81(2) -- considered

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Rules considered by Rothstein J.:

Rules of Court, 1990, B.C. Reg. 221/90

Generally -- referred to

Regulations considered by Rothstein J.:

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909

s. 7(3) -- considered

s. 9 -- referred to

Regulations considered by LeBel J.:

Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8

General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909

Generally -- referred to

s. 3 -- referred to

s. 7(3) -- considered

s. 9 -- considered

s. 13 -- referred to

s. 14 -- referred to

APPEAL by pension plan committee from judgment reported at *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2007), (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8249, 60 C.C.P.B. 67, (sub nom. *DCA Employees Pension Committee v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 282 D.L.R. (4th) 227, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ont.)*) 225 O.A.C. 163, (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 86 O.R. (3d) 1, 2007 CarswellOnt 3493, 2007 ONCA 416, 32 E.T.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), holding that employer was entitled to take contribution holidays in respect of pension plan members.

POURVOI par le comité de retraite à l'encontre d'un jugement publié à *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2007), (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 2007 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8249, 60 C.C.P.B. 67, (sub nom. *DCA Employees Pension Committee v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*) 282 D.L.R. (4th) 227, (sub nom. *Nolan v. Superintendent of Financial Services (Ont.)*) 225

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O.A.C. 163, (sub nom. *Kerry (Canada) Inc. v. DCA Employees Pension Committee*) 86 O.R. (3d) 1, 2007 CarswellOnt 3493, 2007 ONCA 416, 32 E.T.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), ayant conclu que l'employeur avait le droit de s'accorder des périodes d'exonération de contribution relativement aux participants du régime de retraite.

Rothstein J.:

I. Introduction

1 This appeal raises issues related to the obligations of an employer under a pension plan for its employees. In particular, the appeal concerns (1) whether the employer was responsible for paying plan expenses or whether such expenses were properly payable from the pension trust fund; (2) whether the employer could use actuarially determined surplus pension funds to satisfy its contribution obligations in respect of both defined benefit ("DB") and defined contribution ("DC") components of the pension plan. In addition, the appeal raises two issues with respect to costs: first, whether the Financial Services Tribunal (the "Tribunal") had the authority to award costs to the appellants out of the pension trust fund; second, when on judicial review of a pension decision, a court should exercise its discretion to award costs out of the pension trust fund.

2 The Ontario Court of Appeal found in favour of the respondents on all issues before this Court (2007 ONCA 416, 282 D.L.R. (4th) 227 (Ont. C.A.), and 2007 ONCA 605, 282 D.L.R. (4th) 625 (Ont. C.A.)). I am in agreement and I would dismiss this appeal.

II. Facts

3 The respondent employer (the "Company") is presently named Kerry (Canada) Inc.; its predecessors include DCA Canada Inc. It has administered a pension plan (the "Plan") for its employees since 1954. The terms of the Plan were set out in a pension plan text dated December 31, 1954. The Plan text required contributions from both the employees and the Company. A predecessor of the Company and the National Trust Company Limited entered into a separate trust agreement, also dated December 31, 1954. Contributions were paid into a trust (the "Trust") created under the trust agreement and held in a trust fund (the "Trust Fund" or the "Fund").

4 The Plan has about 80 members. By 2001, the Fund had been in an actuarially determined surplus position for a number of years.

5 The Plan text and the Trust Agreement have been amended a number of times. Until 1984, the Company paid the Plan expenses directly. In 1985, following amendments to the Plan documents, third-party Plan expenses for actuarial, investment management and audit services were paid from the Fund. Between 1985 and 2002, approximately \$850,000 was paid from the Fund to cover these expenses.

6 As of 1985, the Company also started taking contribution holidays from its funding obligations, that by 2001 were worth approximately \$1.5 million.

7 Prior to 2000, the Plan existed solely as a DB pension plan. In 2000, the Plan text was amended again in order to introduce a DC component. The DB pension component continued for existing employees, but was closed to new employees; thereafter, all newly hired employees would join the DC component. Employees who were DB members had the option of converting to the DC component. As a result of these amendments, employees were divided into Part 1 Members, who participated in the Plan's DB provisions and Part 2 members who, after January 1, 2000, participated in the DC part of the Plan. The Trust Fund was constituted in two separate funding vehicles with two separate trustees. The Company announced its intention to take contribution holidays from its obligations to DC mem-

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bers by using the surplus accumulated in the Fund from the DB component, which still covered DB members, to satisfy the premiums owing to the DC component.

8 The appellants are members of the DCA Employees Pension Committee and former employees of the Company who participated in the Plan (the "Committee"). The Committee was created by employees of the Company and is distinct from the Retirement Committee created under the Plan documents. After the Company introduced the 2000 amendments, the Committee asked the Superintendent of Financial Services (the "Superintendent"), the other respondent in this case, to make a number of orders under the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 (the "PBA"), relating to the payment of Plan expenses from the Fund and the Company's contribution holidays.

9 The Superintendent issued two Notices of Proposal. Under the first Notice of Proposal, the Superintendent proposed to order that the Company reimburse the Fund for expenses that had not been incurred for the exclusive benefit of Plan members. Under the second, the Superintendent proposed to refuse, among other things, to order the Company to reimburse the Fund for the contribution holidays it had taken. The Company requested a hearing before the Tribunal to challenge the Notice of Proposal regarding expenses. The Committee challenged the second Notice of Proposal concerning contribution holidays before the Tribunal. The Superintendent was a party to both hearings.

10 On the issues relevant in this appeal, the Tribunal generally ruled in favour of the Company. At the first hearing, it held that all of the Plan expenses at issue could be paid from the Fund except for \$6,455 in consulting fees related to the introduction of the DC part of the Plan ((F.S. Trib.)).

11 In the second hearing, the Tribunal held that the Company was entitled to take contribution holidays while the Fund was in a surplus position ((F.S. Trib.)). The Tribunal did recognize that the Plan documents as amended in 2000 did not permit DC contribution holidays. However, it held that the Company could retroactively amend the Plan provisions to designate the DC members as beneficiaries of the Trust Fund, thereby allowing the Company to fund its DC contributions from the DB surplus.

12 The Tribunal also refused to award costs ((F.S. Trib.) and (F.S. Trib.)). With respect to costs in the second hearing, a majority of the Tribunal held it did not have the authority to order costs from the Fund and that regardless it did not think a costs award against either party was justified.

13 The Committee appealed these decisions to the Divisional Court.

III. Lower Court Rulings

14 The Divisional Court ruled that the payment of Plan expenses out of the Trust Fund constituted a partial revocation of the Trust, noting that this Court's decision in *Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd.*, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 611 (S.C.C.), forbids revoking a trust unless a specific power to do so was reserved at the time the trust was constituted. The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's ruling that DB contribution holidays were permitted as nothing in the Plan texts precluded them.

15 However, it ruled that the surplus in the Fund accumulated under the DB arrangement could not be used to fund the employer's contribution obligations to the DC arrangement. It ruled that the 2000 Plan text created two separate funds -- one for the DB arrangement and one for the DC arrangement. It concluded that there were "in law" two plans and two pension funds, which could not be joined.

16 The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal was correct that it did not have jurisdiction to award costs out of the Fund ((2006), 209 O.A.C. 21 (Ont. Div. Ct.)). However, it held that the court could award costs from the Fund. It

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ordered the Company to pay the Committee's costs on a partial indemnity basis ((2006), 213 O.A.C. 271 (Ont. Div. Ct.)). It also ordered that the difference between these costs and the Committee's solicitor-client costs be paid to them out of the Fund.

17 Gillese J.A., writing for a unanimous Ontario Court of Appeal, allowed the Company's appeal, dismissed the Committee's cross-appeal and upheld the Tribunal's rulings on the issues before this Court.

IV. Issues

1. Did the Tribunal err in concluding that the Company did not have the obligation to pay the expenses at issue?
2. Did the Tribunal err in concluding that the Company was entitled to take contribution holidays with respect to the DB arrangement?
3. Did the Tribunal err in concluding that the Company was entitled to take contribution holidays with respect to the DC arrangement?
- 4a. Did the Tribunal err in holding that it could not award costs from a pension trust fund?
- 4b. Did the Court of Appeal err in declining to award costs to the Committee from the Trust Fund?

18 An issue surrounding the notice given by the Company in relation to its 2000 amendments was raised before the Tribunal and the courts below. It was not argued before this Court.

V. Preliminary Matters

A) Pension Terminology

19 There are two main categories of pension plans. Defined Benefit plans ("DB" plans) guarantee the employees specific benefits on retirement. The employer is usually responsible to make contributions which ensure the plan's trust fund can cover the expected future benefits that it will pay out to retiring employees. Actuaries are generally retained to estimate the contributions needed. Should the actuary determine that the funds in the trust are greater than the amount needed to cover future benefits, the plan is said to be in surplus. If the legislation and plan documentation permits, the employer may take a contribution holiday, whereby the surplus funds are used to cover the employer's contribution obligations. Should the actuary determine that the trust has less money than is needed to cover future benefits, the plan is in deficit and the employer is required to make the necessary contributions to ensure the benefit obligations can be met.

20 In Defined Contribution plans ("DC" plans), the employer guarantees the amount of contribution it will make for each employee. The benefits on retirement are determined by these contributions and any earnings from their investment. Since no benefits are guaranteed, DC plans do not have surpluses or deficits.

21 A further distinction exists between terminating, winding up, and closing a pension plan. Termination and wind-up are part of the process of discontinuing a pension plan, whereby contributions cease being made, benefits

cease being paid out and assets are distributed. Generally earned employee benefits are paid into a new retirement vehicle for the employees: see Ari N. Kaplan, *Pension Law* (2006), at pp. 502 ff. and Susan G. Seller, *Ontario Pension Law Handbook* (2nd ed. 2006), at pp. 61 ff. Closing a plan's membership, by contrast, does not imply discontinuing it or liquidating its assets. A closed plan will continue to pay benefits to its members and may continue to require contributions. However, it will no longer accept new members.

B) Standard of Review

22 On the issues before this Court, the Divisional Court reviewed the Tribunal's decision on a correctness standard. The Court of Appeal reviewed the issues of Plan expenses, DB contribution holidays and DC contribution holidays on a reasonableness standard, though it would have upheld the Tribunal's rulings on a correctness review as well. It reviewed the issue of the Tribunal's authority to award costs from the Fund on a correctness standard.

23 Since the Court of Appeal released its decision in this case, this Court has revisited the analytical framework for determining standard of review in *New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir*, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.). That decision established a two-step process for determining the applicable standard of review (para. 62).

24 Under the first step of the process, the court must "ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question" (para. 62). In *Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*, 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 (S.C.C.), this Court applied a standard of correctness to the Tribunal's ruling involving the interpretation of the PBA. This case does not involve the interpretation of the PBA. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the second step of the *Dunsmuir* process.

25 The second step involves applying the "standard of review analysis", which Bastarache and LeBel JJ. explained this way in *Dunsmuir*, at para. 64:

The analysis must be contextual. As mentioned above, it is dependent on the application of a number of relevant factors, including: (1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal. In many cases, it will not be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a specific case.

26 In this case, there is no privative clause.

27 Under the PBA, the purpose of the Tribunal is to review decisions of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions in the context of the regulation of the pension sector. Where it is of the opinion that the PBA is not being followed, the Superintendent "may require an administrator or any other person to take or to refrain from taking any action in respect of a pension plan or a pension fund" (s. 87(1) and (2)). The PBA provides a right of appeal to the Tribunal for many of these orders at the proposal stage. At s. 89(9), it grants the Tribunal the power to

direct the Superintendent to carry out or to refrain from carrying out the proposal and to take such action as the Tribunal considers the Superintendent ought to take in accordance with this Act and the regulations, and for such purposes, the Tribunal may substitute its opinion for that of the Superintendent.

The Tribunal, therefore, serves an adjudicative function within Ontario's pension regulation scheme.

28 The purpose of the PBA was explained at para. 13 of *Monsanto Canada Inc.*, citing *GenCorp Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)* (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 497 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 16:

[T]he *Pension Benefits Act* is clearly public policy legislation establishing a carefully calibrated legislative and regulatory scheme prescribing minimum standards for all pension plans in Ontario. It is intended to benefit and protect the interests of members and former members of pension plans, and "evinces a special solicitude for employees affected by plant closures".

In *Monsanto Canada Inc.*, Deschamps J. noted that this objective of protecting employees is balanced against the fact that pension legislation is a complex administrative scheme in which the regulator has a certain advantage because it is closer to the industry (para. 14). The Tribunal plays a role in the administration of this complex scheme when reviewing decisions of the Superintendent taken under the PBA.

29 The questions at issue in this appeal are largely questions of law, in that they involve the interpretation of pension plans and related texts, as noted above. However, the Tribunal does have expertise in the interpretation of such texts, being both close to the industry and more familiar with the administrative scheme of pension law.

30 Having regard to the purpose of the Tribunal, the nature of the questions and the expertise of the Tribunal, the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness for the issues of Plan expenses, DB contribution holidays and DC contribution holidays.

31 The issue of the Tribunal's authority to order costs from the Fund requires the interpretation of the Tribunal's enabling statute, the *Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997*, S.O. 1997, c. 28. As noted in *Dunsmuir*, at para. 54, "[d]eference will usually result where a tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to its function, with which it will have particular familiarity."

32 On the other hand, para. 59 of *Dunsmuir* states that "administrative bodies must also be correct in their determinations of true questions of jurisdiction or vires". However, para. 59 goes on to note that it is important "to take a robust view of jurisdiction" and that true questions of jurisdiction "will be narrow".

33 Administrative tribunals are creatures of statute and questions that arise over a tribunal's authority that engage the interpretation of a tribunal's constating statute might in one sense be characterized as jurisdictional. However, the admonition of para. 59 of *Dunsmuir* is that courts should be cautious in doing so for fear of returning "to the jurisdiction/preliminary question doctrine that plagued the jurisprudence in this area for many years".

34 The inference to be drawn from paras. 54 and 59 of *Dunsmuir* is that courts should usually defer when the tribunal is interpreting its own statute and will only exceptionally apply a correctness of standard when interpretation of that statute raises a broad question of the tribunal's authority.

35 Here there is no question that the Tribunal has the statutory authority to enquire into the matter of costs; the issue involves the Tribunal interpreting its constating statute to determine the parameters of the costs order it may make. The question of costs is one that is incidental to the broad power of the Tribunal to review decisions of the Superintendent in the context of the regulation of pensions. It is one over which the Court should adopt a deferential standard of review to the Tribunal's decision.

36 I have arrived at the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal with respect to the standard of review that is ap-

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plicable to the issues before this Court except on the issue of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to award costs from the Fund. As mentioned above, Gillese J.A. also found that the Tribunal's decisions on these issues withstood a correctness review. She came to this conclusion through an analysis that was more detailed than is necessary for a review on a standard of reasonableness. However, her analysis is cogent and proves that the Tribunal's decisions would clearly satisfy a review on a reasonableness standard. These reasons adopt large portions of her analysis.

VI. Issue 1 -- Plan Expenses

A) Background

37 Since 1985, Plan expenses had been paid from the Fund, rather than by the Company. These include expenses relating to accounting, actuarial, investment and trustee services. In 1994, the Company accepted that it was responsible for certain trustee fees and administrative expenses. As a result, it reimbursed approximately \$235,000 to the Fund. The remaining expenses, totalling approximately \$850,000 through 2002 remain in dispute.

38 The Tribunal ruled that expenses were payable from the Trust Fund, with the exception of \$6,455 in consulting fees relating to a study of the possibility of introducing a DC component to the Plan ((F.S. Trib.), at para. 38). The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision was incorrect. The expenses could not be paid out of the Trust Fund as they were not for the exclusive benefit of the employees. Moreover, the Divisional Court ruled that the paying of expenses out of the Fund constituted a partial revocation of the Trust.

39 Gillese J.A. approached the question of the responsibility for payment of Plan expenses by looking first to the PBA, as amended, and then to the common law to determine whether any statutory provisions or common law rules place such an obligation on the employer. She found nothing in the PBA or the common law that would impose such a requirement on the employer. She then focussed on the Plan documents and found nothing in them that would require the employer to pay Plan expenses.

40 I am in substantial agreement with her analysis and conclusion. The Committee cites no statutory or common law authority that would oblige an employer to pay the expenses of a pension plan. Rather, the obligations of the employer will be determined by the text and context of the Plan documents.

B) Textual Analysis

41 The Committee's position is that because the original Plan documents did not expressly permit Plan expenses to be paid from the Trust Fund, expenses must be paid by the employer. It argues that paying Plan expenses from the Fund would not be for the exclusive benefit of the employees and would partially revoke the Trust.

42 The Company replies that the Plan documents do not create an express obligation for the employer to pay Plan expenses. This is because the documents do not address the Plan expenses at issue in this appeal.

43 The Committee rightly insists that it is necessary to consider the context in which the Plan documents deal with the obligation to pay expenses to determine whether by necessary implication the Company undertook to pay Plan expenses.

44 Sections 5 and 19 of the 1958 Trust Agreement provide that the employer undertook to pay Trustee fees and Trustee expenses.

5. The expenses incurred by the Trustee in the performance of its duties, including fees for expert assistants employed by the Trustee with the consent of the Company and fees of legal counsel, and such compensation to the Trustee as may be agreed upon in writing from time to time between the Company and the Trustee, and all other proper charges and disbursements of the Trustee shall be paid by the Company, and until paid shall constitute a charge upon the Fund.

.....

19. The Trustee shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the Schedule of Fees on pension and profit-sharing trusts of National Trust Company, Limited now in effect, which compensation may be adjusted from time to time based upon experience hereunder, as and when agreeable to the Company and the Trustee. Compensation payable to any successor trustee shall be agreed to by the Company and such successor trustee at the time of its designation. Such compensation shall constitute a charge upon the Fund unless it shall be paid by the Company. The Company expressly agrees to pay all expenses incurred by it or by any Trustee in the execution of this Trust and to pay all compensation which may become due to any Trustee under the provisions of this Agreement.

[Emphasis added.]

As between the Company and Trustee, these provisions only cover expenses incurred "in the performance of [the Trustee's] duties" and "in the execution of this Trust". They do not refer to expenses otherwise incurred in the administration of the Plan. As Gillese J.A. correctly pointed out, silence does not create an obligation on the employer to pay Plan expenses.

45 The Committee argues that "in the execution of this Trust" means operating a pension plan. They point to this Court's decision in *Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc.*, 2006 SCC 28, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.), in which Deschamps J. wrote, at para. 2: "[A] pension trust is not a stand-alone instrument. The Trust is explicitly made part of the Plan."

46 The Trust is indeed part of the Plan, but it is not all of the Plan; rather, it plays a role in the working of the Plan. The two are distinguished in the Plan documents.

47 The 1954 Plan text defined the Trust Fund as the "Retirement Trust Fund established, under the terms of the Retirement Plan and the undermentioned Trust Agreement, for the accumulation of contributions as herein described and for the payment of certain benefits to Members" (s. 1). It defined the "Trustee" as the company appointed to administer the Fund (s. 1). The Trustee is responsible for the administration of the Fund from which benefits are paid in accordance with the terms of the Plan. The preamble to the 1954 Trust Agreement also makes clear that the Trust exists as a part of the Plan for the purpose of holding funds irrevocably contributed for the payment of benefits. The Trust is therefore an element of the Plan that holds the contributions and from which the benefits are paid out. The Plan itself is a broader document which sets out such things as eligibility criteria, contribution requirements, the form of benefits and what happens upon termination.

48 Sections 5 and 19 of the 1958 Trust Agreement make clear that they apply to expenses incurred in the execution of the Trust. They do not, therefore, refer to the administration of the Plan outside the execution of the Trust.

49 As Gillese J.A. explained, at para. 59, a properly administered pension plan requires other services than those of the trustee, such as actuarial, accounting and investment services. In this case, the responsibility for such services rested not with the trustee, but with the "Retirement Committee", as part of its responsibility for the administration

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of the Plan. Section 4 of the original Plan text provides:

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PLAN

The Plan shall be administered by a Retirement Committee consisting of at least three members appointed by the Company.

.....

The Committee shall have the right and power, among other rights and powers,

.....

(c) to employ or appoint Actuaries, Accountants, Counsel (who may be Counsel for the Company) and such other services as it may require from time to time in the administration of the Plan.

50 Obviously, there are expenses associated with the employment of actuaries, accountants, counsel and other services required for the administration of the Plan. These are expenses of the Plan, but they are not fees and expenses incurred in the execution of the Trust. I think it is a fair inference that where the employer undertook to pay amounts associated with the Plan, its obligations were expressly stated. The expenses it undertook to pay were those incurred in the execution of the Trust and not others.

51 The Committee says that because the 1958 amendments to the Trust Agreement provided that taxes, interest and penalties were to be paid from the Fund, by implication all other expenses are the responsibility of the employer. However, s. 11 of the 1958 amendments also provided that:

11. This Agreement may be amended in whole or in part or be terminated any time and from time to time by an instrument in writing executed by the Company and the then Trustee; provided however that unless approved by the Minister of National Revenue no such amendment shall authorize or permit any part of the Fund to be used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of such employees, or their beneficiaries or personal representatives as from time to time may be included under the Plan, and for the payment of taxes assessments or other charges as provided in Section 5 and Section 19 herein, provided, it being understood that this proviso is not to be construed to enlarge the obligations of the Company beyond those assumed by it under the Plan.

[Emphasis added.]

The last part of this section specifies that the amendments do not increase the employer's original obligations with respect to the expenses for which it was responsible. The original documentation was silent as to the obligation to pay Plan expenses other than those associated with the Trust. The 1958 amendments could not impose any additional obligations on the Company because s. 11 expressly provided that the Trust Agreement was not to be construed as enlarging the Company's obligations.

C) "Exclusive Benefit"

52 Nor could the language in s. 11 forbidding trust funds from being used for any purpose other than the exclusive benefit of the employees impose an obligation on the Company to pay the Plan expenses. The "exclusive benefit"

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language in s. 11 is subject to the limitation that it will not enlarge the Company's obligations. While it is true that the employer did pay the expenses at issue for a number of years, it was never under any obligation to do so. In light of there being no obligation on the Company and of the expenses at issue being essential to the administration of the Plan, subsequent amendments allowing the expenses to be paid out of the Trust Fund do not infringe the exclusive benefit language.

53 Nor can the term "exclusive benefit" be construed to mean that no one but the employees can benefit from a use of the trust funds. Many persons will benefit indirectly from a use of pension funds. Notably, the employee's family would benefit from the employee's long-term financial security.

54 An employer might also benefit in a number of ways. The U.S. Supreme Court, in dealing with an employer's introduction of an early retirement plan, recognized that an employer can legitimately receive a number of incidental benefits from a pension plan even though the plan is subject to legislation containing exclusive benefit language. These incidental benefits include "attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred compensation, settling or avoiding strikes, providing increased compensation without increasing wages, increasing employee turnover, and reducing the likelihood of lawsuits by encouraging employees who would otherwise have been laid off to depart voluntarily": *Lockheed Corp. v. Spink*, 517 U.S. 882 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1986), at pp. 893-94. Such indirect or incidental benefits from the use of pension funds do not mean that the funds are being used for a purpose other than the exclusive benefit of the trust beneficiaries.

55 Here the existence of the Plan is a benefit to the employees. The payment of Plan expenses is necessary to ensure the Plan's continued integrity and existence. It is therefore to the exclusive benefit of the employees, within the meaning of s. 11, that expenses for the continued existence of the Plan are paid out of the Fund.

56 The Committee has sought to rely on *Hockin v. Bank of British Columbia* (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4th) 538 (B.C. C.A.). The British Columbia Court of Appeal was called upon to rule on the propriety of the employer charging expenses to the pension trust fund. The Court of Appeal wrote, at para. 59:

The bank not only charged the costs of its internal staff but also the costs of the actuaries involved in the plan conversion and the cost of producing the video and other publicity material designed to persuade the employees to participate in the new plan. These costs were, in our view, incurred by the bank rather more for its own benefit than for the benefit of the employees and were collateral to the purposes of the pension fund.

This conclusion is not unlike the Tribunal's conclusion in this case; the Tribunal held that consulting fees related to studying the possibility of adding a DC part to the Company's Pension Plan were not for the employees' exclusive benefit and could not be charged to the Plan. Rather than considering all the expenses at issue together and coming to a global judgement on whom they benefited more, the Tribunal in this case considered the various expenses separately and decided whether each one was for the benefit of the employees. Such an approach is eminently reasonable.

D) Partial Revocation and Markle

57 I reject the Committee's contention that allowing for the Plan expenses to be paid out of the Trust constitutes a partial revocation of the Trust.

58 This Court ruled in *Schmidt* that an employer cannot remove pension funds it has placed in a trust unless it expressly reserved the power of revocation at the time the trust was created. Cory J. wrote, at p. 643: "Generally,

however, the transfer of the trust property to the trustee is absolute. Any power of control of that property will be lost unless the transfer is expressly made subject to it."

59 Paying plan expenses out of the trust fund is not a matter of the settlor (the Company in this case) exercising a power of control on a part of the property it has transferred to the trust. So long as nothing in the plan texts requires the paying of expenses by the employer, funds in the pension trust can be used to pay reasonable and *bona fide* expenses. In the absence of an obligation on the employer to pay the plan expenses, to the extent that the funds are paying legitimate expenses necessary to the integrity and existence of the plan, the employer is not purporting to control the use of funds in the trust.

60 In this case, Plan expenses were incurred for services of third parties and not those of the employer. However, in my view whether the services are provided by third parties or the employer itself is immaterial as long as the expenses charged are reasonable and the services necessary. The Committee cited *Metropolitan Toronto Pension Plan (Trustees of) v. Toronto (City)* (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.) [*Markle*], in which the Ontario Court of Appeal disallowed the City of Toronto's attempt to charge its employee pension fund for expenses it incurred itself in providing services necessary to the administration of the pension plan. The by-law which set out the terms of the plan had previously made the City responsible for those expenses. The City attempted to amend these terms such that it would be entitled to recover the costs of administrative services it provided to the plan. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the City of Toronto's actions constituted a partial revocation of the trust.

61 *Markle*, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In *Markle*, the City had a previous obligation to pay plan expenses, which it attempted to amend both retroactively and prospectively. The retroactive amendment allowing the City to recover for expenses it had been required to pay before the amending legislation was passed was inconsistent with the terms of the trust, which required the City to pay plan expenses over the period that the amendment covered. The amendment sought to charge the trust for services already performed and for which the City was to bear the expense; it was not an amendment to reflect the true intention of the earlier plan text.

62 The prospective amendment would have required the trustees to pay from the trust fund expenses for services the City had previously agreed to cover. This was considered to fetter the discretion of the trustees, and in so doing, return control over funds in the plan trust fund to the City, thereby resulting in an impermissible partial revocation of the trust. The wording of previous amendments relating to expenses made them payable from the trust fund "subject to the approval of the Board of Trustees". By conferring control on the Board of Trustees, the City was not purporting to control use of trust funds or to fetter the trustee's discretion. Unlike the impugned amendments, these earlier amendments did not constitute a revocation of the trust.

63 The situation in the present case is different because the Trust Agreement had never imposed an obligation on the Company to pay Plan expenses. The Company did not purport to control the use of funds it had placed in trust by forcibly shifting its own obligation onto the Trust Fund.

64 Each case will turn on its own facts and the terms of the plan and trust at issue. Unlike *Markle* where the employer attempted to cancel its own obligation to pay plan expenses by obliging the trustees to pay them from the fund, here there was no obligation to pay Plan expenses, nor any action that was inconsistent with the Company's power of amendment.

65 Where trust funds may be used for the payment of plan expenses for services required by the plan, the distinction between whether the services are provided by the settlor or a third party is artificial. The only consideration is whether funds can be used to pay expenses and the legitimacy and reasonableness of the costs incurred. To the extent that the expenses at issue are *bona fide* expenses necessary to the administration of the pension plan, it should

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not matter whether the expenses are owed to a third party or to the employer itself. There is no reason in principle why the employer should be obliged to contract out such services.

66 For these reasons, I would not disturb the findings of the Tribunal with respect to Plan expenses.

VII. Issue 2 -- DB Contribution Holidays

67 Since 1985, the employer has taken contribution holidays from its funding obligations to the employees covered by the DB part of the Plan. The Committee argues that the Plan forbids DB contribution holidays in this case because it provides a specific formula for calculating the Company's contributions. That is, the Company's contributions to the DB arrangement are not properly determined by the exercise of actuarial discretion.

68 In *Schmidt*, this Court held that "unless the terms of the plan specifically preclude it, an employer is entitled to take a contribution holiday" (p. 638). Cory J. explained the criteria for determining whether a plan permitted contribution holidays, at p. 653, where he wrote:

I can see no objection in principle to employers' taking contribution holidays when they are permitted to do so by the terms of the pension plan. When permission is not explicitly given in the plan, it may be implied from the wording of the employer's contribution obligation. Any provision which places the responsibility for the calculation of the amount needed to fund promised benefits in the hands of an actuary should be taken to incorporate accepted actuarial practice as to how that calculation will be made. That practice currently includes the application of calculated surplus funds to the determination of overall current service cost.

Cory J. went on to further clarify this point, at p. 656, writing:

An employer's right to take a contribution holiday must also be determined on a case-by-case basis. The right to take a contribution holiday can be excluded either explicitly or implicitly in circumstances where a plan mandates a formula for calculating employer contributions which removes actuarial discretion. Contribution holidays may also be permitted by the terms of the plan. When the plan is silent on the issue, the right to take a contribution holiday is not objectionable so long as actuaries continue to accept the application of existing surplus to current service costs as standard practice.... Because no money is withdrawn from the fund by the employer, the taking of a contribution holiday represents neither an encroachment upon the trust nor a reduction of accrued benefits.

[Emphasis added.]

69 When plan documents provide that funding requirements will be determined by actuarial practice, the employer may take a contribution holiday unless other wording or legislation prohibits it.

70 The Tribunal held that under the 1965 Plan amendments, DB contribution holidays are permitted. Section 14(b) of the Plan text was amended to read:

The Company shall contribute from time to time but not less frequently than annually such amounts as are not less than those certified by the Actuary as necessary to provide the retirement income accruing to Members during the current year pursuant to the Plan and to make provision for the proper amortization of any initial unfunded liability or experience deficiency with respect to benefits previously accrued as re-

quired by the Pension Benefits Act, after taking into account the assets of the Trust Fund, the contributions of Members during the year and such other factors as may be deemed relevant.

[Emphasis added.]

Contribution holidays are permitted under this clause, because the Company's contributions are determined by actuarial calculations. Nothing in the clause prevents the Company from taking a contribution holiday where the actuary certifies that no contributions are necessary to provide the required retirement income to members.

71 However, the Committee argues that the original 1954 Plan text prohibits contribution holidays and that subsequent amendments -- including the 1965 amendments cited above -- are invalid. The Tribunal disagreed. It noted that s. 22 of the 1954 Plan text granted the Company a broad power of amendment of the Plan, subject to the limitation that amendments to the Plan could not affect accrued rights of Plan members. Contribution holidays did not affect the benefits of Plan members under the Plan at the time of the 1965 amendment. As Cory J. wrote in *Schmidt*, at p. 654:

The entitlement of the trust beneficiaries is not affected by a contribution holiday. That entitlement is to receive the defined benefits provided in the pension plan from the trust and, depending upon the terms of the trust to receive a share of any surplus remaining upon termination of the plan.

The Tribunal held that the 1965 amendment was valid. Since the Company did not begin taking contribution holidays until 1985, the Tribunal held that it therefore did not need to examine whether contribution holidays were permitted in the 1954 Plan text.

72 Gillese J.A. did examine the 1954 Plan text provisions and concluded that they also allowed contribution holidays. I agree.

73 The text of the 1954 Plan addresses employer contributions at s. 14(b):

(b) Contributions by the Company

In addition to contributing the full cost of providing the Past Service retirement incomes referred to in Section 13 (a) of this Plan, the Company shall also contribute, in respect of Future Service benefits, such amounts as will provide, when added to the Member's own required contributions, the Future Service retirement incomes referred to in Section 13 (b) of the Plan.

74 In its factum, the Committee stressed the fact that s. 14(b) did not refer to an actuary (para. 92), though at the hearing the Committee's counsel conceded that the legitimacy of contribution holidays under the Plan did not turn on the use of the word "actuary". The Committee argues that s. 14(b) is analogous to clauses in previous cases which required specific annual contributions: *C.U.P.E., Local 1000 v. Ontario Hydro* (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) 620 (Ont. C.A.); *Trent University v. T.U.F.A.* (1997), 35 O.R. (3d) 375 (Ont. C.A.); *Hockin and Châteauneuf c. TSCO of Canada Ltd.* (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 308 (Que. C.A.). In those cases, they argue, requirements for annual contributions prevented the employer from taking contribution holidays.

75 However, nothing in s. 14(b) provides a formula that would eliminate actuarial discretion. The clause requires the Company to contribute "such amounts as will provide" for the employees' retirement incomes. Actuarial discretion is clearly called for, as the clause does not specify how these amounts will be determined -- nor does it preclude

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the amounts from being zero.

76 As noted by Gillese J.A., the cases cited by the Committee concerned clauses that provided for contributions that would cover the difference between employee contributions and the benefits accrued or paid out in a given year (para. 122). This can be calculated without the exercise of an actuary's discretion. Section 14(b) provides for contributions that will cover the members' future retirement benefits. It requires the exercise of actuarial discretion, as it does not fix annual contributions and therefore does not preclude contribution holidays.

77 Again, I would find that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable.

VIII. Issue 3 -- DC Contribution Holidays

A) Background

78 In 2000, the Company amended the Plan text in order to introduce a DC component. The amendment closed the DB component to new employees; new employees would thereafter become DC members on being hired. Existing employees who were DB members had the option of converting to the DC component. As a result of these amendments, employees were divided into Part 1 Members, who are governed by the Plan's DB provisions and Part 2 Members who, after January 1, 2000, are governed by the DC part of the Plan. The Plan was constituted in two separate funding vehicles with two separate custodians -- by January 2000, CIBC Mellon Trust held the original DB Fund; Standard Life Assurance Company held the DC funds. However, both parts of the Plan would be registered as a single plan (the Company's counsel acknowledged at the hearing that the Plan had yet to be registered).

79 The Company expressed its intention to take contribution holidays from its obligations to DC members, by using the surplus from the original DB component to satisfy the premiums owing to the DC component.

80 The Tribunal ruled that the 2000 amendments which purported to allow DC contribution holidays were contrary to s. 1 of the 1954 Trust Agreement, which provides:

No part of the corpus or income of the Fund shall ever revert to the Company or be used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of such persons or their beneficiaries or personal representatives as from time to time may be designated in the Plan except as therein provided.

The Tribunal reasoned:

Any holiday taken by the Company in respect of Part 2 contributions in this fashion can only be realized by actually moving money out of the Fund and transferring it to the insurer that is the funding agency for Part 2, for credit to the individual accounts of the Part 2 members. This action is inconsistent with section 1 of the 1954 Trust Agreement, recited above under the heading "FACTS" (section 1 of the 1958 Trust Agreement is in similar terms).

There are two ways in which this inconsistency could be resolved. The 2000 Plan could be amended to eliminate the authority of the Company to apply the surplus in the Fund to satisfy its contribution obligation in respect of Part 2 members or the Part 2 members could be made beneficiaries of the trust in respect of the Fund (in which case it would seem to follow that the insurance policy that is the funding vehicle for Part 2 should be held by the trustee). [paras. 32- 33]

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81 The Committee contests the permissibility of the retroactive amendment envisaged by the Tribunal. They question whether the Company could, as the Tribunal concluded, introduce a new DC pension component that was part of the same pension plan as the existing DB component and whose members were also beneficiaries of the same Trust Fund as the DB members.

82 It is on this point that LeBel J. and I join issue. While he acknowledges that s. 13(2) of the PBA permits retroactive amendments, he finds that the DB and DC arrangements constitute distinct plans and that the DB and DC members cannot be beneficiaries of the same trust.

83 LeBel J. says that the contribution holidays for DC members violate the exclusive benefit provisions of the Trust. He also says that the contribution holidays constitute a partial revocation of the Trust. His position is premised on there being two separate trusts and two separate plans, one for the DB members and one for the DC members.

84 However, with one trust in which all DB and DC members are beneficiaries, the use of trust funds for either the DB or DC members would not infringe the exclusive benefit provision. Surplus funds applied to DC accounts would simply move funds within the Trust. And if there is one trust, there is no partial revocation when the actuarial surplus is used for contribution holidays with respect to the DC part of the Plan. In my view, having regard to the Plan documentation, it was reasonable for the Tribunal to find that there was one plan and that, with a retroactive amendment, there could be one trust and that contribution holidays with respect to either or both of the DB and DC components of the Plan did not violate the exclusive benefit provision or constitute a partial revocation of the Trust.

85 LeBel J. says that it is wrong to presume "a single plan with two (or more) components, simply to be displaced by prohibitive language in the documentation or the legislation" (para. 162). However, pension plans are private arrangements subject to government regulation. Absent regulation prohibiting the combining of DB and DC components in a single plan or prohibiting the taking of contribution holidays in respect of either component of the plan, whether such actions are permitted will be determined with reference to the plan documentation and contract and trust law. In this case, there is no government regulation that prevents the retroactive amendment, a single plan and trust and the DC contribution holidays.

86 LeBel J. expresses concern that the use of a DB surplus for DC purposes disrupts the careful balance between providing incentives for employers to provide pension schemes and the need to protect pensioners' rights (para. 149). In my respectful view, it is not the role of the courts to find the appropriate balance between the interests of employers and employees. That is a task for the legislature. Indeed, as Deschamps J. noted, at para. 14 of *Monsanto Canada Inc.*: "[P]ension standards legislation is a complex administrative scheme, which seeks to strike a delicate balance between the interests of employers and employees, while advancing the public interest in a thriving private pension system". The role of the courts is to ascertain and uphold the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable statutory and common law and the terms of the relevant documentation. In my view, the applicable law and Plan documentation does permit and provide for DC contribution holidays.

B) Can the DC and DB Arrangements Be Included in a Single Plan and Single Trust?

87 The Committee relies on the Divisional Court's finding that the creation of a DC arrangement alongside the existing DB arrangement created "in law, two (2) pension plans, two (2) pension funds and two (2) classes of members" (para. 72). Generally, it does not necessarily follow that the creation of two differently funded pension arrangements results in two distinct pension plans and two distinct trusts. In this case, I do not think it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that the DB and DC arrangements could be components of a single Plan and that the 2000 Plan could be retroactively amended to create a single trust.

88 The 2000 amendments to the Plan text can reasonably be interpreted as intending a single plan. Section 1.07 of the foreword says:

The Plan is hereby amended and restated ... to:

.....

(c) change the Plan from one having defined benefit provisions only to a pension plan with a defined benefit component and a defined contribution component, effective January 1, 2000.

Section II defines "Plan" as "the Pension Plan for Employees of Kerry (Canada) Inc., as Revised and Restated at January 1, 2000, the terms of which are as set forth in this document, and as it may be amended from time to time". Members of the Plan are defined as employees who meet the applicable eligibility requirements and continue to be entitled to benefits under either section of the Plan. Section 18.08 specifically provides that actuarial surplus can be used for "either Part 1 or Part 2 [members]". These provisions demonstrate that the 2000 amendments to the Plan text evince the intention that there be a single plan.

89 The support for a single plan found in the Plan text distinguishes this case from *Kemble v. Hicks (No.2)*, [1999] EWHC 301, [1999] O.P.L.R. 1 (Eng. Ch. Div.). In *Kemble*, the plan sponsor ran a DB plan and decided to create a new DC arrangement by a temporary deed (plan text) that it intended to incorporate into the main plan deed. However, it never did amend the main deed governing the original plan to reflect the new DC arrangement. The two pension arrangements existed under separate deeds and the one governing the DB plan made no mention of incorporating the one governing the DC arrangement.

90 Here there is an amendment to the overall plan indicating that the intention is to create a single plan and expressly allowing for contribution holidays in respect of each component of the Plan. Nothing in the relevant statutory or common law prohibits the creation of combined DB and DC plans. Therefore it was not unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that this would be a single plan.

91 Similarly, it was not unreasonable that DC members could be designated beneficiaries of the Trust. Trusts may have different classes of beneficiaries or numerous accounts; the fact that DB and DC funds will be held by different custodians does not prevent them from belonging to the same trust. Section 6(b) of the *Trustee Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.23, for instance, allows different trustees to be appointed over different parts of the trust property. Section 27(3) of the same Act allows trustees to invest in mutual funds, which will themselves often be administered by their own trustees. There is no reason why a single plan could not have DB and DC components whose members were beneficiaries of the same trust, provided the plan documents and legislation do not prohibit this.

92 The Committee argues that *Schmidt* forecloses this possibility. They cite the statement of McLachlin J. (as she then was), dissenting in part on a different point, that "[a] defined contribution plan can never have a surplus" (p. 697). They also cite the following passage, at p. 653, of Cory J.'s majority judgment as supporting their position:

An employer's right to take a contribution holiday can also be excluded by the terms of the pension plan or the trust created under it. An explicit prohibition against applying an existing fund surplus to the calculation of the current service cost, or other provisions which in effect convert the nature of the plan from a defined benefit to a defined contribution plan, will preclude the contribution holiday. For example, the presence of a specific formula for calculating the contribution obligation, such as those considered in the *Ontario Hydro* and *Trent University* cases, prevents employers from taking a contribution holiday. However, whenever

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the contribution requirement simply refers to actuarial calculations, the presumption will normally be that it also authorizes the use of standard actuarial practices.

[Emphasis added.]

In this passage, Cory J. was concerned with explaining the criteria by which the previous case law determined a right to contribution holidays in existing plan provisions. Where the employer's existing contribution requirements are fixed by a specific formula, such that contributions are not determined by an exercise of actuarial discretion, there can be no contribution holidays. Speaking generally, a single stand-alone DC plan will not allow contribution holidays, because its contributions are fixed and not determined by actuarial discretion.

93 However, the Plan at issue in this case is different. A new component is being added to the existing Plan. After the retroactive amendments, the Plan would consist of DB and DC components. So long as it is a single plan and all employees are beneficiaries of the same trust, the Plan will not have been converted to a stand-alone DC plan. The point made in *Schmidt* does not apply to this situation.

94 The Committee points to the fact that *Schmidt* concerned the amalgamation of two plans into a single plan. Despite the amalgamation, this Court considered the contribution holidays issue separately for each of the formerly existing plans. The Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in *Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc.* (2003), 179 O.A.C. 196 (Ont. C.A.), similarly concerned the merger of pension plans, in which each merging plan's surplus was considered separately. The Committee says that, "except where the trust permits the activity, an employer may not amend the trust to 'co-mingle' or 'cross-subsidize' its obligations to employees in one part of a pension plan by using assets of the fund held exclusively for members in the other part of the same plan" (A.F., at para. 103).

95 However, both *Schmidt* and *Aegon Canada Inc.* involved mergers of pre-existing plans. The plans and trusts had different beneficiaries to which different employers had undertaken different obligations. In this case, the obligations have always been to the same set of employees -- the Company's employees -- and, after the retroactive amendment, always from the same trust. Neither *Schmidt* nor *Aegon Canada Inc.* blocks the retroactive amendment at issue here.

96 This is because there is nothing inherently wrong with a pension plan being structured in the way the Company proposes -- provided the plan documents or legislation do not forbid it. This was Gillese J.A.'s conclusion (para. 111). Siegel J. came to this same conclusion in a decision released shortly after Gillese J.A.'s judgment (though he seemingly reached this conclusion independently -- see para. 236): *Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co.* (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 64 (Ont. S.C.J.). Siegel J. concluded, at para. 219, that

(1) there is no support in the case law for the plaintiffs' proposition that the assets of an "exclusive benefit trust" may not be used for the benefit of members of a defined contribution section added to a pension plan previously structured solely as a defined benefit plan, and (2) more generally, there is judicial support for, and no legal principle prohibiting, amendments to a pension plan that establish a defined contribution section that exists together with a defined benefit section, with the same trust fund supporting the payment of benefits under each section of the plan.

97 The case law supporting the permissibility of a single plan involving DC and DB components includes the English Chancery decision in *Barclays Bank Plc v. Holmes*, [2000] EWHC 457, [2001] O.P.L.R. 37 (Eng. Ch. Div.). In *Barclays Bank Plc*, Neuberger J. ruled that there is no reason in law that an employer could not set up a single plan under which some beneficiaries receive DB benefits and some receive DC benefits. At para. 54, he wrote the following, referring to amendments in a 41st deed which granted the employer the right to use a surplus in a DB

component to take contribution holidays in respect of a DC component that was part of the same plan:

There is no intrinsic reason, as a matter of general law, why an employer or any other person could not set up a Pension Scheme expressly on that basis, in the way that, for instance, the Bank has undoubtedly purported to do, in the present case, in the 41st Deed. Such a view is supported by consideration of the multifarious types of private trusts which are created from time to time, which often involve many differing classes of beneficiary but a single fund.

It is true that in *Barclays Bank Plc*, the same trust Company controlled all accounts. However, as stated above, I do not think there is any difficulty with a single trust having numerous accounts at different institutions.

98 *Barclays Bank Plc* is not, of course, determinative of this appeal. The legislative context and plan texts are different. However, it does support the proposition that there is nothing repugnant in principle to the existence of a single plan whose members receive different benefits, funded in different ways, depending on which of the various parts of the plan they participate in.

C) Do the Plan Documents or Legislation Prohibit the Plan from Having DB and DC Components or Prohibit Contribution Holidays for either of These Components?

99 Combining DB and DC components or contribution holidays for one or both components can be prohibited by the plan documents or by legislation. Therefore, for the Committee's argument to succeed, it must establish that there is a legislative or contractual impediment to the Company taking contribution holidays in the DC part of the Plan. It has not succeeded in this task.

100 First, the legislation does not prevent the retroactive amendment making the DC members beneficiaries of the existing Trust and entitling the employer to apply the actuarial surplus to its DC contribution obligations. To the contrary, as noted by the Court of Appeal, at para. 103, s. 9 of the *Pension Benefits Act* General Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909 (the "*Regulations*"), provides that on conversion of a DB plan to a DC plan, a surplus can be used to offset contributions to the DC plan. While this case is not a conversion and s. 9 does not apply, it does suggest that a surplus accumulated under a DB component of a plan can be applied to a DC component of a plan.

101 Section 7(3) of the *Regulations* allows the following:

In any year for which no special payments are required to be made for a pension plan under section 5, an actuarial gain may be applied to reduce contributions for normal costs required to be made by the employer, by a person or entity required to make contributions on behalf of the employer, by the members of the pension plan or by any of them.

So long as the DC component is part of the same Plan as the DB component, s. 7(3) supports the principle that any surplus in the Plan can be applied to DC contribution obligations. The retroactive amendments aim to ensure that the DB and DC components are part of the same Plan.

102 The Committee pointed to no parts of the legislation that would prevent making the two components parts of a single Plan.

103 LeBel J. rightly points out that nothing in the legislation permits contribution holidays where a DC component is added to a DB plan. He highlights the difference between the full conversion from a DB to a DC plan con-

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templated by s. 9 of the *Regulations* and the situation in which a DC component is added to an existing DB plan. However, I do not think it follows from this difference that the legislation prohibits contribution holidays in the circumstances of this case. Here the legislation is silent on the specific point at issue. Absent legislative restriction, the permissibility of contribution holidays must be determined with reference to contractual and trust law. In my view, nothing in the Plan documents prevents combining the two components in one plan or prohibits contribution holidays in respect of either component.

104 The Committee argues that retroactively permitting the funding of the DC component from the DB surplus is not for the exclusive benefit of any of the members. The Committee analogizes the situation in this case to the one this Court dealt with in *Buschau*. In *Buschau*, an ongoing plan with a substantial surplus was closed to new members. The employer had previously withdrawn surplus funds in breach of the trust. It subsequently acknowledged that it had no right to recover the surplus funds and repaid them, but still sought to benefit from the surplus by other means. It attempted to re-open the membership of the closed plan to access its surplus by taking contribution holidays in respect of its obligations to the new plan members. The Committee seeks to rely on Deschamps J.'s statement at para. 41 of *Buschau* that re-opening the plan in that case would be problematic.

105 I do not find the Committee's use of *Buschau* convincing, because the circumstances here are quite different. *Buschau* involved a DB plan in surplus that had been closed for a number of years and was still paying benefits to its existing members. The employer attempted to re-open the plan to new members in order to gain access to its surplus by way of contribution holidays to these new members -- thereby using the surplus in the plan to cover its contribution obligations to the new members. The employer had previously attempted to use the surplus to cover its contribution obligations by merging the closed plan with other plans in order to use the closed plan's surplus to take contribution holidays with respect to the other plans. A previous judgment prevented a merger from achieving such a result -- despite the merger, the fund remained separate. The Court of Appeal in *Buschau* had stated that by re-opening the plan the employer would rightly be viewed as trying to do what it could not do by merger, i.e. benefit from the surplus by taking contribution holidays [2004 CarswellBC 325 (B.C. C.A.)]. The Court of Appeal stated that, as with the merger, because of the employer's previous breach of trust, an attempt to re-open the plan would result in the employer being forced to account for its trust obligations to the original plan members as if the plan had not been re-opened. Deschamps J.'s remark about re-opening the plan being problematic was made in this context.

106 What the Tribunal contemplated here was a retroactive amendment expressly permitted by the PBA. The legal effect of the retroactive amendment would not amount to re-opening a closed plan, but to establishing that DC members were beneficiaries of the Trust from the moment the DC component was created and the DB component closed to new members. Because the amendment is retroactive, there would be no re-opening of a closed plan in law and no attempt to merge two independent trusts. This case is not analogous to *Buschau*; what was problematic in *Buschau* does not arise here.

107 Another factor distinguishing this case from *Buschau* is the significant difference between a terminated plan and an ongoing plan. In *Schmidt*, Cory J. distinguished between an ongoing plan's *actuarial* surplus and a terminated plan's *actual* surplus. At pp. 654-55, he wrote:

While a plan which takes the form of a trust is in operation, the surplus is an actuarial surplus. Neither the employer nor the employees have a specific interest in this amount, since it only exists on paper, although the employee beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the total assets of the fund while it is in existence. When the plan is terminated, the actuarial surplus becomes an actual surplus and vests in the employee beneficiaries. The distinction between actual and actuarial surplus means that there is no inconsistency between the entitlement of the employer to contribution holidays and the disentitlement of the employer to recovery of the surplus on termination. The former relies on actuarial surplus, the latter on actual surplus.

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In this case, as stated, the Plan and Trust have not been terminated. Only a part of the Plan has been closed to new employees. There is, therefore, no actual surplus that has vested with the employees. The DB surplus remains actuarial and the DB members retain their right to the defined benefits provided for under the Plan. Their interest in the surplus is only to the extent that it cannot be withdrawn or misused. Retroactively amending the Plan takes no vested property right away from the DB members.

108 Moreover, Deschamps J. wrote at para. 34 of *Buschau*:

A plan is also seen as being, if not a permanent instrument, at least a long-term one. However, the participation of any individual member is ephemeral: members come and go, while plans are expected to survive the flow of employees and corporate reorganizations. In an ongoing plan, a single group of employees should not be able to deprive future employees of the benefit of a pension plan.

Here, the Plan was intended to be ongoing and cover all employees of the Company. As Gillese J.A. noted, at para. 110, it was intended that all employees would be members of the Plan and the Trust.

109 This intention is demonstrated in the Plan documents. Section 1 of the 1954 Trust Agreement provided that the Trust Fund would not be diverted or used for "purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of such persons or their beneficiaries or personal representatives as from time to time may be designated in the Plan except as therein provided". The 1958 Trust Agreement, in force at the time of the 2000 amendments, similarly provided that beneficiaries would be "such persons as from time to time may be designated in the Plan" (s. 1). Section 22 of the Plan text designates existing and retired employees as the persons to benefit from the Plan. The Plan was always meant to apply to all employees. It continues to do so with this retroactive amendment. It is therefore not inconsistent with the Plan to designate the DC members as beneficiaries of the original Trust.

110 After the retroactive amendments, members of both parts of the Plan will be beneficiaries of the Trust; use of funds in the Trust to benefit either part is allowed because the Trust explicitly provides that the funds can be used for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

111 LeBel J. finds that the Trust only ever contemplated DB plan members being its beneficiaries. He notes that certain provisions in the 1954 Trust Agreement contemplate the possibility of the amount of the Fund either being inadequate to meet its liabilities (ss. 2 and 6) or exceeding its liabilities (s. 11), scenarios that could not arise in a DC plan.

112 In my opinion, the Trust contemplated a broader category of beneficiaries. As stated above, the language governing the designation of the beneficiaries of the Trust is general and it has always applied to the employees of the Company. I do not think it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that the Plan allowed for the designation of DC members, who are Company employees, as beneficiaries of the Trust.

113 LeBel J. says that an amendment that purports to make DC employees beneficiaries of the same single trust as DB employees and to allow the employer to take contribution holidays in respect of the DC employees affects the benefits of the DB employees in the sense that assets in the pension fund are being reduced. DB members may well prefer higher actuarial surpluses in the pension fund. Indeed, the Committee argued against the use of the actuarial surplus for the payment of Plan expenses and the taking of DB contribution holidays, as well as for the taking of DC contribution holidays. However, absent legislation stating otherwise, DB members have no right to require surplus funding of the Plan in order to increase their security. In *National Grid Co. Plc v. Mayes*, [2001] UKHL 20, [2001] 2 All E.R. 417 (U.K. H.L.), Lord Hoffmann stated: "Caution is a matter for the actuary in certifying the surplus and

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certifying the arrangements as reasonable" (para. 17). It is the plan documents and trust law that govern. Nothing in the Plan documents or trust law gives the DB members a vested interest in the actuarial surplus of the Trust Fund or prevents the use of the actuarial surplus for Plan expenses or DB or DC contribution holidays.

114 In my respectful opinion, the Tribunal's decision to allow contribution holidays in respect of the DC component of the pension Plan, once appropriate retroactive amendments are made, was not unreasonable.

IX. Issue 4 -- Costs

115 There are two issues with respect to costs. First, did the Tribunal have the authority to order that costs be paid out of the Trust Fund? Second, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the Divisional Court and was therefore entitled to make its own costs ruling: 2007 ONCA 605, 282 D.L.R. (4th) 625 (Ont. C.A.). It declined to award costs to the Committee from the Fund. The issue is whether this Court should interfere with that exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeal.

A) Tribunal's Authority to Award Costs

116 On the first issue, s. 24 of the *Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act, 1997* provides: "The Tribunal may order that a party to a proceeding before it pay the costs of another party or the Tribunal's costs of the proceeding." The Tribunal held that since the Fund was not a party to the proceedings before it, it did not have the authority to order costs payable from the Fund.

117 The language of s. 24 is unambiguous on this point. The Tribunal cannot order costs from the Trust Fund if the Fund is not a party. Here, the Fund was not a party. In these circumstances, the Court should defer to the Tribunal.

B) Awarding Costs from the Fund

118 On the second issue, I would not interfere with Gillese J.A.'s decision not to order costs payable to the Committee from the Fund.

119 Gillese J.A. identified two authorities setting out the proper approach to follow in deciding when to award an unsuccessful litigant its costs from a trust fund. The English case *Buckton, Re*, [1907] 2 Ch. 406 (Eng. Ch. Div.), notes three categories of cases in the wills and estate context. The first category is comprised of cases in which the trustees apply to a court to construe the terms of the trust deed so that they may determine the proper administration of the trust. The second category is comprised of similar cases seeking to determine the proper administration of the trust, but brought by the beneficiaries of the trust rather than the trustees. In both these cases, costs may rightfully be paid from the trust fund. However, costs will not be paid from the fund in cases that fall under the third category, that is, where a beneficiary makes a claim which is adverse to other beneficiaries of the trust.

120 In *Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co.* (2006), 53 C.C.P.B. 154 (Ont. S.C.J.) ("*Sutherland (2006)*"), Cullity J. set out the situations where he finds that costs may be payable from a trust fund. His approach appears similar to the first two categories of *Buckton*. At para. 11, he writes:

Orders for the payment of costs out of trust funds are most commonly made in either of two cases. One is where the rights of the unsuccessful parties to funds held in trust are not clearly and unambiguously dealt with in the terms of the trust instrument. In such cases, the order is sometimes justified by describing the

problem as one created by the testator or settlor who transferred the funds to the trust. The other case is where the claim of the unsuccessful party may reasonably be considered to have been advanced for the benefit of all of the persons beneficially interested in the trust fund.

121 I think these cases helpfully define the circumstances in which costs should be awarded from a pension trust fund. The rules in both *Buckton* and *Sutherland (2006)* would allow a court to award its costs out of the fund where there is a legitimate uncertainty as to how to properly administer the trust and where the dispute is not adversarial.

122 In *Patrick v. Telus Communications Inc.*, 2008 BCCA 246, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 506 (B.C. C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal has recently criticized the application of *Buckton* to a number of cases, including one it had previously decided. It expressed the view that in British Columbia *Buckton* should only apply to proceedings dealt with in chambers (originating applications under the British Columbia *Rules of Court*) and not to more complex trial litigation. It nevertheless acknowledged that in pension litigation, costs may be awarded on the basis set out in *Sutherland (2006)*. I think this ruling points to some difficulties in applying *Buckton* in the context of pension litigation.

123 Pension litigation is frequently more complex than estate litigation. In the context of pension litigation, the court must not just be sensitive to the litigation being adversarial between beneficiaries of the trust, as *Buckton* might be taken to suggest, but also between the beneficiaries and the settlor (in this case the Company), the trustees or the administrators (in this case the Retirement Committee). Unlike the wills and estate context, the employer that settles a pension trust is likely under an ongoing obligation to contribute to the trust fund. As a result, awarding costs out of a pension trust fund may have an impact on the employer. This is especially true in cases such as this involving issues of expenses payable by a trust fund and of contribution holidays. In these cases, a costs award from the fund will reduce the actuarial surplus in the fund and hasten the date when the employer must satisfy expense requirements or must begin making contributions again.

124 In *Smith v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc.*, 2008 NSCA 107, 271 N.S.R. (2d) 274 (N.S. C.A.), the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal addressed the question of costs with the benefit of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in this case. It agreed with Gillese J.A.'s finding that the key question is whether the litigation is adversarial rather than aimed at the due administration of the pension trust fund. Claims that are adversarial amongst beneficiaries will not qualify for a costs award from the fund. However, not even every claim in which the beneficiaries have a common interest in the litigation will entitle them to their costs from the fund. A claim might still be adversarial, even if it is not adversarial amongst beneficiaries. Costs will only be awarded from the fund where the proceedings are necessary for the due administration of the trust.

125 Where litigation involves issues, such as in the present case, of a dispute between a settlor of a trust fund and some or all of its beneficiaries, the ordering of costs payable from the fund to the unsuccessful party may ultimately have to be paid by the successful party. In these types of cases, a court will be more likely to approach costs as in an ordinary lawsuit, i.e., payable by the unsuccessful party to the successful party.

126 In the end, of course, costs awards are quintessentially discretionary. Courts have considered a number of factors in finding that litigation was concerned with due administration of the trust. Courts have noted that the litigation was primarily about the construction of the plan documents (*Huang v. Telus Corp. Pension Plan (Trustees of)*, 2005 ABQB 40, 41 Alta. L.R. (4th) 107 (Alta. Q.B.), *Patrick v. Telus Communications Inc.*, 2005 BCCA 592, 49 B.C.L.R. (4th) 74 (B.C. C.A.), and *Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co.*, 2008 ONCA 690, 299 D.L.R. (4th) 277 (Ont. C.A.)), clarified a problematic area of the law (*Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2003), 36 C.C.P.B. 154 (Ont. Div. Ct.), and *Burke*), was the only means of clarifying the parties' rights (*Burke*), alleged maladministration (*MacKinnon v. Ontario (Municipal Employees Retirement Board)*, 2007 ONCA 874, 288 D.L.R. (4th) 688 (Ont. C.A.)), and had no effect on other beneficiaries of the trust fund

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(*C.A.S.A.W., Local 1 v. Alcan Smelters & Chemicals Ltd.*, 2001 BCCA 303, 198 D.L.R. (4th) 504 (B.C. C.A.), and *Bentall Corp. v. Canada Trust Co.* (1996), 26 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 (B.C. S.C.)).

127 Courts have refused to award costs when they considered litigation ultimately adversarial. In reaching this conclusion, they have noted the following factors: the litigation included allegations by the unsuccessful party of breach of fiduciary duty (*White v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) Pension Committee*, 2007 NSCA 22, 252 N.S.R. (2d) 39 (N.S. C.A.)); the litigation only benefited a class of members and it would impose costs on other members should the plaintiff be successful (*Smith, Lennon v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2007), 87 O.R. (3d) 736 (Ont. Div. Ct.), and *Turner v. Andrews*, 2001 BCCA 76, 85 B.C.L.R. (3d) 53 (B.C. C.A.)); the litigation had little merit (*Smith, White and Lennon*).

128 In this case, the Company was successful, i.e., it does not have to pay into the Fund to cover expenses at issue and may take contribution holidays. There is no reason to penalize it by reducing the Fund surplus and thereby reducing its opportunity for contribution holidays.

129 Moreover, Gillese J.A. held that the litigation was adversarial in nature because it was ultimately about the propriety of the Company's actions and because the Committee sought to have funds paid into the Fund to the benefit of the DB members only. The litigation seems particularly unusual in light of several Committee members having played a part in the taking of the decisions the Committee is now challenging.

130 I agree with Gillese J.A. that this case is adversarial in nature.

131 Gillese J.A. also concluded that the Committee was not bringing this litigation on behalf of all beneficiaries. She rested this conclusion on the fact that the benefits the Committee claimed were only for the DB members of the Plan. She also took into account a conclusion reached by a concurring Tribunal member (see *Nolan v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)*, [2004] O.F.S.C.D. No. 191 (F.S. Trib.), at para. 27, Mr. McNairn), that the Committee had not demonstrated its precise level of support among Plan members.

132 For these reasons, there would be no justification to interfere with the costs ruling of Gillese J.A. that costs should be payable by the Committee in favour of the Company.

X. Disposition

133 The appeal should be dismissed with costs in favour of the Company against the appellants.

Appeal dismissed.

LeBel J.:

I. Introduction

134 The issues raised in this appeal affect the millions of Canadians who are members of occupational pension plans. Several of these issues are the subjects of frequent litigation in the pension field, such as an employer's use of pension funds to pay plan expenses, the taking of "contribution holidays" in a defined benefit pension plan ("DB plan"), and the proper test for determining whether the costs of litigation can be awarded from a pension fund. I agree with my colleague's conclusions on these issues and will not address them in the reasons below.

135 However, one question raised in this appeal is novel, and more contentious: it asks whether an employer can use the surplus of a DB pension plan to fund its contribution obligations toward a defined contribution pension plan ("DC plan"). It is on this issue that my colleague and I part ways. I believe that the employer's use of DB surplus to fund its obligations toward the DC plan is not supported by the legislative regime and constitutes a breach of the plan provisions, the trust agreement, and the relevant principles of trust law. When the DC plan was created in 2000, the company's employees ceased to be members of a single plan. The employees in the DC plan ("DC members") are not beneficiaries of the DB trust and any amendment that would purport to designate them as such would contravene these same provisions and principles. As a result, the decision of the Financial Services Tribunal (the "Tribunal") that approved such an amendment was unreasonable and must be quashed.

II. Overview

136 I will not attempt to duplicate my colleague's thorough review of the facts. However, a brief sketch of the parameters of this appeal and of some particular facts is necessary. The pension plan in this case provided benefits on a DB basis until January 1, 2000, when the respondent company closed the DB plan to new members and opened a DC plan. Existing employees could choose whether to join the DC plan or to remain in the DB plan, whereas new employees were only entitled to join the DC plan. The appellants, a group of former employees of Kerry (Canada) Inc. and its predecessor companies ("Kerry"), essentially contend that their employer misused the funds in their pension trust. The appellants claim that the company did not ever have the right to pay certain expenses related to the management of the plan from the pension fund, and that it was not entitled to use the fund's surplus to offset its required contributions (i.e. to take a "contribution holiday") with respect to both the DB and the DC plans. This case arose as a result of the appellants' decision to challenge these alleged irregularities before the Superintendent of Financial Services (the "Superintendent"). The Superintendent, who is the other respondent in this appeal, ordered Kerry to reimburse the pension fund for some of the third-party expenses, but refused to order reimbursement for the contribution holidays Kerry had taken with respect to the DB and DC plans.

137 The Tribunal heard the appeal against the Superintendent's Notices of Proposal. The Tribunal released several sets of reasons, only one of which is relevant to this discussion: (F.S. Trib.). In those reasons, the Tribunal held that Kerry was entitled to take contribution holidays from the DB plan. Moreover, it held that Kerry could continue to fund its contributions toward the DC plan from the DB surplus, but on the condition that it retroactively amend the 2000 pension plan (the "Plan") to designate the DC members as beneficiaries of the pension trust fund (the "retroactive designation" remedy).

138 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court (the "Divisional Court") reviewed the Tribunal's contribution holiday decision on the standard of correctness because, in its opinion, the issue required the interpretation of pension plan documents and trust agreements, and therefore engaged a question of law. The Divisional Court concluded that the Tribunal did not correctly address the contribution holiday issue and reversed the Tribunal on this point: (2006), 209 O.A.C. 21 (Ont. Div. Ct.). It viewed the DB and DC plans as two separate and distinct pension plans, and held that the contribution holidays taken with respect to the DC plan constituted unlawful cross-subsidization between pension funds that could not be remedied by a retroactive designation of DC members as fund beneficiaries.

139 The Ontario Court of Appeal applied the standard of reasonableness to the Tribunal's contribution holiday decision, as the issue engaged the Tribunal's relative expertise in interpreting pension plan documents and was not a pure question of law. Gillese J.A., for the court, held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and reinstated its proposed remedy, adding that she would have reached the same conclusion even on the correctness standard: 2007 ONCA 416, 86 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). Although her reasoning was not the same as that of the Tribunal, Gillese J.A. agreed that a retroactive amendment designating the DC members as trust beneficiaries would permit the employer to use the surplus in the fund to pay its contributions toward the DC plan. The appellants sought and obtained

leave to appeal to this Court: [2008] 1 S.C.R. xi (note) (S.C.C.).

140 I agree that the appropriate standard of review for the contribution holiday issue is reasonableness. As my colleague has aptly explained, at paras. 26-30 of his reasons, the four factors underlying the standard of review analysis clearly point to the conclusion that the Tribunal's decision concerning the DC contribution holidays must only be interfered with if it is unreasonable. In *New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir*, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), this Court explained that reasonableness is a deferential standard that requires the reviewing court to determine whether the administrative decision falls within a range of defensible outcomes. A decision is unreasonable if, for instance, it fails to adhere to the principles of "justification, transparency and intelligibility" (*Dunsmuir*, at para. 47) or if the outcome cannot be supported on a reasoned analysis of the facts and the law underpinning the issue in question. Respect for the rule of law requires that a court not uphold an administrative decision that is irrational, arbitrary, or untenable. A decision is irrational when it is devoid of a basis in law in respect of its core legal issues.

141 In this case, the Tribunal's decision with respect to the DC contribution holidays fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes available to it. The Tribunal did acknowledge that the employer's amendments to the Plan seeking to permit contribution holidays in the DC plan violated the terms of the original Trust Agreement entered into in 1954 (the "Trust Agreement") and constituted an encroachment on irrevocable trust funds. However, it failed to take these very principles into consideration when ordering its remedy of retroactively designating DC members as beneficiaries of the fund. The retroactive amendment would breach the same terms of the Trust Agreement and the Plan's text that prohibited the DC contribution holidays in the first place. The Tribunal's failure to take this into account when crafting the remedy cannot be justified and the remedy is therefore unreasonable.

142 The Court of Appeal therefore erred in concluding that the Tribunal's contribution holiday decision was reasonable and in reinstating the retroactive designation remedy. Indeed, I believe that the court's conclusion that Kerry would be entitled to take contribution holidays in the DC plan following the retroactive amendment was predicated on a number of errors. First, the court failed to consider the lack of support for this type of contribution holiday in the governing legislation and regulations. The *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 (the "*PBA*"), and the *Pension Benefits Act* General Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909 (the "*Regulations*"), do not authorize the use of surplus in a DB fund to offset an employer's contribution obligations toward a DC plan except in the event of a full conversion from a DB to a DC plan. All parties to this appeal agree that full conversion has not occurred. As such, the legislation is of no assistance to the respondents.

143 Second, the court adopted an unduly formalistic view of the pension plan. Gillese J.A. held that Kerry's creation of a DC plan did not result in a new plan, since "[c]ontrol, management and administration of the Plan remained with the Retirement Committee and the company" (para. 111). It is true that the Plan falls to be registered as a single plan and that the same committee administers both parts of the Plan. However, this appeal demands a much closer examination of the arrangement that has been in place since the creation of the DC plan in 2000. The DB and DC contributions are completely segregated and belong to entirely different funding regimes. Members who switched to the DC plan removed all their accrued benefits from the DB fund and placed them in separate annuity accounts that have no real, factual connection to the fund. Gillese J.A. failed to appreciate the separate and distinct nature of the DB and DC plans in this case and instead focused on the formal existence of a single plan. In so doing, she failed to acknowledge that Kerry's use of the DB surplus to eliminate its contribution obligations to the DC plan resulted in a violation of the provisions in the Plan and Trust Agreement that prohibit the use of trust funds for other than the exclusive benefit of fund beneficiaries. Moreover, she overlooked the serious problems with the Tribunal's remedy of ordering the retroactive designation of DC members as beneficiaries of the fund.

144 Third, the court ought to have considered the trust ramifications of the employer's DC contribution holidays. In *Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd.*, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 611 (S.C.C.), this Court held that pension funds im-

pressed with a trust are governed primarily by the equitable principles of trust law. Cory J. wrote that a pension trust "is governed by equity, and, to the extent that applicable equitable principles conflict with plan provisions, equity must prevail" (p. 655). Thus, even if there were no legislative or contractual impediment to the DC contribution holidays, it would still be necessary to determine whether the holidays are barred by trust principles. In this case, the DC contribution holidays could only be realized by the withdrawal of funds from the pension trust, which holds the contributions and accrued benefits of the employees of the DB plan ("DB members"), and the subsequent deposit of those same funds into the DC members' annuity accounts. This is a clear example of the employer's controlling and encroaching on funds that are irrevocably held in trust for the benefit of DB members. This action violates the general trust principle against revocation as well as the provisions in the Plan's documentation that expressly prohibit the employer's revocation of trust funds.

145 In sum, Kerry's contribution holidays in the DC plan cannot be supported under any reasonable interpretation of the Plan's documentation or of relevant trust law principles. I will address each of these points in turn in the following reasons.

III. Analysis

A. Background: Contribution Holidays

146 As explained by Rothstein J., an employer can lawfully use the surplus of a pension fund to take contribution holidays with respect to a DB pension plan, provided that it is permitted by the legislation and plan documentation: *Schmidt*. A plan might expressly authorize or prohibit contribution holidays. When a plan is silent on the matter, implicit authorization for contribution holidays might be found in the plan's formula for calculating employer contributions. If the formula requires the discretion of an actuary to determine the amount of each contribution, then the actuary's discretion enables him or her to follow the accepted actuarial practice of using fund surplus to offset employer contributions. A fixed formula for employer contributions, however, would implicitly prohibit the taking of contribution holidays since it obliges the employer to contribute to the fund regardless of whether the contributions are actually required to provide the members with their guaranteed benefits (*Schmidt*, at p. 653).

147 While it is settled law that an employer may take contribution holidays in these circumstances, that does not mean that the issue has not attracted some controversy or that contribution holidays might not be, at times, imprudent. Many employees believe that surplus should be maintained to serve as a "cushion" against future market failings or employer insolvency (A. N. Kaplan, *Pension Law* (2006), at p. 404). Indeed, there is a very real risk that contribution holidays could affect the stability of pension plans. According to the report of the Ontario Expert Commission on Pensions, some employers have taken contribution holidays when the results of their last triennial valuation permitted them, despite the fact that the plans were under-funded at the time the holidays were taken. Research conducted on federally regulated pension plans and cited in the Commission report revealed that "45% of under-funded plans would not have been under-funded had they [the employers] not taken contribution holidays" (Government of Ontario, *A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Plans, Fair Rules* (2008), at p. 78).

148 On the other hand, many employers maintain that the ability to take contribution holidays provides them with the incentive to fund DB pension plans generously, since any contributions over the amount required to meet the plan's liabilities can serve to reduce their future contributions. Moreover, the possibility of taking contribution holidays might entice employers to provide pension benefits on a DB basis in the first place, in spite of the often greater demands on employers in such plans. Employees typically prefer DB plans because they provide guaranteed benefits with less attendant risk. Given the current trend among Canadian employers to create DC rather than DB plans, some employees might welcome measures (such as contribution holidays) that encourage employers to adopt DB plans.

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149 This debate demonstrates the tension between providing incentive for employers to establish pension schemes that do not carry with them prohibitive financial burdens, and the need to protect pensioners' rights and ensure the vitality of those plans, especially at times of economic instability. While it might be said that allowing employers to take contribution holidays with respect to DB plans strikes the appropriate balance between these competing demands, I believe that the use of surplus from a DB plan to fund an employer's obligations with respect to a separate DC plan disrupts this careful balance, to the detriment of plan members.

150 The question of contribution holidays in the context of DC plans has rarely been examined by Canadian courts. The reason for this stems from the nature of a DC plan: the contribution amount is guaranteed. The employer (and possibly the employee, depending on the type of plan) makes regular contributions of a fixed amount to the member's account. The final benefit that the member receives consists of the total sum that has been contributed, plus any return on the investment. Thus, unlike the members of a DB plan, the members of a DC plan recoup *all* the money that has accumulated in their personal account, whatever the amount. For this reason, DC plans themselves do not accumulate a surplus. Since employers cannot lawfully take a contribution holiday unless the plan is in a state of actuarial surplus, there is no opportunity for contribution holidays in a pure DC plan. In this case, the employer's addition of a DC plan to an ongoing DB plan means that a surplus arises, unusually, in the context of a DC plan.

151 As I will explain in these reasons, no support for this type of contribution holiday can be found in the legislative framework or in the provisions of the Plan and Trust Agreement. Rather, the Plan documentation and the principles of trust law effectively forbid the taking of a contribution holiday in the DC plan that is funded from the surplus in the DB plan. The Tribunal's remedy of retroactively designating the DC members as fund beneficiaries cannot cure this defect in the Plan amendments that seek to permit contribution holidays with respect to the DC plan.

B. The Legislative Framework

152 Pension law is governed first and foremost by provincial legislation. In Ontario, all pension plans must be administered in accordance with the *PBA* and the *Regulations* (see *PBA*, s. 19). The legislation clearly permits an employer to take contribution holidays when a pension fund is in a state of actuarial surplus. Section 7(3) of the *Regulations* reads:

In any year for which no special payments are required to be made for a pension plan under section 5, an actuarial gain may be applied to reduce contributions for normal costs required to be made by the employer, by a person or entity required to make contributions on behalf of the employer, by the members of the pension plan or by any of them.

As I noted above, a DC plan on its own can never be in a state of surplus. Presumptively, then, s. 7(3) of the *Regulations* is limited in scope to DB plans that are capable of accumulating a surplus (or an "actuarial gain").

153 There is, however, one instance in which a DC plan might be said to enjoy some benefit of a surplus, and that is following a full conversion from a DB plan. This is made clear by s. 9 of the *Regulations*:

If an amendment to a pension plan with defined benefits converts the defined benefits to defined contribution benefits, the employer may offset the employer's contributions for normal costs against the amount of surplus, if any, in the pension fund after the conversion.

My colleague and I agree that the DB plan in this case was not fully converted to a DC plan, since the DB plan continued to operate after it was closed to new members in 2000. As such, s. 9 of the *Regulations* does not apply to the

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case at bar. There is therefore no legislative provision that permits the allocation of surplus from a DB plan to a DC plan when a full conversion has not occurred. The circumstances in which a surplus might lawfully be used to fund contribution holidays under s. 7(3), then, is limited to either a DB plan standing alone or a DC plan that has been fully converted from a DB plan.

154 My colleague, however, contends that the legislation, while it does not expressly permit the use of surplus in a DB plan to fund contribution holidays in a DC plan, suggests that there is nothing inherently wrong with using the surplus in this way, provided the DC members are designated as beneficiaries of the pension fund.

155 However, the circumstances of a full conversion from a DB to a DC plan differ significantly from those of the current appeal, which involves (for lack of a better phrase) only a partial conversion to a DC plan. Upon total conversion to a DC plan, the pension benefits would still be held by the same members whose contributions made up the original DB fund, albeit in a different form. It would be a vertical transformation: full conversion would turn a single DB plan into a single DC plan. The beneficiaries would not change and the plan would simply continue in a different form. This picture is consistent with s. 81(1) of the *PBA*:

81 (1) Where a pension plan is established by an employer to be a successor to an existing pension plan and the employer ceases to make contributions to the original pension plan, the original pension plan shall be deemed not to be wound up and the new pension plan shall be deemed to be a continuation of the original pension plan.

Benefits from the original plan are also deemed to belong to the new plan after total conversion (*PBA*, s. 81(2)). When a DB plan completely changes to a DC plan, the issue of cross-subsidization simply does not arise as there are not two separate plans or separate funding arrangements between which funds are transferred.

156 For these reasons, the legislation and its regulations do not permit Kerry to use the surplus from the DB fund to finance its contributions toward the DC plan. If Kerry had simply converted the Plan into a DC plan for all members, then s. 9 of the *Regulations* might permit this use of surplus. Fortunately for existing employees, however, they were given the option to remain in the ongoing DB plan. The resulting arrangement thus does not fall into any of the categories addressed by the legislation.

C. Two Separate Plans

157 This appeal also requires the resolution of a preliminary question: did Kerry's creation of a DC plan in 2000 maintain a single pension plan for all employees, or did it effectively result in two separate plans, one DB and one DC? The Divisional Court held that Kerry had created two separate plans:

The 2000 Plan text, no matter what language is employed, clearly creates two (2) funds. The Appellants, who elected to stay in Plan 1, as they were entitled to do, are or have contributed to the DBP and have a beneficial interest in all of the funds in the Plan. The DCP, Part 2, fund is completely separate and funded separately. The Part 2 DCP employees have no connection to the Part 1 DBP plan and cannot legitimately be given a beneficial interest in the fund on the DBP side. Here, there are in law, two (2) pension plans, two (2) pension funds and two (2) classes of members. [para. 72]

The Court of Appeal, however, held that there was in essence a single pension plan with two components and two classes of members. Since the plan was originally designed to benefit all full-time employees, the creation of a DC scheme for some of those employees could not have resulted in an entirely new plan.

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158 Though I disagree with much of the Divisional Court's reasoning, I agree with its conclusion that Kerry effectively created a second pension plan whose members are not beneficiaries of the original fund. It is true that there is only one plan in a formal sense. The Plan falls to be registered as a single plan that provides benefits to all of the company's eligible employees, and it is managed by a single administrator. However, its characterization as a single plan cannot be sustained in light of the high degree of segregation in the Plan documentation between the DB and DC components. I believe that, for all intents and purposes, the DB and DC plans exist as separate entities and should not be treated in this appeal as two components of a single plan.

159 To start, DB and DC pension plans are not cut from the same cloth. DB and DC plans provide different types of benefits to their members, and carry a different set of risks and rewards. In a DB plan, the members' final pension benefits are guaranteed and the employer bears primary responsibility for making up any shortfall if the plan is under-funded. While members of a DB plan still bear some risk, such as in the event of employer insolvency, that risk is spread across the membership. Individuals in a DC plan, however, are more vulnerable to market forces. They stand to benefit greatly if the return on their investments is high, but if the return is low, then their overall pension benefits are also low and the employer bears no liability for the plan's poor performance. DB plans are also much more heavily regulated than DC plans. For instance, the reporting requirements under Ontario's *PBA Regulations* are more stringent for DB plans than for DC plans (see e.g. ss. 3, 13 and 14). In light of these fundamental differences between the two types of plans, it should not be presumed that when an employer creates a DC plan for some employees and retains a DB plan for others, he or she has created a single plan.

160 In this case, the structure of the Plan reflects these differences by treating the two groups of employees differently. The Plan is divided into Part 1, some provisions of which apply exclusively to DB members, and Part 2, which applies exclusively to DC members. Different provisions govern each group of members on matters such as member contributions and their entitlement to benefits, both while the plan is ongoing and upon plan termination. For instance, s. 16.03 reads:

On termination or discontinuance, each Part 1 Member shall have recourse only to the assets in the Pension Fund attributable to Part 1 Members for the provision of the benefits outlined in the Plan for Part 1 Members and each Part 2 Member shall have recourse only to the amounts in his Member's Account.

The Part 2 provisions do not establish any link between Part 2 DC members and the pension fund, aside from the amendment that purports to allow the company to take contribution holidays from the surplus of the fund.

161 The Plan delineates the funding arrangements for the DB and DC plans and the means by which employees converted to the DC plan in 2000. The assets of DB members continue to be held in the original trust fund, which is administered by CIBC Mellon Trust Company according to the terms of the Trust Agreement entered into between those parties in 2000. For those employees who decided to convert to the DC plan, however, the company ascertained the value of their benefits that had accrued in the fund on a DB basis up to that time and transferred trust assets equal to that amount to the employees' new DC accounts. Thus, the DC members no longer have any contributions in the fund. Their assets are held in individual accounts and are invested by the Standard Life Assurance Company pursuant to the terms of its contract with Kerry. According to this contract, Standard Life has undertaken to manage the DC members' contributions and to invest them in pooled funds, the value of which fluctuates with the investments' market value, and in guaranteed funds. Upon retirement, the benefits would be paid out as an annuity from those funds in accordance with the terms of the Plan and the statutory framework. Unlike the DB fund benefits, the value of the DC benefits upon retirement is not guaranteed as it is contingent on the success (or otherwise) of the investments. I believe that from the moment the DC members' accrued benefits were moved out of the fund into these separate investment accounts, the DC members ceased to belong to the DB plan and were no longer beneficiaries of the fund.

162 My colleague asserts that there is no reason in law why a pension plan might not have a single fund for both DB and DC members, provided that the plan documentation and legislation do not prohibit it. To some extent, I agree. There is certainly nothing repugnant in having several components of a single pension plan with a shared fund, as is clear from the growing number of "hybrid plans". But to the extent that my colleague's reasons suggest a *presumption* that the employer's provision of DB and DC plans for a single group of employees results in a single plan, I cannot agree. The starting point should not be the presumption of a single plan with two (or more) components, simply to be displaced by prohibitive language in the documentation or the legislation. Rather, it is necessary to examine the plan's particular arrangement, which will differ from case to case, to determine whether there is in fact a single plan in existence. The plan documentation must clearly evince an intention to maintain a single plan and, most importantly, the plan structure must actually reflect and follow from this intention. In the few cases in which courts have allowed contribution holidays in a DC plan by resort to surplus in a DB fund, the courts have emphasized the need to examine the plan documentation for evidence of a single plan with a single fund for all members.

163 In one of these cases, *Sutherland v. Hudson's Bay Co.* (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 64 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice examined a DB pension trust to which two DC components were added at different times. Siegel J. concluded that the employees were all members of the same plan and beneficiaries of the same trust fund. In arriving at this conclusion, he acknowledged that "the issue as to whether a single trust fund was accomplished in any given situation is fact specific, depending entirely on the text of the relevant documentation" (para. 218). The documentation in *Sutherland* showed that when the DC members were added to the plan, their assets were transferred to the DB trust fund and the pooled assets were ultimately administered by a single trustee, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada ("Royal Trust"). Although the DC members had accounts to which their pension contributions were credited, Siegel J. noted that there was "no evidence that such accounts were segregated in some manner" (para. 71). Indeed, all of the assets were invested on a collective basis.

164 The structure of the plan changed somewhat in 2001 when Royal Trust appointed an agent, The Standard Life Assurance Company of Canada ("Standard Life"), to invest the contributions that attached to the DC section of the plan. The Standard Life policy explicitly recognized Royal Trust as the trustee of those assets, and invested the funds only under the direction of Royal Trust, rather than the plan members. Siegel J. held that this new arrangement did not alter the legal relationship between the plan members and the trustee. Apart from Standard Life's physical possession of those funds, there was no legal separation between the assets held by Standard Life and those contained in the Fund (para. 298).

165 Siegel J. contrasted the arrangement in *Sutherland* with that in the case at bar. After pointing to some degree of similarity between the DC investment arrangements in the two cases, he held that the plan documentation in the case at bar contemplated a greater separation between the DB and DC schemes:

The pension plan document in *Kerry* evidences an intention to separate the assets in the trust fund that are referable to the defined benefit section of the plan from those that are referable to the defined contribution section of the plan. [para. 269]

Siegel J. was right to make this distinction. In the current appeal, there is no evidence that the contributions of the DB and DC plan members were ever pooled in a single fund; nor is there any suggestion that the insurance company that invests the DC members' assets has an agency relationship (or any relationship at all) with CIBC Mellon Trust, the fund's trustee. To the contrary, Standard Life invests the DC members' assets according to the terms of its contract with Kerry, which refers neither to CIBC Mellon Trust nor to the assets held for DB members in the original trust (A.R., at p. 731). The plan documentation thus contemplates a far greater level of differentiation between DB

and DC members than the arrangements in *Sutherland*.

166 My colleague also cites *Barclays Bank Plc v. Holmes*, [2000] EWHC 457, [2001] O.P.L.R. 37 (Eng. Ch. Div.), for the proposition that a pension plan might be structured as a single plan with both DB and DC members as beneficiaries of the fund. The conclusion in *Barclays Bank Plc* again turned largely on the court's interpretation of the relevant plan documentation. Neuberger J. held that the documentation and the plan structure clearly showed the employer's intention to create a single plan impressed with a trust. For instance, the definition of "Member" in the plan text specifically entitled DC members to benefits under the fund and, as noted by Rothstein J., the same trustee administered all the accounts. Furthermore, the court was influenced by the particular legislative context, which contemplated that a pension plan might have a single fund that supports both DB and DC schemes.

167 The outcome in *Barclays Bank Plc* can be contrasted with that of another English case, *Kemble v. Hicks (No.2)*, [1999] EWHC 301, [1999] O.P.L.R. 1 (Eng. Ch. Div.), which involved a DB pension plan to which a DC component was added. As in the current case, the DC members' contributions were held in individual investment accounts under a contract with an insurance company that was not the trustee of the DB fund. The court held that the employer was not entitled to use the DB surplus to fund its contributions toward DC members. Rimer J. acknowledged that the DB and DC plans were "part of the same overall scheme", but held that

the establishment of the money-purchase [DC] scheme involved the setting up of what was, within that overall scheme, a scheme quite separate from the final-salary scheme and to which different considerations applied. Those who joined the money-purchase scheme severed their connection with the final-salary scheme, transferred to a new scheme and enjoyed the benefit of a payment to it of a sum representing the actuarial value of their benefits in the final-salary scheme accrued until 31 March 1989. Those who elected not to transfer retained their interest in the assets which remained subject to the final-salary [DB] scheme. [p. 7]

168 I believe that the arrangement in *Kemble* more closely mirrors the arrangement in the case at bar and, as such, similar considerations apply. These cases demonstrate that while it may not be impermissible for an employer to create two divisions of a single plan, it is also not impermissible for an employer to create what are in fact two separate plans for a single group of employees. Indeed, this possibility is contemplated by s. 34 of the *PBA*, which enables an employer to set up separate pension plans for full-time and part-time employees. One must examine the plan documentation and the actual arrangements to determine which structure is adopted in a particular case. As I outlined above, the Plan documentation in this case reveals a degree of segregation between the DB and DC plans that confirms that the 2000 amendments effectively created a second pension plan.

D. The "Exclusive Benefit" Provisions

169 Why does it matter in this case whether the employees belong to a single plan or to two separate plans? The answer to this question lies in the provisions of the Plan and Trust Agreement that forbid the use of trust assets for other than the exclusive benefit of plan members.

170 The relevant provisions can be found in the original plan documentation. Section 22 of the 1954 Plan Text provides that

all contributions made by the Company are irrevocable, and, together with all contributions made by Members, may only be used exclusively for the benefit of Members, retired Members, their beneficiaries or estates, and their contingent annuitants.

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[Emphasis added.]

Section 1 of the 1954 Trust Agreement contains a similar restriction on the use of trust assets:

No part of the corpus or income of the Fund shall ever revert to the Company or be used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of such persons or their beneficiaries or personal representatives as from time to time may be designated in the Plan except as therein provided.

[Emphasis added.]

For ease of reference, I will refer to both of these provisions as the "exclusive benefit" provisions, though it is the Trust Agreement that is of paramount importance here. As noted above, the Tribunal acknowledged that the amendments purporting to authorize contribution holidays in the DC plan from the DB surplus would violate these provisions, as they would allow the Company to use or divert some part of the Fund, i.e. the surplus, "to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of" the beneficiaries of the trust in respect of the Fund who, by virtue of the 2000 Plan, are now the Part 1 members. Any holiday taken by the Company in respect of Part 2 contributions in this fashion can only be realized by actually moving money out of the Fund and transferring it to the insurer that is the funding agency for Part 2, for credit to the individual accounts of the Part 2 members. This action is inconsistent with section 1 of the 1954 Trust Agreement [para. 32]

171 It is important at the outset to be clear about who is protected by these provisions and whom the Trust Agreement is meant to serve. I agree with the Tribunal's conclusion that "such persons ... as from time to time may be designated in the Plan" referred to in the Trust Agreement are the DB members only, for two reasons. First, as I have explained above, the assets in the fund consist solely of the contributions made by or on behalf of the DB members alone. Any assets previously held in the name of current DC members were removed at the time of the conversion. Second, the terms of the Trust Agreement clearly contemplate that member beneficiaries would belong to a DB plan. For instance, the Agreement contains provisions concerning the possibility of fund liabilities, which do not arise in a DC plan (ss. 2, 6 and 11). Indeed, the very nature of a trust fund is inconsistent with the structure of the DC accounts in this case. I will address this issue once again in my discussion of the Tribunal's retroactive designation remedy. For the time being, however, I simply conclude that the exclusive benefit provisions serve to protect DB members from any use of trust assets that is not for their exclusive benefit, such as cross-subsidization between separate plans.

172 The issue of cross-subsidization has received significant judicial attention in cases concerning the merger of two or more pension plans. The question of how the merger affects the members' entitlement to assets under their original plan is typically resolved with reference to the terms of the plan documentation and trust agreements in each case. Thus, in some cases, the co-mingling of funds in a merged plan has been found to be lawful: e.g. *Lennon v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2007), 87 O.R. (3d) 736 (Ont. Div. Ct.); *Baxter v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services)* (2004), 43 C.C.P.B. 1 (Ont. Div. Ct.). In others, the particular facts of the case militated against the co-mingling of funds after a merger: *Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc.* (2003), 179 O.A.C. 196 (Ont. C.A.); *Sulpetro Ltd. Retirement Plan Fund (Trustee of) v. Sulpetro Ltd. (Receiver of)* (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 271 (Alta. C.A.).

173 While the merger cases engage a host of issues that are not relevant to this appeal, the cases are instructive in terms of the broader principle against cross-subsidization between plans that are effectively distinct from one another. In *Aegon Canada Inc.*, for instance, the trust assets of two funds were segregated after a merger in accordance with the terms of the trust agreement and the employer's undertaking to the then Pension Commission of Ontario. The employer, however, diverted the assets from one fund to the other in order to take contribution holidays with

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respect to the second fund. The Court of Appeal held that this action violated the trust agreement because it used trust assets for other than the exclusive benefit of the plan members who were beneficiaries of the fund.

174 This general principle was affirmed in *Sutherland*, when Siegel J. noted:

Where it is found that two separate funds exist, there is no principle that can support "cross-subsidization" in the form of payment of the pension benefits of one group of beneficiaries by using assets in a trust fund intended to fund the pension benefits of a separate group of beneficiaries. [para. 260]

Indeed, the results in *Sutherland* and *Barclays Bank Plc* were predicated on the courts' conclusion that the employees were members of a single plan and beneficiaries of the same fund. As such, there was no use of trust assets for other than the exclusive benefit of the members. In *Kemble*, however, the existence of two separate plans meant that the employer's use of surplus from a DB fund to reduce its contributions toward a DC plan was an unjust subsidization of the DC members at the DB members' expense. The same result enures in this case: the use of fund surplus to provide contribution holidays with respect to the DC plan violates the exclusive benefit provisions in the Plan documentation as it benefits all but the DB members.

175 This brings us to the Tribunal's remedy, also approved by my colleague in his reasons, of retroactively amending the Plan to designate the DC members as beneficiaries of the DB trust fund in order to legitimize the DC contribution holidays. I believe that this remedy is unreasonable and cannot be adopted as it would breach the terms of the Trust Agreement, and would not solve the problem of the DC contribution holidays constituting a violation of the exclusive benefit provisions.

176 The company has the right to amend the Plan unilaterally and can, by virtue of s. 13(2) of the *PBA*, make retroactive amendments. However, plan amendments are still subject to the terms of the original Trust Agreement that prohibit the use of funds for other than the exclusive benefit of the trust beneficiaries, who in this case are DB members. Therefore, an amendment to the Plan that seeks to change the beneficiaries of the fund must not contravene the same exclusive benefit provisions that precipitated the need for the remedy in the first place.

177 The designation, which aims to provide formal legitimation for DC contribution holidays, would not be for the exclusive or even primary benefit of the DB members. It would not benefit them at all. The company certainly stands to benefit from this designation, by being relieved of its contribution obligations to DC members for as long as the DB fund experiences a surplus. It might even be argued that DC members could benefit from the arrangement, by sharing the same entitlement to surplus upon termination that the DB members might be found to have. Indeed, Gillese J.A. concluded that the designation would have the effect of granting the DC members a right to enjoy the surplus with the DB members upon termination of the plan (paras. 107-8). However, the respondents have not pointed to any benefit that might accrue to the DB members from this designation, and none can be established. Rather, the DB members stand only to lose from the retroactive designation of DC members as beneficiaries of the trust.

178 It is true, as Gillese J.A. at the Court of Appeal and Rothstein J. in his reasons have pointed out, that the plan contemplated an expanding class of members and that new employees would continually have been added to the DB scheme as trust beneficiaries prior to 2000. Deschamps J. acknowledged the fluidity of pension plans in *Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc.*, 2006 SCC 28, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.), when she wrote:

A plan is also seen as being, if not a permanent instrument, at least a long-term one. However, the participation of any individual member is ephemeral: members come and go, while plans are expected to survive the flow of employees and corporate reorganizations. [para. 34]

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Along these lines, the respondent Kerry argues that the designation of DC members as beneficiaries of the trust is simply an extension of the employer's general power to continually add new members to an existing plan, such as by merger:

The introduction of new members into a pension plan does not breach any underlying trust and is not objectionable as a matter of contract law so long as members continue to receive their benefits. If a plan merger is permissible, it is difficult to see how it cannot be permissible to amend plan language so as to treat all members of a single plan having two parts as members of the Plan for the purposes of being able to receive benefits from the Fund. [R.F., at para. 83]

One might argue, then, that the regular addition of new employees, or the introduction of an entirely new class of employees (e.g. part-time employees), into an existing plan is so commonplace that there is no need to even inquire into whether the addition of new members would violate the exclusive benefit provisions of the plan documentation.

179 However, the proposed arrangement in this case raises significant concerns that are not engaged by the addition of new employees to an ongoing plan. Prior to 2000, new employees who joined the Plan made regular contributions to the fund or had contributions made in their name, thus increasing the *corpus* (or body) of the fund. Those financial contributions to the fund can be seen as providing some sort of benefit, however indirectly, to the existing plan members. More assets mean a stronger and more resilient pension fund, and higher returns on the investments. The same benefit does not arise from the retroactive designation of DC members as beneficiaries of the fund. After 2000, new employees (and existing employees who switched into the DC plan) no longer contribute anything to the fund. Their contributions are directed into their separate annuity accounts, and any prior contributions made by employees who switched to the DC plan were removed at the time of the conversion. The DC members have no more entitlement to the trust fund. It would make a mockery of the significant protections afforded to trust funds if such entitlement could be granted by the mere stroke of a pen.

180 Why is it that the DC members cannot claim any entitlement to the fund? As noted above, when employees opted to convert their DB benefits to the DC plan in 2000, assets equal to the amount of benefits that had accrued to date were taken from the fund and placed in individual accounts. The Plan stipulates that, after this conversion, the new DC members would "henceforth be governed by the defined contribution provisions of the Plan and will not be permitted to resume participation in the Plan under the defined benefit provisions" (2000 Plan Text Foreword, s. 1.07). By the terms of this arrangement, then, the DC members can be seen to have relinquished their interest in the remaining assets of the DB Fund. All of their previous contributions and all employer contributions made in their name were removed from the fund and placed in individual accounts, and they cannot revert to the DB plan. They are not beneficiaries of the fund because they do not and cannot derive any benefit from the assets held in that fund. An amendment that would serve to designate them as such is simply an artificial and incomplete response to the problem.

181 This is quite unlike the situation contemplated by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in *Sutherland*, when Siegel J. held that there is no reason in law why a pension plan might not be structured with two sections, one DB and one DC, "with the same trust fund supporting the payment of benefits under each section of the plan" (para. 219). In the current appeal, only DB members would have their benefits paid from the trust fund. The DC members' benefits are held separately in annuity accounts that have no connection to the original trust fund that was set up to provide pension benefits on a DB basis to Kerry's employees in 1954.

182 Indeed, because the company started taking contribution holidays from the DB plan in 1985, everything that has been contributed to the fund since that time has been amassed penny by penny by the DB members alone. The

Tribunal's remedy would permit the company to remove assets from the fund and to place those assets in the accounts held by DC members, simply to relieve itself of the obligation to contribute toward the DC plan. As a result, the DB members would see the same amount of money going into the fund as before 2000, but a greater amount coming out of it. The intuitive unfairness of this arrangement should be apparent to even the greatest cynic. More importantly, the arrangement is not only unfair on a principled basis but is also unlawful, as it would result in the use of trust funds for other than the exclusive benefit of the current DB members.

183 The unlawfulness of the DC contribution holidays would not be remedied *even if* the DC members could be declared beneficiaries of the fund. The withdrawal of funds to enable the employer's DC contribution holidays would continue to violate the exclusive benefit provisions regardless of whether the DC members were technically beneficiaries of the fund. There is no evidence before this Court that the structure of the fund would change as a result of this designation. The employer would continue to take DC contribution holidays by withdrawing assets from the fund and placing them in the DC members' accounts. As I noted above, this movement of funds is not for the exclusive benefit of any of the beneficiaries, whether DB or DC members. To the contrary, it harms the DB members, who see the *corpus* of their fund decreasing at a steady rate. And while the initial designation of the DC members as beneficiaries might provide them with some future benefit with respect to potential entitlement to surplus, the use of the fund surplus to finance the contribution holidays would simply deplete the overall surplus to which they might one day claim entitlement.

184 It is hard to see how the DC contribution holidays benefit anyone but Kerry, who is relieved of its contribution obligations to the DC plan. Of what use are the exclusive benefit provisions if they could permit the withdrawal of trust funds for the primary or even exclusive benefit of the company? Indeed, it is not necessary to find that the members have a vested interest in the surplus to appreciate that the present arrangement violates the exclusive benefit provisions and would continue to do so even if the Tribunal's remedy were adopted. Every DC contribution holiday leaves the *corpus* of the trust smaller, whereas a contribution holiday in respect of a regular DB plan simply leaves the trust alone.

185 For these reasons, I believe that the Tribunal's order to amend the Plan to make the DC members beneficiaries of the trust in respect of the Fund is unreasonable and that the amendment purporting to allow DC contribution holidays from the DB surplus remains invalid for contravening the exclusive benefit provisions in the Plan documentation.

E. The Law of Trusts

186 The original pension plan in this case was impressed with a trust in 1954. As such, it is subject not only to the requirements imposed by statute and the law of contract, but also to the strictures of trust law. The law of trusts is notoriously difficult to define because, like a child with sticky fingers, it leaves its imprint on a number of different areas ranging from wills and estates to divorce proceedings and pension schemes. What must be remembered, however, is that the law of trusts is primarily oriented toward the protection of beneficiaries, who are entitled to have the trust property administered in their best interest.

187 This Court held in *Schmidt* that a pension trust is akin to a classic trust, as it is created in order to provide a benefit to employees (p. 640). In a classic trust, the trustee and the beneficiaries share ownership of the trust assets: the beneficiaries have an equitable interest in the trust assets while the trustee holds legal title to them. The trustee has a fiduciary duty to hold the assets exclusively in the interest of the beneficiaries (D.W.M. Waters, M.R. Gillen and L.D. Smith, eds., *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada* (3rd ed. 2005), at p. 38). Indeed, the beneficiaries of a trust are given legal protection of the highest order.

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188 Despite their status as classic trusts, however, pension trusts engage somewhat different considerations due to the existing legal relationship between the settlor (usually the employer) and the trust beneficiaries (the employees). Browne-Wilkinson V.-C.'s comments in *Imperial Group Pension Trust Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.* (1990), [1991] 2 All E.R. 597 (Eng. Ch. Div.), are apt:

Pension scheme trusts are of quite a different nature to traditional trusts. The traditional trust is one under which the settlor, by way of bounty, transfers property to trustees to be administered for the beneficiaries as objects of his bounty. Normally, there is no legal relationship between the parties apart from the trust. The beneficiaries have given no consideration for what they receive. The settlor, as donor, can impose such limits on his bounty as he chooses, including imposing a requirement that the consent of himself or some other person shall be required to the exercise of the powers.

As the Court of Appeal has pointed out ... a pension scheme is quite different. Pension benefits are part of the consideration which an employee receives in return for the rendering of his services. In many cases, ... membership of the pension scheme is a requirement of employment. In contributory schemes, ... the employee is himself bound to pay his or her contributions. Beneficiaries of the scheme, the members, far from being volunteers have given valuable consideration. The company employer is not conferring a bounty. In my judgment, the scheme is established against the background of such employment and falls to be interpreted against that background [pp. 605-6]

189 U.K. courts are not alone in noting the distinction between traditional and pension trusts. In *Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society* (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 326 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at pp. 385-88, aff'd (1994), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), Adams J. wrote:

Trust law responds to the long gestation of pension arrangements and accommodates the welfare of former employees who often lack any other effective means to protect their interests. ... Trust law, in this modern context, must accommodate and be responsive to key differences between the traditional settling of a trust and the ongoing administration of a pension plan in a changing economic environment. But employers, trade unions and trustees must also appreciate the central importance of pension arrangements to all employees and be vigilant of the dependent interests engrained in these plans.

The beneficiaries of a pension trust depend on the fund's assets to sustain them during retirement. In the unionized workplace, employees will have often traded other benefits for a strong pension regime for themselves and their families. Pension schemes are frequently used by employers to attract the most qualified employees and to encourage long-term commitment to the job. In this context, it is important to call upon the flexibility of trust law in assessing the legitimacy of the employer's actions carried out with respect to the trust. It is not enough simply to look to the propriety of the trustee's administration of the trust to determine whether the rights of the beneficiaries have been unjustly interfered with. The employer's actions are also implicated.

190 Newbury J.A. recognized the special role of the employer in the pension trust context in *Buschau v. Rogers Communications Inc.*, 2001 BCCA 16, 195 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 1 (rev'd in 2006 SCC 28, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.), but not on this point):

In Canada at least, pension trusts and plans also usually contemplate that the settlor, or employer, will play a role akin to that of the trustee in a traditional trust, even though a trust company is appointed as formal trustee. Indeed, employers often retain the authority to direct the trustee as to many matters relating to the administration of the trust, and even to amend or modify the class of beneficiaries under the trust, change the benefits to which they will be entitled, and on occasion, revoke or terminate the trust unilaterally.

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Lane J. came to a similar conclusion in *Aegon Canada Inc. v. ING Canada Inc.* (2003), 34 C.C.P.B. 1 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 38, aff'd (2003), 179 O.A.C. 196 (Ont. C.A.):

These cases illustrate the importance of the trust aspect of the pension scheme before me. It is not simply a payment scheme or other appurtenance to the pension, but an important legal relationship created by the employer with its employees, not subject to unilateral alteration.

191 In this case, the law of trusts provides the appellants with an added layer of protection. The employer's attempt to use the DB surplus to fund its contribution obligations toward the DC plan not only breaches the "exclusive benefit" provisions, but also violates one of the hallmarks of trust law: the prohibition against the revocation of trust assets.

192 In *Schmidt*, this Court ruled that an employer may not remove pension contributions held in trust unless a power of revocation was expressly included in the trust at the time of its inception. A general power of amendment does not amount to a power of revocation (pp. 643-46).

193 The classic explanation of revocation comes from *Waters' Law of Trusts in Canada*:

A settlor cannot revoke his trust unless he has expressly reserved the power to do so. This is a cardinal rule, and it involves two important concepts. The first is that the trust is a mode of disposition, and once the instrument of creation of the trust has taken effect ... the settlor has alienated the property as much as if he had given it to the beneficiaries by an out-and-out gift. [p. 353]

Generally speaking, revocation consists in the settlor's exercising some control over the trust assets. Once assets have been placed in the trust fund, the settlor cannot interfere with them and cannot withdraw them for his or her own use without the express power to do so in the trust agreement. In *Schmidt*, Cory J. wrote:

Generally, however, the transfer of the trust property to the trustee is absolute. Any power of control of that property will be lost unless the transfer is expressly made subject to it. [p. 643]

194 This principle extends not only to the *corpus* of the trust fund but also to any surplus in the fund, unless there is specific wording in the plan documentation that would oust the surplus from the trust's ambit (*Schmidt*, at pp. 641-42). Thus, once placed in the fund, *all* assets must be administered in accordance with the principles of trust law and should therefore be safe from the interference and control of the settlor.

195 Within a classic DB plan, a contribution holiday would not result in an encroachment on the trust because no money need actually be withdrawn from the fund to enable the holiday (*Schmidt*, at p. 654). Trust principles do not attach to pension contributions until they are actually paid into the fund. In other words, the *failure* to put money in a fund does not generally amount to a breach of trust principles unless that contribution is required by the terms of the trust.

196 Against this background, it is necessary to determine whether Kerry's contribution holidays in the DC plan from the DB surplus amounted to a partial revocation of the trust. I believe that it did.

197 No power of revocation is contained in the Trust Agreement in this case. And yet, the contribution holidays in the DC plan were accomplished by means of a withdrawal of assets from the DB fund and a deposit of those assets

into the DC members' accounts. The actual transfer of funds is necessary because Kerry is required by the terms of the Plan to make a regular contribution to the DC plan. Thus, the "holidays" still involve the deposit of funds into the account, but the source of the employer's contribution has changed: rather than coming from the employer's own pocket, the value of each contribution is withdrawn from the DB fund and placed in the members' annuity accounts. This shifting of funds is a clear example of the employer's exercising control over trust assets. It is not comparable to the employer's legitimate use of assets from the fund to cover reasonable and *bona fide* plan expenses. The transfer of trust assets to enable a contribution holiday can hardly be described as necessary to ensure the integrity and proper maintenance of the plan.

198 Nor is it comparable to the circumstances in *Sutherland*, where the court held that there was no impediment to the employer's contribution holidays in the DC part of the plan from the DB surplus because the employees were all members of the same plan and beneficiaries of the same trust (paras. 284-89). Recall that until 2001, the DB and DC assets were held in a single fund. The contribution holidays did not require the removal of assets from the fund and, therefore, did not constitute an encroachment on the trust. Even after the arrangement changed in 2001, such that the DC funds were invested separately by the trustee's agent, the court's finding that the contributions were effectively held in a single fund led to the conclusion that contribution holidays did not entail an encroachment on the trust (paras. 290-303). No withdrawal of assets from the trust fund was required to effect a contribution holiday, and hence no encroachment occurred. The employer simply refrained from making contributions to the fund. In this case, however, the DC contribution holidays required the removal of assets from the trust fund and the deposit of those assets in the DC members' annuity accounts. This is not a case of the employer's simply failing to contribute to the fund. Thus, the reasoning in *Sutherland* does not assist the respondents.

199 Similarly, in *Police Retirees of Ontario Inc. v. Ontario (Municipal Employees' Retirement Board)* (1999), 22 C.C.P.B. 49 (Ont. S.C.J.), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the retirees' argument that the employer's contribution holidays resulted in an encroachment on the trust. The employer had taken contribution holidays after additional funds that arose through a Supplementary Benefits Agreement were added to the pension fund. The court held that the establishment of the Supplementary Benefits Agreement did not create a separate pension plan and that, as a result, the supplementary funds were part of the regular fund (paras. 61-70). Therefore, no money was actually paid out of the fund in order for the employer to take contribution holidays (para. 76). Again, this conclusion was premised on the finding that there was a single plan in existence, which meant that the Police Board could take contribution holidays by merely ceasing its contributions to the fund. The failure to pay into the fund did not amount to an encroachment on the trust assets. In the current appeal, every DC contribution holiday leaves the DB trust fund smaller than before, without any justification in law. This clearly constitutes an encroachment on and a revocation of the trust.

200 It should be noted that I would reach the same conclusion *even if* the DC members could legitimately be designated as beneficiaries of the trust fund. The rationale in *Schmidt* for upholding an employer's right to take contribution holidays is limited to those situations in which no assets are withdrawn from the trust fund. In an ordinary DB plan, the employer is simply required to ensure that the assets in the fund are sufficient to meet its expected liabilities. If the plan documentation and legislation permit them, then contribution holidays can be taken for as long as the plan is in a state of actuarial surplus. Nothing in *Schmidt* suggests that an employer should be permitted to remove trust assets in the manner contemplated by Kerry, even if the ultimate recipients of those assets are among the trust beneficiaries. This would not only constitute an unlawful interference with the trust assets (revocation) but also would pit one group of beneficiaries against the other, with the ultimate reward falling to the employer.

201 The principles of trust law are as relevant in the context of an ongoing pension trust as they are in the context of a terminated or wound-up plan impressed with a trust. In this case, the trust beneficiaries are protected by the specific language in the Plan documentation that prohibits the use of trust funds for other than their own benefit. Moreover, the law of trusts forbids the employer's attempts to control or withdraw irrevocable assets within the fund in

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order to take contribution holidays with respect to its obligations toward a different group of plan members.

F. Conclusion

202 For the reasons above, I must disagree with my colleague's conclusion that the respondent Kerry was entitled to withdraw assets from the DB surplus and deposit them in the DC members' accounts. I believe that the amendments to the Plan purporting to authorize these payments are not permitted by the legislation and are in breach of the "exclusive benefit" provisions of the Plan documentation and the relevant principles of trust law. The Tribunal's conclusion that these defects could be cured by a retroactive designation of DC members as fund beneficiaries was unreasonable, and the Court of Appeal erred in upholding the Tribunal's conclusion on this point.

203 I would thus allow the appeal in part, quash the Tribunal's decision on contribution holidays, and direct the Superintendent to refuse registration of the amendments that purport to permit the employer's use of fund surplus under Part 1 of the Plan to offset or eliminate its contribution obligations under Part 2 of the Plan.

204 On the matter of costs, I do not need to take issue with my colleague's determination that costs could not be awarded from the fund in this case. Since I would allow the appeal in part, the appellants would be entitled to full costs throughout from the respondent Kerry.

Appeal dismissed.

Pourvoi rejeté.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 2

DATE: 20020214
DOCKET: C35896 and C35919

COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

ABELLA, FELDMAN AND MACPHERSON J.J.A.

IN THE MATTER of a decision by the Superintendent of Pensions on August 15, 1997, to permit the transfer of the assets of the Retirement Income Plan for Salaried Employees of Weavexx Corp., Registration No. 0264663 (formerly C-1144) to the BTR Pension Plan for Canadian Employees Registration No. 559716 and other related decisions or omissions.

B E T W E E N :)
)
EYSTEIN HUUS, PETER LEROY,) *Steve Waller*
MICHAEL MARCELLUS, DON) for the respondents
PIERCE and TOM WOOD, on behalf)
of the members of the Retirement)
Income Plan for Salaried Employees of)
Weavexx Corp., Registration)
No. 0264663 (formerly C-1144))
) *Deborah McPhail*
Applicants) for the appellant
(Respondents in Appeal)) Superintendent of Pensions
)
- and -)
)
SUPERINTENDENT OF PENSIONS,) *Bruce Pollock*
WEAVEXX CORPORATION, BTR) for the appellants
INC., BTR CANADA HOLDINGS) Weavexx Corporation,
INC., and NATIONAL TRUST) BTR INC. and
COMPANY (as trustee for Plan)) BTR Canada Holdings Inc.
)
Respondents)
(Appellants))
)
) Heard: November 19, 2001

On appeal from the decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) (R. J. Flinn, J. R. R. Jennings and D. S. Ferguson JJ.) dated May 30, 2000.

MACPHERSON J.A.:

A. **INTRODUCTION**

[1] When a company wants to transfer pension assets from an existing pension plan to a different pension plan, it must obtain the consent of the Superintendent of Pensions (the “Superintendent”) [1] to the transfer. The Superintendent must withhold consent to a transfer “that does not protect the pension benefits of the members and former members of the pension plan”: see s. 81(5) of the *Pension Benefits Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 (the “*PBA*”).

[2] In the present case, a company proposed a transfer of pension assets into a consolidated plan with a view to harmonizing several pension plans operated by its affiliates in Canada and the United States. The company applied for consent to the transfer by the Superintendent.

[3] At about the same time, a Pension Advisory Committee (the “PAC”) representing the retired salaried members of the existing pension plan took a different view of the transfer. Concerned that the transfer might remove their potential right to a distribution of the substantial surplus that had accumulated in the plan, the PAC applied to the Superintendent for a partial wind-up of the pension plan pursuant to s. 69 of the *PBA*.

[4] This appeal concerns how the Superintendent dealt with these two requests.

B. **FACTS**

(1) **The parties and the events**

[5] The appellant, Weavexx Corporation (“Weavexx”), a Canadian corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of products used in the pulp and paper production process. At all times relevant to this litigation, Weavexx was a majority-owned subsidiary of the appellant BTR Canada Holdings Inc., which in turn was a Canadian affiliate of the appellant BTR Inc., a Delaware corporation (together, “BTR”).

[6] Weavexx was formed by the amalgamation on October 1, 1992 of two companies in the BTR group, Hucyk Canada Inc. (“Hucyk”) and Niagara Lockport Industries Ltd. (“Niagara Lockport”). At the material time, Weavexx had operations in Arnprior, Ontario and Kentville, Nova Scotia formerly operated by Hucyk and in Warwick and Trois-Rivières, Quebec formerly operated by Niagara Lockport.

[7] The respondents, the members of the PAC [2] for retired salaried employees which was established in 1990, wrote to the Pension Commission of Ontario [3] in 1993 advising it that there had been substantial downsizing in the ranks of salaried employees at Weavexx.

[8] On October 26, 1995, the PAC, which had got wind of BTR's plan to consolidate the pension plans of all of its affiliates in Canada and the United States, wrote a letter to the Superintendent requesting that the Weavexx Pension Plan be wound up. The letter, signed by the respondent Eystein Huus, stated, *inter alia*:

We in the committee strongly believe that this plan now should be wound up. The main reason for this is the severe downsizing which has taken place during the last four years, including two "early retirement windows" – one in early 1992, and one in 1994. The ratio of "Actual Members" to "Retirees" has dropped from 93/46 at the end of 1991 – to 49/72 at the end of 1994. There has also been further downsizing in 1995.

The plan has a very healthy surplus as shown in the enclosed "Report of Operations – for Plan Year ended December 31, 1994". This in spite of the fact that the Company has not contributed to the plan for about 20 years. The surplus therefore comes from employee contributions, wise investments, and a nearly total lack of improvements to the plan. The latter can best be exemplified by the fact that there have been no improvements for the retirees in the last 20 years – in spite of hefty inflation rates in several of those years!

Our committee believes that this surplus should primarily benefit those who have contributed to it, and who in many cases now live in dire circumstances – rather than end up as an asset for a company which hasn't contributed to it for such a very long time! And for that reason we recommend the plan be wound up.

[9] Almost a year later, on October 7, 1996, Mr. Huus again wrote to the Superintendent, informing him that Weavexx had announced that it would close its plant in Arnprior in 1996. He continued: "All production has now ended, and the dismantling of the plant is well under way". On behalf of the PAC, he concluded

by urging the Pension Commission to order a partial wind-up of the Weavexx pension plan.

[10] In the same 1995-1996 time frame, the appellants had been moving on an entirely different track. In September 1995, Weavexx notified its employees and retirees of BTR's intention to consolidate the pension plans of all its affiliates, including Weavexx. More than a year later, on December 30, 1996, Weavexx made a formal application to the Superintendent to transfer its pension assets into the consolidated BTR plan. The proposed effective date of the transfer was January 1, 1996 (almost a year earlier). The surplus in the Weavexx plan on January 1, 1996 was \$4,216,300.

[11] In considering the appellants' application for a transfer, the Superintendent was required to consider s. 81(5) of the *PBA* which provides:

81(5) The Superintendent shall refuse to consent to a transfer of assets that does not protect the pension benefits and any other benefits of the members and former members of the original pension plan or that does not meet the prescribed requirements and qualifications. [Emphasis added.]

[12] On August 15, 1997, the Superintendent approved the transfer of pension funds from the Weavexx plan to the BTR plan. The amount of the approved transfer was \$14,661,282. The Superintendent communicated his consent to the transfer to the appellants but not to the respondents.

[13] The Superintendent appears never to have made a formal decision concerning the respondents' request for a partial wind-up of the Weavexx pension plan.

(2) **The litigation**

[14] On June 30, 1998, the respondents brought an application for judicial review of the Superintendent's decision dated August 15, 1997 approving the transfer of the assets of the Weavexx pension plan to the consolidated BTR pension plan. In a decision dated May 30, 2000, the Divisional Court (Flinn, Jennings and Ferguson JJ.) set aside the Superintendent's consent and ordered the return of the assets to the Weavexx plan.

[15] In an addendum to the reasons for judgment dated November 16, 2000, dealing with the question of remedy, the court said that any new decision of the Superintendent dealing with the wind-up or partial wind-up of the Weavexx plan

was to be referred to the Financial Services Tribunal (the “Tribunal”), the successor since 1997 of the Pension Commission.

[16] In the same addendum, the court awarded the applicants their costs on a solicitor and client basis against the Superintendent and BTR fixed at \$54,294.06.

[17] The appellants appeal against all aspects of the decision of the Divisional Court – i.e. the merits, the remedy and costs.

C. **ISSUES**

[18] The issues on the appeal are:

- (1) Did the Divisional Court err by setting aside the decision of the Superintendent dated August 15, 1997?
- (2) Did the Divisional Court err by ordering that the issue of wind-up or partial wind-up be determined by the Superintendent and reviewed by the Tribunal?
- (3) Did the Divisional Court err by awarding costs to the respondents on a solicitor and client basis payable by the Superintendent and BTR?

D. **ANALYSIS**

(1) **The consent to transfer issue**

(a) **General**

[19] The appellants contend that the Divisional Court made several errors when it set aside the Superintendent’s decision dated August 17, 1997 approving the transfer of pension assets from the Weavexx plan to the consolidated BTR plan. They submit that the Divisional Court erred by holding that the Superintendent exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to give adequate consideration to the trust provisions of the Weavexx plan and to the accrued surplus in the prior plan. The appellants also submit that the Divisional Court erred by holding that the Superintendent exceeded his jurisdiction by approving the transfer without taking account of a post-transfer development, namely the closure some months later of the Arnprior plant. The appellants also contend that the Divisional Court erred by concluding that the Superintendent did not accord the respondents their rights of procedural fairness. Finally, the appellants contend that the Divisional Court erred by concluding that BTR owed, and breached, a duty of procedural fairness to the appellants. In summary, the appellants contend that the Divisional Court erred in

its interpretation of substantive pension law and erred in its analysis of the process issue.

[20] I do not think that the appellants have accurately characterized the decision of the Divisional Court. My reading of the decision is that the Divisional Court disposed of the application *entirely* on the process issue. It is true that the court referred to the substantive pension law issues, including the trust provisions of the Weavexx plan and the legal nature of a surplus. However, these references were made in the context of explaining the arguments the appellants wanted to make to the Superintendent. In my view, this is clear from the final two paragraphs of the court's reasons on the validity of the Superintendent's decision. The court stated its conclusion in this fashion:

Accordingly, the court concludes that the Superintendent exceeded his jurisdiction when he did not give adequate consideration to the question of wind-up and the trust provisions of the Weavexx plan with its surplus and further failed to observe their fiduciary duties to the applicants.

Without deciding how far the Superintendent had to go with respect to procedural fairness in dealing with the request of the applicants and a number of members of the pension plan of Weavexx, procedural fairness was not accorded to these members of the plan by either the Superintendent or BTR.

[21] I do not read this passage as representing a decision by the Divisional Court on the substantive pension law issues arising from the fiduciary duties of pension administrators, the interpretation of the trust provisions of the Weavexx pension plan or the legal nature of, and entitlement to, a pension plan surplus. Rather, the court is saying that because the PAC was not accorded procedural fairness, it was not able to argue, and the Superintendent did not therefore "give adequate consideration to", those substantive issues. It goes without saying that if the PAC had been given the opportunity to advance these arguments, the Superintendent might well have decided them against the PAC.

(2) **Standard of review**

[22] Although the Divisional Court employed 'excess of jurisdiction' language on occasion in its reasons for judgment, which might raise the spectre of a correctness standard of review, the court's reasons read as a whole make it clear that it was applying a reasonableness standard to its review of the merits of the

Superintendent's decision. Indeed, the court stated this explicitly: "The court takes the view that the standard to be applied to the Superintendent should be that of reasonableness". The appellants agree that this is the appropriate standard, although they contend that the court actually applied the higher correctness standard. The respondents do not challenge the reasonableness standard.

(a) **Standard of review**

[23] In *Hinds et al v. Superintendent of Pensions et al* [4] ("*Hinds*"), this court held that the standard of review of a decision of the Superintendent made pursuant to s. 80 of the *PBA* is reasonableness *simpliciter*. Since s. 81(5) is identical to s. 80(5), the same standard should apply.

(c) **Merits**

[24] The Superintendent's decision approving the transfer of assets from the Weavexx pension plan to the consolidated BTR pension plan was made pursuant to s. 81 of the *PBA*. Section 81(5) of the *PBA* requires the Superintendent to refuse consent if the proposed transfer of assets "does not protect the pension benefits of the members and former members of the employer's pension plan".

[25] I start with this observation: pension plans are for the benefit of the employees, not the companies which create them. They are a particularly important component of the compensation employees receive in return for their labour. They are not a gift from the employer; they are earned by the employees. Indeed, in addition to their labour, employees usually agree to other trade-offs in order to obtain a pension. As explained by Cory J. in *Schmidt v. Air Products Canada Ltd.*, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 611 at 646:

In the case of pension plans, employees not only contribute to the fund, in addition they almost invariably agree to accept lower wages and fewer employment benefits in exchange for the employer's agreeing to set up the pension trust in their favour.

[26] Similar statements have been expressed by this court in several cases. In *Gencorp Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)* (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 38 at 43 (C.A.), Robins J.A. said:

[T]he *Pension Benefit Act* is clearly public policy legislation establishing a carefully calibrated legislative and regulatory scheme prescribing minimum standards for all pension plans in Ontario. It

is intended to benefit and protect the interests of members and former members of pension plans

[27] In *Firestone Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Pension Commission)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 122 at 127 (C.A.) ("*Firestone*"), Blair J.A. stated that the *PBA* "is clearly intended to benefit employees" and "[i]n particular . . . evinces a special solicitude for employees affected by plant closures". In the present case, it was the downsizing and then closure of the Arnprior plant which clearly played a role in the retirees' concern and in the employer's transfer application.

[28] The implication of these authorities is that the Superintendent owes a high duty to employees with Ontario pension plans. As for the nature and consequences of this duty, I would adopt, as I did in *Hinds*, the eloquent language used by Reid J. in *Re Collins and Pension Commission of Ontario* (1986), 56 O.R. (2d) 274 at 285 (Div. Ct.) ("*Collins*"):

[I]t appears that the commission was established to ensure that certain interests were protected. While there is no doubt that those interests included the employer's, there appears to be equally no doubt that the commission was established to safeguard the plan members' interests as well . . . While the commission may not, strictly speaking, be a trustee for the members, for it holds no money belonging to the plan, it would be artificial to conclude that the commission's obligation to members is lower than the high standard of fiduciary obligation imposed on trustees.

[29] The chronology and contents of the record establish that the Superintendent focussed almost exclusively on the employers' transfer application made pursuant to s. 81 of the *PBA*, but ignored almost entirely the retirees' request for a wind-up or partial wind-up of the pension plan with a view to a distribution to them of the surplus that had accumulated in the plan.

[30] Sections 80 and 81 of the *PBA* are the principal provisions dealing with transfers. Section 69 of the *PBA* relates to the winding-up of pension plans. It provides, *inter alia*:

69.(1) The Superintendent by order may require the wind up of a pension plan in whole or in part if,

(a) there is a cessation or suspension of employer contributions to the pension fund; . . .

(d) a significant number of members of the pension plan cease to be employed by the employer as a result of the discontinuance of all or part of the business of the employer . . . ;

(e) all or a significant portion of the business carried on by the employer at a specific location is discontinued

[31] All of these sub-sections were in play in the 1995-1997 period. The corporate appellants admitted that the employer made no contributions to the pension plan after 1983: see the affidavit of Emily Van Vleet, Director of Employee Benefits at BTR, paragraph 13. Thus s. 69(1)(a) of the *PBA* was a potential source for a wind-up order by the Superintendent. As well, throughout the early 1990s there was significant downsizing at Weavexx's Arnprior plant and it was closed in late 1996. Accordingly, s. 69(1)(d) and (e) were also potential bases for a wind-up order. [5]

[32] Against the backdrop of the availability of both transfer and wind-up of the Weavexx pension plan, I turn to the chronology of events and the Superintendent's role and responses.

[33] The PAC moved first. It wrote to the Superintendent in 1993, alerting him to the substantial downsizing at the Arnprior plant. It wrote again on October 26, 1995 informing the Superintendent that it had been notified by BTR of its proposal to consolidate various pension plans, including the Weavexx plan. The PAC informed the Superintendent that they "strongly believe that this plan now should be wound up". The Superintendent acknowledged their letter on November 28, 1995 and said: "I would like to assure you that your representation on behalf of the Pension Advisory Committee will be taken into consideration when we review any application that is filed in respect of the proposed consolidation". On October 7, 1996, the PAC again wrote to the Pension Commission and requested that the Commission order a partial wind-up.

[34] The corporate appellants did not make their transfer application until December 30, 1996, more than a year after the first request by the PAC for a wind-up. The appropriate documents were sent to the Superintendent. However, the corporate appellants did not send them to the PAC until May 7, 1997, even though the subject matter of the application was *employee and retiree pensions*, there was a \$4,216,300 surplus in the plan, there was a PAC which had been established pursuant to s. 24 of the *PBA*, and the PAC had corresponded extensively with Weavexx and BTR about the proposed transfer and consolidation.

[35] Because the PAC was having difficulty communicating with the Pension Commission, it contacted the area M.P.P., W. Leo Jordan, and asked for his assistance. The result was a letter from the Superintendent to Mr. Jordan dated June 11, 1997, stating, *inter alia*:

We have reviewed the reported annual membership for the above named pension plan and other related documents filed with the Pension Commission of Ontario for the periods between January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1995 and cannot establish any reason why the plan should have been wound up or even partially wound up at any time during the above described period.

We have also reviewed the documents filed for the plan consolidation (merger) effective January 1, 1996 and conclude that the consolidation meets the requirement of the *Pension Benefits Act*. . . .

A letter has been sent to the plan administrator [Ms. Van Vleet at BTR] requesting confirmation of the closure of the Arnprior Plant of Weavexx Corporation since a partial wind up may be warranted under subsection 69(1) of the Act. This would not have any effect on the consolidation . . . as the partial wind up of the plan would be subsequent to the consolidation of the plans. To date we have not received confirmation that a partial wind up is warranted.

[36] The timing and the contents of this letter are a cause of concern. On June 11, 1997, the Superintendent is informing an M.P.P. that a wind-up or partial wind-up based on downsizing is not warranted. This decision was not, however, formally communicated to the PAC which made the formal request for a wind-up. In the same letter, the Superintendent is informing an M.P.P. that the proposed consolidation complies with the *PBA*. This was not, however, communicated to the corporations which made the application until the Superintendent made his formal decision on August 15, 1997. Moreover, the decision made on that date was never communicated formally to the PAC, even though it was its members' pensions which lay at the heart of the application and even though the PAC had corresponded extensively with the Superintendent about the proposed transfer and consolidation.

[37] The third paragraph of the Superintendent's letter (set out above) is also interesting. It refers to a letter that Steve Young, the Pension Officer with carriage of the file, had sent to Ms. Van Vleet on May 30, 1997 requesting information about the closure of the Arnprior plant. In the letter Mr. Young said:

If certain conditions are met, the Superintendent of Pensions may order the wind up of a pension plan, in whole or in part, pursuant to authority under section 69 of the *Pension Benefits Act*. . . .

Please provide us with the name and registration number of any pension plan in which employees affected by the above event [the plant closure] participated. Also advise us as to your company's intentions with respect to these pension plans and the affected members. If it is not your company's intention to voluntarily declare a wind up of the plan, either in whole or in part, we would ask that you provide us with details of the events affecting the members. The information is being requested to determine if any of the conditions under section 69 of the Act for the Superintendent to exercise his authority to order a wind up have been satisfied.

[38] Ms. Van Vleet responded to this letter on June 19, 1997. She indicated that Weavexx had initiated a full wind-up with respect to hourly employees. She said: "the Arnprior Hourly Plan is significantly overfunded with a surplus of \$2.9 million. We have approached the Union and are currently negotiating with them regarding a proposed distribution of that surplus". In other words, for the hourly workers, BTR was contemplating a wind-up, acknowledged a surplus, and was negotiating a distribution of the surplus with the members of that plan.

[39] With respect to the salaried employees, Ms. Van Vleet communicated the following:

The closure also affected seven salaried employees who are participating in the *BTR Pension Plan for Canadian Employees* registration number 0559716. We do not intend to declare a formal partial windup of this plan in respect of the seven individuals involved, but we will grant these members full vesting and growth rights.

[40] It will be recalled that the surplus in the Weavexx pension plan for salaried employees was approximately \$4.2 million. There is nothing in Ms. Van Vleet's letter to explain why a surplus of \$2.9 million in the pension plan for hourly workers suggests a full wind-up, whereas a surplus of \$4.2 million in the pension plan for salaried workers does not suggest any kind of wind-up.

[41] The Superintendent made his formal decision approving the transfer application on August 15, 1997. There is nothing in that decision about the PAC's request for a wind-up or partial wind-up of the pension plan. The Superintendent's decision was not sent to the respondents.

[42] Based on this review, mostly chronological, of the major events, I share the Divisional Court's discomfort with the process adopted by the Superintendent in this case.

[43] On the transfer side of the equation, the Superintendent engaged in a review of the application and made a formal decision. However, I question whether this decision was anything more than a formality given that the Superintendent presaged his final decision in a letter to an M.P.P. two months before the formal decision.

[44] On the wind-up side of the equation, the Superintendent's performance was genuinely troubling. There was little and poor communication with the PAC, even though the PAC was established pursuant to s. 24 of the *PBA* and requested the Superintendent to consider a wind-up more than a year before the corporate appellants made their transfer application. The only substantive communication the Superintendent ever made about the merits of the PAC's request was in a letter to the M.P.P. from the PAC's constituency. The Superintendent appears never to have made a formal decision about the wind-up request. Indeed, it is unclear whether the Superintendent was seriously considering the wind-up issue. Pension Officer Young's letter to Ms. Van Vleet at BTR on May 30, 1997 seems to suggest that he was:

The information is being requested to determine if any of the conditions under section 69 of the Act for the Superintendent to exercise his authority to order a wind-up have been satisfied.

However, in his letter to the M.P.P. just 11 days later, on June 11, 1997, the Superintendent stated that a partial wind-up would be subsequent to the consolidation and that "[t]o date, we have not received confirmation that a partial wind up is warranted", which seems to suggest that the Superintendent regarded

his role on the wind-up issue as reactive – and, indeed, reactive to the employer, not the requesting PAC.

[45] There was a good deal at stake in this merger/consolidation/wind-up matter. There was a surplus of more than \$4.2 million in a plan to which, on its own evidence, the employer had not contributed for 13 years previous to its consolidation application. I do not say that this is unlawful. Rather, I do say that the Superintendent ignored the PAC's request for a wind-up decision as he considered that application. Moreover, on the record, it is unclear how the Superintendent viewed the relationship between the employers' s. 81 transfer and consolidation application and the employees' s. 69 wind-up request. Finally, it appears that the Superintendent never made a decision on the employees' request. All of this was, in my view, starkly contrary to the observation of Blair J.A. in *Firestone, supra*, that the *PBA* "is clearly intended to benefit employees" and "[i]n particular . . . evinces a special solicitude for employees affected by plant closures". Accordingly, I think that the Divisional Court was correct to conclude that the Superintendent's decision of August 15, 1997 was unreasonable. The Superintendent's failure to consider the partial wind-up request prior to, or in conjunction with, deciding the transfer application rendered unreasonable his consent to the transfer.

[46] Turning to a different issue, the Divisional Court also concluded that BTR had not accorded procedural fairness to the respondents. In my view, this conclusion is in error. The decision that is the subject matter of the application for judicial review and this appeal is the Superintendent's decision. BTR was the applicant, not the decision-maker. Hence it did not owe the respondents any duty of procedural fairness related to that decision.

(2) **The remedy issue**

[47] On the subject of remedy, the Divisional Court ordered that the consent of the Superintendent to the transfer of assets be set aside. The court also ordered that the pension assets be returned to the Weavexx plan. Finally, the court ordered the Superintendent to consider the wind-up issue. Any decision by the Superintendent (or failure to make a decision) would then be referred to the Tribunal. The appellants challenge the second and third components of this decision – i.e. the return of the assets to the Weavexx plan and the compulsory role of the Tribunal in the resolution of the wind-up issue.

[48] On the return of the assets issue, the appellants contend that the Divisional Court only had jurisdiction to quash the Superintendent's consent to the transfer; it did not have the authority to take the additional step of returning the assets to the

Weavexx plan. Specifically, the appellants contend that the Divisional Court's order breached s. 81(6) of the *PBA*:

81(6) The Superintendent by order may require the transferee to return to the pension fund assets . . . transferred without the prior consent of the Superintendent

According to the appellants, this provision requires that the Superintendent, not the Divisional Court, decide whether the pension assets should be returned to the Weavexx plan.

[49] I disagree. On the specific point, I agree with the analysis of the Divisional Court:

Insofar as the transfer of assets is concerned the argument that s. 81(6) and (7) apply, is, in our view, in error. These sections refer to the situation where assets are transferred “without the prior consent of the Superintendent” That is not the case here, the assets were transferred with the consent of the Superintendent.

[50] On the general point, I see no principled basis for interfering with the Divisional Court's decision to order the return of the pension assets to Weavexx. Once the Superintendent's decision was set aside, an order which had the effect of returning the parties to their original positions can hardly be viewed as frustrating the purposes of the *PBA*.

[51] On the component of the decision according a compulsory role to the Tribunal on any future decision on the wind-up issue, the respondents in effect concede in their factum that the Divisional Court erred:

65. The Superintendent has pointed out that interpreted liberally, the reasons of the Divisional Court would require that any future decision by the Superintendent on the request for a partial wind up must be referred to a Tribunal hearing, regardless of whether any party requests a hearing. This could not reasonably have been intended by the Divisional Court. All parties agree that the decision of the Superintendent with respect to the wind up request

should be referred to the Tribunal only at the request of one of the affected parties.

[52] This is a fair concession. Section 89 of the *PBA* permits a party affected by a potential wind-up order by the Superintendent to *request* a hearing by the Tribunal. The Divisional Court erred by making such a hearing mandatory.

(3) **The costs issue**

[53] The Divisional Court awarded costs on a solicitor and client scale “for a number of reasons”:

- a) The matter was indeed a complex one made more complex by the lack of support given by both the office of the superintendent and BTR.
- b) This attitude was demonstrated by the manner in which the assets were finally merged, notwithstanding the original representation that they would be kept separate and apart and the lack of information given to the applicants by the Superintendent and, indeed, to their counsel when it appeared that litigation was being contemplated.
- c) The fact that it is not clear whether or not the Superintendent had taken any position with respect to the wind-up of the Weavexx plan.
- d) Finally, by the fact that BTR would not support these retirees by providing them with funds in order to retain counsel to make submissions on their behalf.

[54] In my view, the record supports these four reasons. The Superintendent appears never to have made a decision on the wind-up request made by the respondents. The appellant corporations also did not treat the respondents properly. They did not send a copy of the valuation report to the PAC until almost five months after the transfer application was filed, even though they knew that the PAC was deeply concerned about the matter. They did not assist the PAC with legal representation, even though the pension plan had a surplus of \$4.2 million and Weavexx had not contributed a penny to it for 13 years.

[55] In summary, although solicitor and client costs should be awarded only in exceptional cases, I can see no basis for interfering with the Divisional Court's conclusion that this was such a case.

E. DISPOSITION

[56] I would allow the appeal in part. I would set aside those components of the Divisional Court's decision in which the court concluded that the corporate appellant BTR had not accorded procedural fairness to the respondents and ordered that any future decision made by the Superintendent on the wind-up issue be automatically referred to the Financial Services Tribunal.

[57] In all other respects, I would dismiss the appeal.

[58] The respondents have been substantially successful on the appeal. I would award them costs of the appeal payable by all of the respondents.

Released: February 14, 2002

“J. C. MacPherson J.A.”

“I agree R. S. Abella J.A.”

“I agree K. Feldman J.A.”

[1] Now the Superintendent of Financial Services.

[2] The respondent Tom Wood passed away in 1998.

[3] Now the Financial Services Commission of Ontario.

[4] Released today.

[5] I note in passing that none of the appellants takes the position that a wind-up order can flow only from an application by the employer. Although s. 68 of the *PBA* envisions a wind-up process initiated by the employer, s. 69 is not limited in this fashion. Indeed, the steps the Superintendent took in this case, to be discussed below, indicate that the Superintendent regarded it as his duty to deal with a wind-up request from the respondent retirees.

TAB 3

B. DUTY AND STANDARD OF CARE

The broad range of an administrator's functions in connection with a pension plan and pension fund situates it in a sobering position with respect to its potential for liability to plan beneficiaries—liability both under the *PBA* and for damages in civil actions. This section describes the general duties of pension plan administrators and their agents and advisors and the standards of care expected of them.

1) Introduction

a) Statutory duty of care

Because the plan administrator is the ultimate authority accountable for the administration and investment of the pension plan and fund, the administrator owes its constituency a "special" duty of care as a fiduciary in connection with its statutory functions.⁷⁷

An administrator is responsible for administering the pension plan and investing its assets using "all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator's profession, business or calling, ought to possess."⁷⁸ In addition, an administrator must administer and invest the pension fund in a manner "that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person."⁷⁹ A similar standard of care is prescribed in other jurisdictions.⁸⁰ When exercising its duty to administer and invest the pension fund, the plan administrator's principal regard must be for the purpose of preserving the fund, which is to ensure that the interests of employees and pensioners are protected. As stated by one court:

The purpose of the [PBA] in preserving the fund is only in the context of addressing the interests of members and former members of the pension plan. ... The preservation of the fund is an objective of the [PBA] only to the extent of ensuring that the interests of members and former members are met. Preservation of the fund in order to

77 *Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)* (1995), 18 C.C.P.B. 198 at para. 31 (PCO) [*Imperial Oil*]; FSCO Policy A300-100 at 10 (May 1990).

78 *PBA*, s. 22(2).

79 *Ibid.*, s. 22(1).

80 See federal (*PBSA*, ss. 8(3)–(5)), Alberta (*AEPPA*, s. 13(5)), British Columbia (*BCPBSA*, ss. 8(5) and (6)), Manitoba (*MPBA*, ss. 28.1(2)–(4)), New Brunswick (*NBPBA*, ss. 17(1) & (2)), Newfoundland and Labrador (*NLPBA*, s. 14(1)), Nova Scotia (*NSPBA*, ss. 29(1) & (2)), Quebec (*QSPPA*, ss. 150–151), Saskatchewan (*SPBA*, s. 11(2)).

ensure a surplus to any beneficiary of the remainder, after the needs of members and former members are met, is secondary.⁸¹

While the distinction may be a fine one, the duties of care owed by an administrator under the PBA are “statutory obligations” that are enforceable by the Superintendent and are “independent of causes of action in tort, fiduciary or trust law.”⁸² The relevance of the distinction between the extent of an administrator’s so-called “statutory” and “common law” fiduciary duties goes more to the remedy and the forum in which a person alleging a breach of the duty seeks to obtain the remedy, than it does to the qualitative content of the duty.⁸³

b) Common law duty of care

Independent of its statutory obligations, a pension plan administrator is a fiduciary at common law vis-à-vis the beneficiaries of the pension fund and, as such, can be liable for damages, restitution or other equitable relief for a breach thereof. A person owes another a fiduciary duty at common law where there is evidence of a dependency relationship in which that person is reasonably reposed with trust and confidence by the other to act in his or her best interests.⁸⁴ It is “virtually self evident” that a pension plan administrator meets these criteria in light of the administrator’s statutory obligations and the fact that plan beneficiaries are always dependent on the administrator to manage the plan and pro-

81 *Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Superintendent of Pensions)* (1993), 108 D.L.R. (4th) 95 at 130 (N.S.S.C.), aff’d (1994), 113 D.L.R. (4th) 424 (N.S.C.A.) [*Hawker Siddeley*].

82 *Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Superintendent of Pensions and CWA/ITU Pension Plan (Canada) Board of Trustees* (7 June 1999), PCO Index No. XDEC-45 (PCO). Qualitatively, the “distinction drawn is probably unimportant in respect of administrators ... because, it is clear that in placing such responsibility upon the administrator, the Act is treating the administrator as a fiduciary.” Eileen E. Gillese, “The Fiduciary Liability of the Employer as Pension Plan Administrator” (Paper presented at Pension and Other Benefit Funds, Who is the Fiduciary?, Toronto, The Canadian Institute, 18 November 1996) 1 at 11.

83 The question remains open to what extent the Superintendent has jurisdiction to find that an administrator complied with the provisions of the PBA, in the face of evidence establishing a breach of the administrator’s common law fiduciary duties to the plan and its members: *Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Superintendent of Pensions and CWA/ITU Pension Plan (Canada) Board of Trustees*, *ibid.*

84 *Guerin v. The Queen*, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 at 384; *Hodgkinson v. Simms*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377 at 412-13.

tect the fund.⁸⁵ In short, a pension plan administrator “owes a duty of care to members of the pension plan.”⁸⁶

But regardless of the source of the duty, what is clear is that an administrator must comply with both the statutory and common law standards.

c) To whom the duty is owed

There is little doubt that an administrator stands in a fiduciary relationship to persons entitled to pension benefits and other money payable under the pension plan, including employees, pensioners and other former members, and, where applicable, their spouses, former spouses, estates, and beneficiaries. As stated by the Ontario Court of Appeal, “pension plans are for the benefit of the employees, not the companies which create them.”⁸⁷ This backdrop provides the context of to whom an administrator owes duties under a pension plan:

The sole duty of the Board of Trustees was their fiduciary duty to consider the welfare of the employees. The decisions are uniform that the duties of trustees of employee trust funds are owed to employee beneficiaries of the trusts, not to the parties to the collective bargaining agreements creating or sustaining them.⁸⁸

There is an emerging viewpoint that an administrator, in limited circumstances, owes duties to a pension plan sponsor, such as an employer or trade union, or both, for example, where the sponsor can be identified as a “beneficiary” to the surplus in plan upon its termination.⁸⁹ In a MEPP or JSPP, there is a separation in the legal identity be-

85 Gillese, above note 82. See also *Brathowski v. Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board* (1997), 16 C.C.P.B. 182 at para. 65 (Gen. Div.).

86 *Hembruff v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board* (2005), 48 C.C.P.B. 214 at paras. 63–69 (Ont. C.A.) [*Hembruff*].

87 *Huus v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)* (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 380 (C.A.).

88 *Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Benefit Fund for Hospital & Health Care Employees*, 697 F.2d 562 at 567 (4th Cir. 1982); *Bathgate v. National Hockey League Pension Society* (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 326 at 407 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff'd (1994), 110 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.) [*Bathgate*]; *HEPP*, above note 37 at para. 104.

89 Where an employer is a beneficiary of a surplus on plan termination, the administrator may owe duties to the employer, provided those duties do not interfere with the legal entitlements of employees. See, for example, *MicMac Agencies Ltd. (Receiver of) v. Prudential Assurance Co.* (1987), 82 N.S.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), where the insurance company that administered an employer sponsored pension plan was found to be liable to the receiver of the employer (in its capacity as plan sponsor) for damages arising from the insurance company having used overly-conservative actuarial assumptions in the calculation of employee pension benefits on plan termination

tween the administrator and the sponsors. Since the relationship is at arm's length, the administrator's obligations to the sponsors are easier to circumscribe; they would ordinarily be set out in the trust agreement, the pension plan or another legal instrument between the parties and would also be governed by the duty to act impartially. Similarly, in Quebec, a legal separation between sponsor and administrator is a requirement of the pension legislation.

In Ontario and other jurisdictions that permit an employer to administer single-employer plans, the duties of the administrator vis-à-vis the employer may be perceived to conflict with its obligations to act in the best interests of the employees and, accordingly, the scope of an administrator's obligations to an employer continues to be debated.

2) Content of the Duty

a) Introduction

The common law standards of care imposed upon fiduciaries is the highest standard known at law and is reserved for trustees and those who act in capacities that are equivalent to that of a trustee.⁹⁰ While the statutory duties imposed on pension plan administrators are modelled on the common law standard, they are not identical. At common law, a fiduciary's conduct is measured by reference to what a person of "ordinary prudence" would do when managing his or her own property.⁹¹ This is what has become known as the "prudent person" test. Under the PBA, an administrator, in exercising care, diligence, and skill, must act as a person of ordinary prudence would "in dealing with the property of another person."⁹² In other words, the administrator may not take the same risks as it invests the pension fund, for example, that it might take when investing its own assets.

As a result, it is generally recognized that the fiduciary standards imposed upon pension plan administrators are higher than those required of trustees at common law because it is assumed that a person of ordinary prudence would be more diligent when dealing with the property of another than they would be in dealing with their own property.⁹³

which resulted in larger pension liabilities and thus in a smaller surplus being available to be paid to the receiver after the discharge of all employee pensions.

90 *Collins v. Pension Commission of Ontario* (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 86 at 98 (Ont. Div. Ct.).

91 *Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co.*, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 302 at 315.

92 PBA, s. 22(1).

93 See Patricia J. Myhal, "Doing One's Duty: Pension Plan Administrators, Agents and Trustees," (1991) 11 E. & T.J. 10 at 11; Dona L. Campbell, "Investment

b) Relevant knowledge and skill

Coincidental to, and further illustrative of, the high prudent-person standard imposed on administrators under the PBA is the duty to use “all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought to possess.”⁹⁴ Pension plan administrators and their agents and employees⁹⁵ are deemed to possess “specialized” and “expert” knowledge and skill, which must be exercised when discharging their statutory functions and common law duties.⁹⁶ Accordingly, a prudent administrator will provide its employees, agents, and, if the administrator is a board of trustees,⁹⁷ its board members, “with appropriate training and ongoing education, as required.”⁹⁸ Continuing education and training is especially important in jointly-governed pension plans where the composition of the board often includes lay persons and the governance regime is more closely bound up in the collective bargaining process.

Moreover, the PBA modifies the traditional common law rule concerning the level of skill and knowledge expected of a so-called “professional” trustee who has particular expertise. That rule held a professional trustee to same standard as a lay trustee.⁹⁹ Because the statutory standard insists on a level of skill that a person “ought to possess” by reason of the administrator’s “profession, business or calling,” it becomes unnecessary to debate the scope of the common law rule as it applies to pension plan administrators.

The duty of knowledge and skill extends not only to the investment of the pension fund, but to all aspects of pension plan administration, including communications with employees and beneficiaries, the inter-

Responsibility of Benefit Fund Trustees” (1993) 12 E. & T.J. 309 at 311–12; It should also be noted that some provincial *Trustee Acts* also impose this higher standard on trustees, whereas other Acts impose the common law standard.

94 PBA, s. 22(2).

95 *Ibid.*, ss. 22(5) and (8).

96 *Deraps v. Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada* (1999), 179 D.L.R. (4th) 168 at 184 (Ont. C.A.) [*Deraps*].

97 Under PBA, s. 22(3), s. 22(2) applies to both single-employer and jointly governed pension plan administrators.

98 Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA), *CAPSA Pension Plan Governance Guidelines* (Toronto: CAPSA, 2003) Principle 5: Knowledge and skills at 7.

99 See *Fales et al. v. Canada Permanent Trust Co.*, above note 91. See also *Metropolitan Toronto Pension Plan v. Aetna Life Assurance Co. of Canada* (1992), 98 D.L.R. (4th) 582 at 597 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [*Aetna*]; *Froese v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada* (1996), 137 D.L.R. (4th) 725 (B.C.C.A.) [*Froese*].

pretation of plan documentation, the calculation and payment of pension benefits, regulatory filings, and dealings with the Superintendent.¹⁰⁰

c) Loyalty and good faith

Another common law feature of a fiduciary relationship that applies in pension plan administration is the duty of loyalty and good faith, that is, to act solely in the best interests of the beneficiaries: "A fiduciary is subject to a strict ethic to provide, among other things, the utmost good faith and loyalty to those to whom he acts in the capacity of fiduciary."¹⁰¹ In the oft-quoted passage of Megarry V.C. in *Cowan v. Scargill*:¹⁰²

The duty of the trustees toward their beneficiaries is paramount. They must, of course, obey the law; but subject to that, they must put the interests of their beneficiaries first.¹⁰³

An administrator has a duty not to act in bad faith toward the employees in the pension plan.¹⁰⁴ While the court's comments in *Cowan v. Scargill* were made in the context of prudence in pension fund investment, the duty of loyalty and good faith extends to other aspects of plan administration where the board has discretionary powers of decision.¹⁰⁵

The duty of loyalty applies to members of jointly-administered boards of trustees as well as to administrators established by statute. The scope of the duty of loyalty in connection with single-employer administrators and the extent the duty forms part of the statutory standard remains unresolved. While the terms "loyalty" and "best interests" do not appear in the PBA, clearly, on the investment side, most appear to be in agreement that the duty of loyalty is implicitly wrapped into the statutory obligations to exercise "care, diligence and skill," "ordinary prudence" and "all relevant knowledge" in the "administration and investment of the pension fund."¹⁰⁶ In areas such as plan inter-

100 Compare the language of PBA, s. 22(1) with s. 22(2). The former provision appears to apply solely to an administrator's duties in connection with the "pension fund" whereas the latter provision applies to both the "pension plan" and the "pension fund."

101 *Moffat v. Wetstein* (1996), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).

102 (1984), [1985] 1 Ch. D. 270, [1984] 2 All E.R. 750.

103 *Ibid.* at 287 (Ch. D.).

104 *Hembruff*, above note 86 at para. 116 (C.A.).

105 See *Bathgate*, above note 88; *Boe v. Alexander* (1987), 41 D.L.R. (4th) 520 (B.C.C.A.); and *National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada, Local 458 v. White Farm Manufacturing Canada Ltd.* (1992), 8 O.R. (3d) 606 (Gen. Div.).

106 PBA, ss. 22(1) & (2).

pretation and determinations respecting entitlement to benefits, few would argue that a single-employer administrator is not subject to the duty of loyalty and good faith,¹⁰⁷ especially where there is an element of discretion to be exercised by the employer.¹⁰⁸

To what extent does the administrator of a single-employer plan owe an obligation to the employees—either under the statute or at common law—to recover an optimum financial benefit in all aspects of the pension plan’s administration, outside of simply investment-related activity? This can be illustrated by the discussion on the duty to avoid conflicts of interest, which is closely related to the duty of loyalty, in the next section.

d) No conflict of interest

At common law, a fiduciary has an absolute duty to avoid any conflict of interest, regardless of whether the conflict is actual or perceived:

Subsumed in the fiduciary’s duties of good faith and loyalty is the duty to avoid a conflict of interest. The fiduciary must not only avoid a direct conflict of interest but must also avoid the appearance of a possible or potential conflict. The fiduciary is barred from dividing loyalties between competing interests, including self-interest.¹⁰⁹

This was also the reasoning of the court in *Cowan v. Scargill*, where the union trustees appointed to the administration board of the pension plan were deemed to be acting in a conflict of interest for not taking off their union “hats” when evaluating the plan’s investment policy.

The PBA similarly prohibits an administrator, as a general rule, from “knowingly” permitting its interests to conflict with its duties and powers “in respect of the pension fund,”¹¹⁰ or receiving any benefit other than pension benefits, a refund of contributions, and reasonable fees and expenses related to the administration of the plan “permitted by the common law or provided for in the pension plan.”¹¹¹ Other provinces’ pension standards legislation also contain conflict of interest provisions applicable to the plan administrator.¹¹²

107 See, for example, *Yates v. Air Canada* (2004), 40 C.C.P.B. 121 at paras. 93–108 (B.C.S.C.), where the court applied the duty of loyalty and good faith to a single-employer administrator in connection with its adjudication of a dispute between competing plan beneficiaries to survivor benefit offered under the plan.

108 See Chapter 5, section D(6)(e).

109 *Moffat v. Wetstein*, above note 101.

110 PBA, s. 22(4).

111 *Ibid.*, s. 22(9).

112 See federal (PBSA, ss. 8(6)–(11)), Alberta (AEPPA, Reg., s. 54(1)), British Columbia (BCPBSA, ss. 8(9) & (10)), Manitoba (MPBA, ss. 28.1(1) and (9)), New

The PBA contains limited exemptions to the conflict-of-interest prohibition where a pension plan is jointly governed. The statutory prohibition does not apply to an administrator in circumstances where it enters into a transaction permitted under the plan documentation “related to the administration of the pension plan or pension fund” that is in the “interests” and “protective of the rights” of employees, “disclosed” to the membership prior to entering into it, and confers no “direct or indirect personal benefit” upon the administrator or any individual member of its board.¹¹³ In addition, where the pension plan is a MEPP, the PBA deems a transaction not to be a conflict of interest where the administrator exercises a right under the pension plan documentation to enter into a transaction with one or more of the pension plan sponsors to purchase or lease office space for legal, accounting or “other services,” or purchase materials and equipment “necessary” for the administration and operation of the pension plan, provided that the compensation paid is “reasonable in the circumstances.”¹¹⁴

A plan administrator may find itself in a perceived conflict of interest where it is also the employer under the pension plan and it is perceived to prefer its own interests over that of the employees. To what extent does the PBA’s conflict-of-interest prohibition apply in the case of employer-sponsored plans? The federal *Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA)* provision prohibiting conflicts of interest by administrators has an express term providing that if there is a material conflict of interest between the role of an employer that is an administrator and its role “in any other capacity,” the administrator “shall act in the best interests of the members of the pension plan.”¹¹⁵

Does a single-employer administrator violate the statutory conflict-of-interest prohibition solely by reason of the fact that it is both the employer and the administrator? It appears not. In *Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions)*,¹¹⁶ a group of employees (the “Entitlement 55 Group”) objected to their employer’s amendment to the pension plan that made the eligibility requirements to receive an early retirement pension more difficult to obtain. The employees argued the amendment was void on the basis that the employer was simultaneous-

Brunswick (*NBPBA*, ss. 17(3) and 19), Newfoundland and Labrador (*NLPBA*, ss. 17(1)–(3)), Nova Scotia (*NSPBA*, ss. 29(3) & (7)), Quebec (*QSPPA*, ss. 158–159).

113 *PBA*, Reg., s. 49(2).

114 *Ibid.*, s. 49(1).

115 Federal (*PBSA*, s. 8(10)). See also Maurice C. Cullity, “Personal liability of trustees and rights of indemnification” (1996) 16 *E. & T.J.* 115 at 126. See also Gillese, above note 82.

116 *Imperial Oil*, above note 77.

ly acting in its capacity as employer and its capacity as plan administrator. The employees argued that the employer was acting with an improper purpose in that the amendment had the effect of reducing the potential liabilities of the pension fund in respect of the employees who would otherwise qualify and thereby, increasing the amount of surplus available in the plan for the employer to use to reduce its annual service costs. The Pension Commission of Ontario (PCO) rejected this theory and, in accepting the amendment for registration, affirmed what has since been referred to as the “two hats” principle of employer-sponsored administration:

The Act recognizes that an employer may wear “two hats” in respect of pension plans. Indeed, section 8 specifically states that an employer may be an administrator. In that way, it acknowledges that an employer may play two roles and it is self evident that the two roles may come into conflict from time to time.

... This leads us to the conclusion that, at least in the first instance, when the word “administrator” is used in section 22, it is used to mean the person or body administering the fund and who stands in a special fiduciary relationship with the plan members courtesy of the fiduciary standard of care set out in subsection 22(1) ...

We are of the view that an employer plays a role in respect of the pension plan that is distinct from its role as administrator. Its role as employer permits it to make the decision to create a pension plan, to amend it and to wind it up. Once the plan and fund are in place, it becomes an administrator for the purposes of management of the fund and administration of the plan. If we were to hold that an employer was an administrator for all purposes once a plan was established, of what use would a power of amendment be? An employer could never use the power to amend the plan in a way that was to its benefit, as opposed to the benefit of the employees.¹¹⁷

Imperial Oil is an important case because it recognizes that structural conflicts of interest are explicit in the *PBA* and must be tolerated. This is especially true given that pension plans are so often administered by a single employer. Under the “two hats” principle, when an employer acts in a capacity *qua* administrator, the employer is subject to the statutory and common law fiduciary standards imposed on plan administrators. However, when an employer acts *qua* employer, it likely does not owe employees a statutory duty of care.¹¹⁸

117 *Ibid.* at paras. 30-33.

118 See also *Attard v. Maple Leaf Foods Inc.* (2002), 32 C.C.P.B. 221 at para. 12 (S.C.J.).

An employer must be very careful “not [to] adopt an adversarial approach” vis-à-vis its employees when it is engaged in administrative functions under the plan or the PBA, notwithstanding that it may be involved in a legitimate pension dispute with its employees in its capacity as employer.¹¹⁹ In *Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*,¹²⁰ the Nova Scotia Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Nova Scotia Superintendent of Pensions to refuse to approve a wind up report filed by a pension plan administrator that was also the employer, on the basis that the administrator selected a wind up date for the pension plan that excluded a large number of former employees from being eligible to receive statutory early retirement grow-in benefits conferred under the Nova Scotia PBA.¹²¹ The court observed that the actions of the administrator had the effect of maximizing the amount of the surplus that would remain after all benefits, including grow-in benefits, were eventually paid. The court also observed that the administrator intended to claim that surplus for itself in a separate court action sometime after the wind up application had been concluded. The court identified the administrator’s conflict of interest and its consequences:

An obvious conflict of interest is foreseeable. In the known circumstances, the administrator may be acting contrary to its statutory duty to avoid conflicts of interest and also contrary to its common law fiduciary duties. One wonders whether it should have initiated the present application or should have resigned from its administration of the pension plan and fund before doing so. I find it incomprehensible that it did not resign before initiating this application. If the administrator does not resign prior to claiming the surplus, its claim should not be heard or should be refused out of hand.¹²²

Similarly, in *Sherwood Communications*, the PCO chastised an administrator for bringing an application to withdraw surplus from the pension plan for the benefit of the employer, stating:

We are also troubled by the fact that the application is brought by the Applicant who is the administrator of the Plan. As administrator, the Applicant is a fiduciary. Is it acceptable for a fiduciary to make this argument which clearly is to the detriment of the plan members?¹²³

119 *Sutherland v. Hudson’s Bay Co.* (2005), 74 O.R. (3d) 608 at para. 51 (S.C.J.).

120 (1991), 103 N.S.R. (2d) 388 (T.D.), aff’d (1994), 2 C.C.P.B. 168 (N.S.C.A.).

121 See Chapter 9, section C(3)(f).

122 Above note 120 at 413–14 (T.D.).

123 *Sherwood Communications Group Ltd. Pension Plan, Re* (1994), 7 C.C.P.B. 111 at para. 22 (PCO).

The Nova Scotia court's decision, in *Hawker Siddeley*, and the PCO's decision, in *Sherwood Communications*, may appear at first glance to conflict with the reasoning in *Imperial Oil*;¹²⁴ but a second reading suggests it is possible to reconcile these cases. In *Hawker Siddeley*, the employer was acting in its capacity as administrator when it filed the wind up report, because that is a statutory function imposed on administrators.¹²⁵ Accordingly, to the extent the administrator has any discretion under the pension plan to select the wind up date,¹²⁶ it must do so with due regard to its statutory standard of care.¹²⁷ Similarly, in *Sherwood Communications*, it was the plan administrator that purported to file the application for surplus withdrawal. Under the PBA, however, it is the

124 This was argued by one author, see Anthony J. Devir, "Fiduciary Obligations and Surplus Issues in Pension Plans: The Employers' Perspective" (1999) 18 E.T.P.J. 317 at 319.

125 A substantially similar provision is set out in the Ontario PBA: s. 70(1), "The administrator of a pension plan that is to be wound up in whole or in part shall file a wind up report ..."

126 This would depend on the individual circumstances of the pension plan documentation and wind up process. While many pension plans reserve the power to wind up the plan to the employer, in the event the resolution winding up the plan is silent with respect to the wind up date and, correspondingly, does not direct the administrator to administer the wind up in accordance with a fixed wind-up date selected by the employer, the administrator must select its own wind up date.

127 In *Hawker Siddeley*, above note 81, the administrator appeared to have little discretion in selecting the wind up date. In the circumstances of this particular case, the court perceived the employer's actions in selecting the wind up date as high-handedness (i.e., it had the result of inflating the surplus at the expense of the employees). In light of the remedial purpose of the PBA's grow-in provisions to protect the employees, the court was concerned over the acquiescence of the administrator in respect of the employer's direction which should have led it to either resign as administrator, which the court recommended, or alternatively, and less drastically, to seek the advice and directions of the court or the Superintendent over the extent of its obligation *qua* administrator in these circumstances. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal appeared to agree as it distinguished the nature of the proceedings before it with another option that was available to the employer, in its capacity as administrator (at 442 (N.S.C.A.)):

[*Hawker Siddeley*] is not in the position of an administrator seeking the interpretation of a provision in the plan, nor does it equate to that of an executor asking the court for the interpretation of a provision in a last will and testament and, thereafter, the direction of the court for the course the executor or trustee should follow. Instead, *Hawker Siddeley's* attack relates to the authority of the superintendent and the manner by which he conducted himself. *Hawker Siddeley* has every right to do this, but when it does, in the circumstances underlying this proceeding, the matter is brought to the court more on its own behalf than on any other.

employer that should be seeking consent for a withdrawal of surplus, not the administrator. This feature of the PBA was even acknowledged by the PCO in *Imperial Oil*:

To illustrate how the Act uses the words “administrator” and “employer” differently throughout the Act, consider ... [t]hose provisions [that] enable an employer to seek and receive surplus pension funds. Clearly, an administrator would be in a conflict of interest position if it sought the return of surplus funds for an employer. The Act makes it clear that it is the employer who seeks the refund of surplus funds ... ¹²⁸

Pension law permits an administrator, in many cases, to insulate itself against a conflict of interest by simply setting aside personal views and not acting upon them. In other cases, however, an administrator may have reasonable doubts regarding the scope of its fiduciary obligations with respect to implementing a plan amendment, wind up or other activity, and in such event it should seek legal advice or bring an application for advice and directions to the superior court.¹²⁹

e) Impartiality and even-handedness

The duty of even-handedness is a trust law concept that requires trustees to hold an impartial balance among beneficiaries. This includes not giving preferential treatment to any one beneficiary or class of beneficiaries except to the extent authorized in the trust documentation:

It is I think a primary principle, which need not be laboured by me, that one of the trustees' first duties was to hold the balance evenly between the beneficiaries and various groups of beneficiaries and to try to interpret the document and carry out its provisions in the spirit and letter in which it was expressed. They were not, nor are they now, entitled to favour one group of beneficiaries in any way as against another. They were obliged to treat all beneficiaries with fairness and impartiality, always attempting to carry out the expressed intention of the settlor.¹³⁰

The even-handedness rule has been considered and applied in a number of pension cases, including in the context of employer-sponsored plans,¹³¹

128 *Imperial Oil*, above note 77 at para. 31.

129 See Chapter 6, section B(3)(d).

130 *Boe v. Alexander*, above note 105 at 527. See also *HEPP*, above note 37.

131 *Yates v. Air Canada*, above note 107 at paras. 103–4 (S.C.); *Anova Inc. Employee Retirement Pension Plan (Administrator of) v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.* (1994), 121 D.L.R. (4th) 162 at 180 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [*Anova*]; *C.A.S.A.W., Local 1 v. Alcan Smelters and Chemicals Ltd.* (2001), 198 D.L.R. (4th) 504 (B.C.C.A.).

MEPPs,¹³² and plans administered by a third party on plan wind up.¹³³ Nevertheless, the rule is complicated to apply in the area of pensions, and the nature and scope of the duty depends generally on whether the question concerns a matter of plan administration and interpretation, statutory compliance under the PBA, or a discretionary matter of plan design.

On questions of pure plan administration, there is little doubt that the duty of even-handedness applies to the administrator's functions and forms part of the statutory standard of care. An administrator must interpret and apply the plan text and trust documentation reasonably, in a fashion consistent with the settlors' intentions in establishing the plan, and in such a manner that competing interests are balanced fairly and equitably.¹³⁴

Where a choice exists between two or more competing interpretations of the plan documentation, the administrator is required to prefer the one that is most fair and even-handed to the employees as a whole. Where two or more potential beneficiaries compete for the same benefit, the administrator must be as fair as possible between them in exercising its discretion and powers under the plan and act in good faith, honestly, prudently, impartially, and reasonably, based upon all the relevant facts before it, not taking into account matters it should not take into account, nor taking into account something else that it should take into account.¹³⁵ A clause in a pension plan text protecting the exercise of an administrator's discretion will not preclude judicial review of that decision where the administrator has failed to hold the balance evenly between beneficiaries or has acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of a beneficiary, has acted dishonestly, has failed to exercise the level of prudence to be expected from a reasonable administrator, or has failed to exercise its discretion at all.¹³⁶

Is there more depth to the duty of even-handedness in MEPPs, jointly-trusted plans such as JSPPs or other plans administered by an

132 *Bathgate*, above note 88 at 624–25 (Ont. C.A.); *Cowan v. Scargill*, above note 102 at 760–63 (All E.R.); *HEPP*, above note 37.

133 *Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Arthur Andersen Inc. (re Westar Mining Retirement Plan)* (1994), 4 C.C.P.B. 199 (B.C.S.C.); *Froese*, above note 99.

134 See generally *Huang v. Telus Corp. Pension Plan* (2005), 44 C.C.P.B. 100 at paras. 88–98 (Alta. Q.B.) and the cases cited therein.

135 See generally *Yates v. Air Canada*, above note 107 at paras. 101–108.

136 *Electrical Industry of Ottawa Pension Plan v. Cybulski*, (2001), 30 C.C.P.B. 95 at para. 21 (Ont. S.C.J.) [*Cybulski*]. See also *Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. v. Crown Investments Corp. of Saskatchewan* (2003), 36 C.C.P.B. 272 at paras. 121–127 (Sask. Q.B.).

arm's-length body? Where the trust agreement or other document constituting the administrator accords no discretion or role to play in the area of plan design and benefit conferral, it is difficult to envision how the administrator could be liable to the employees for a decision of the sponsor. But what about where the administrator is given discretionary authority to amend the pension plan or otherwise confer benefits under the plan, for example, to raise benefit levels, give *ad hoc* inflation adjustments, offer early retirement windows, or confer other benefit enhancements? There is authority to the effect an administrator has a duty to act even-handedly where it has the discretion to confer benefits or exercise a power of plan design,¹³⁷ but to discharge its duty the administrator need not ensure that all employees are treated "equally." Provided that the administrator turns its mind to the interests of all employees and pensioners when it makes the decision to make and implement a benefit enhancement amendment and has otherwise acted reasonably, benefits can be conferred on some employees to the exclusion of others.¹³⁸ The same principle applies to discharge a pension trustee or administrator in the obverse situation, that is, where a benefit reduction must be made in order to maintain the plan's solvency status.¹³⁹

137 *Williams v. College Pension Board of Trustees* (2005), 254 D.L.R. (4th) 536 at paras. 28–41 and 65 (B.C.S.C.); *Ruddell v. B.C. Rail Ltd.* (2005), 48 C.C.P.B. 94 (B.C.S.C.); *Rivett v. Hospitals of Ontario Pension Plan* (1995), 9 C.C.P.B. 284 at para. 28 (Gen. Div.).

138 See *Edge v. Pensions Ombudsman*, [1999] 4 All E.R. 546 at 559–60 (C.A.) where the English Court of Appeal (Civil) determined that the trustees discharged their duty of even-handedness by considering the interests of the dissenting employees who did not benefit from the benefit enhancement and contribution reduction, at the time the decision was made. See also D.W.M. Waters, *Law of Trusts in Canada*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) at 788. Further, see the unresolved litigation described in *Turner v. Telecommunications Workers Pension Plan* (2001), 197 D.L.R. (4th) 533 at 540 (B.C.C.A.), where the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed that a representative action on behalf of a group of employees against their board of trustees for excluding them from a benefit enhancement did "not appear to be frivolous."

139 In *Neville v. Wynne* (2005), 46 C.C.P.B. 80 (B.C.S.C.), an action for breach of trust and fiduciary duty by a non-retired member of a union-sponsored plan against the board of trustees that administered the plan was dismissed. The plan faced a shortfall and the trustees' only options were to reduce benefits or wind up the plan. In deciding to reduce benefits, the trustees reduced benefits for all beneficiaries, but allocated more of the reduction to the non-retired members than the retired members. The trustees determined that this was a fair allocation of the burden of the investment risk since pensions-in-pay were not indexed for inflation under the plan terms and non-retired members still had the right to accumulate additional pension benefits as they continued to work.

Notwithstanding the statutory and common law standards of care, the PBA imposes a duty of even-handedness on a plan administrator in specified circumstances. In particular, an administrator is required to ensure that benefits be reduced and paid out "proportionately" in circumstances where an employee has terminated plan membership at a time when the plan is in a state of deficit¹⁴⁰ and, further, where a pension plan has been fully or partially wound-up in a deficit and where the employer is not required or is unable to fund the deficit.¹⁴¹

The scope of the duty of even-handedness in the context of pension plan design and administration is still in a phase of evolution and will undoubtedly be subject to further development, particularly as it may apply or may not apply to employers that administer an employer-sponsored plan.

f) Inform and disclose

The PBA prescribes a host of specific disclosure requirements for a plan administrator vis-à-vis employees and the regulator. In addition to these specific requirements, a plan administrator's general communication obligations are subject to the rule of law that makes it a fiduciary's responsibility to disclose material information sufficient to permit a beneficiary to make a fully informed decision. This is a both common law duty and part of the statutory duty of care imposed upon administrators in the PBA.¹⁴²

In the context of pension administration, the duty to inform is usually applied as part of the law of negligent misrepresentation, the principle being that "the failure to divulge material information may be just as misleading as a positive misstatement."¹⁴³

For an administrator to discharge this duty, a communication from the administrator must be truthful and accurate at the time it was made. In *Beaudry v. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority*,¹⁴⁴ the court dismissed an employee's action against his administrator for damages for negligent

The court held that the trustees' decision was not one which "no reasonable body of trustees properly directing themselves could reasonably have reached."

140 PBA, ss. 42(2), (7), and (8) and PBA, Reg., ss. 19(2), (4)-(6), and (9).

141 PBA, s. 77 and PBA, Reg., s. 29(9) and 30(2)(e). See also *Royal Trust Corp of Canada v. Arthur Andersen Inc.*, above note 133.

142 C.U.P.E., *Local 185 v. Etobicoke (City)* (1998), 17 C.C.P.B. 278 at para. 4 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal dismissed, [1998] O.J. No. 3943 (C.A.); *Deraps*, above note 96 at 183-84; *Aetna*, above note 99 at 597-600.

143 *Deraps*, *ibid.* at 184; *Spinks v. Canada* (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 223 at 230 (Fed. C.A.).

144 [1992] B.C.J. No. 67 (S.C.).

misrepresentation and breach of the duty to inform in connection with answers given to the employee when he elected to retire early. At the time, there was no enhanced early retirement program in effect, nor was one contemplated. Subsequently, the plan was amended to confer an early retirement subsidy, but the plaintiff was not eligible because he had already retired. When dismissing the claim, the court observed that the answers given to the plaintiff were truthful at the time and, absent other surrounding circumstances for either party to conclude otherwise, “there is no continuing duty to up-date or modify the answer when a possibility arises that the answer may no longer be true.”¹⁴⁵

3) Discharge and Mitigation

a) Statutory discharge

The *PBA* contains a number of so-called “discharge” provisions that would appear to lessen a plan administrator’s risk of liability in specified circumstances. These provisions in the *PBA* are limited to situations where the administrator pays or transfers pension benefits in accordance with the information or directions in its possession.¹⁴⁶ So, for example, where an employee terminating plan membership elects to purchase an annuity or transfer his pension entitlement to a locked-in retirement savings vehicle, the administrator is discharged on transferring the benefit in accordance with the election of the employee and, upon doing so, the employee has no continuing interest in the assets

¹⁴⁵ Similar reasoning was applied by the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case of *Hembruff*, above note 86. In this case, the Court of Appeal dismissed the claims of certain employees in connection with benefit enhancements that were being considered by the employer, but were not yet adopted into the pension plan at the time they terminated employment and plan membership. The Court of Appeal held there was no disclosure obligation on the plan administrator in respect of the plan amendments that were under consideration; the information concerning the possible future nature of the plan’s terms was neither highly relevant, nor material and, accordingly, the administrator did not breach its duty of care owed to the employees at large.

¹⁴⁶ An administrator is discharged on making payment or transfer of an employee’s commuted value on termination of plan membership in accordance with the direction of the employee, provided the payment or transfer complies with the *PBA* and regulations: *PBA*, s. 42(11); in the absence of actual notice to the contrary, the administrator is discharged on making payment of a pre-retirement death benefit in accordance with information provided by the person entitled to the benefit: ss. 48(9) & (10); if payment of a pension or a deferred pension is divided between spouses by a domestic contract or an order, the administrator is discharged on making payment in accordance with the domestic contract or order: s. 51(3).

The *Pension Benefits Act*¹ (the PBA) provides two methods by which a pension plan may be wound up: by voluntary decision of the employer or by order of the regulator. There is also, potentially, a third manner by which to terminate all or part of a pension trust fund related to a pension plan, without the consent of the employer or the insistence of the regulator. This is where pension plan beneficiaries collectively attempt to terminate a pension trust and compel the distribution of assets to the beneficiaries, pursuant to the rule in *Saunders v. Vautier*. All three scenarios are discussed in this chapter, as is concept of the “partial” wind-up and the corresponding statutory and legal rights and obligations of the employer, employees, and the plan administrator.

b) Definition of “wind up”

The PBA defines a “wind up” as “the termination of a pension plan and the distribution of the assets of the pension fund” (in French, “liquidation”).² Note that the definition combines two concepts—termination and distribution. Other jurisdictions, most notably the federal jurisdiction, separate these two concepts, conceptually and literally. In the *Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985*³ (PBSA), “termination” in relation to a pension plan means “the cessation of crediting of benefits to plan members generally,”⁴ and “winding up” means “the distribution of the assets of a pension plan that has been terminated.”⁵ It is useful to compare the definitions in these two jurisdictions in order to illustrate that the discontinuance of a pension plan is best described as *a process* than it is a single event, which commences with a triggering stimulus punctuated by the cessation of further contributions and benefits and which continues until the last dollar is liquidated from the pension fund.

This illustration also serves to encapsulate this chapter, which is a discussion of the causes of termination, the process of winding up, the question who is responsible for implementing the wind up, and the manner by which the recipients of the distribution may receive their benefits.

1 R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8.

2 PBA, s. 1, “wind up.”

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. 32 (2d Supp.), as amended.

4 Federal (PBSA, s. 1, “termination”). A pension plan is also terminated where the registration of the plan has been revoked or where the Superintendent has declared the plan terminated, in accordance with PBSA, ss. 29(1) & (2).

5 *Ibid.*, s. 1, “winding up.”

C. RIGHTS AND DUTIES ON WIND UP

1) Introduction

This section discusses the rights and obligations of the administrator, the employer, and the affected employees after a pension plan has been declared or ordered partially or fully wound up. The *PBA* makes a clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of the administrator and those of the employer in connection with the implementation of a wind up. Most notably, it is the employer that must fund all of the accrued pension benefits being discharged and may be a recipient, too, of any surplus remaining. The administrator is the person responsible for all other aspects of the wind up, including ensuring that the employer has made its required contributions and remittances, all employee notices are transmitted and elections received, all required regulatory reports and filings are made, and all benefits and surplus are liquidated from the pension fund.

Except where otherwise stated, the rights and obligations of the parties discussed below apply to both partial and full wind-ups of a pension plan.

2) Administrator Obligations

a) Introduction

It is important to distinguish between the identity of the person who makes the decision to wind up a pension plan and the person who must implement that decision. In a MEPP, this person is usually one and the same, that is, the administrator. In an employer-sponsored plan, it is the employer in its capacity as plan sponsor who generally has the power to wind up the plan, while it is the employer in its capacity as plan administrator who carries out the wind up process.

b) Statutory standard of care

The administrator has the onus of satisfying the Superintendent that all requirements of the *PBA* and regulations have been complied with in the course of administering a plan wind-up.⁹⁴ The duty is the same regardless of whether the wind up comes at the initiation of the employer (or at the initiation of the administrator in the case of a MEPP) or by order of the Superintendent.⁹⁵ The Superintendent has published

⁹⁴ *Marshall*, above note 90 at para. 29.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

guidelines for administrators which set out the regulator's expectations for the satisfactory filing requirements and procedure on full or partial wind-up.⁹⁶

When administering a pension plan during a wind up, the administrator is subject to the same statutory standard of care imposed on administrators when administering an ongoing pension plan.⁹⁷ This would clearly apply, for example, to the investment of the pension fund which must still be invested prudently throughout the wind up process (although with regard to the fact the plan is being wound up).

The statutory standard of care also applies to any discretionary decisions made by the administrator during the wind up process affecting pension rights and entitlements under the plan. The exercise of discretion by an administrator during a wind up must be discharged in a manner that avoids any conflicts of interest in respect of its role as both administrator and employer. The tenuousness of the administrator's position in this regard was illustrated in one court decision:

The administrator of the plan also owes a fiduciary duty in regard to the pension fund.... In the present case, the administrator initiated the wind up by exercising its statutory power and, in so doing, chose an effective date of wind up which had the effect of putting a large number of persons who had elected [the employer's early retirement programme] in the position of being unable to receive [grow-in] benefits pursuant to s. 79 of the Act. The action of the administrator also had another effect, namely, it maximized the amount of the surplus that will remain after all benefits have eventually been paid. The administrator intends to claim that surplus for itself in a separate court action sometime after the present application has been concluded.

An obvious conflict of interest is foreseeable. In the known circumstances, the administrator may be acting contrary to its statutory duty to avoid conflicts of interest and also contrary to its common law fiduciary duties. One wonders whether it should have initiated the present application or should have resigned from its administration of the pension plan and fund before doing so. I find it incomprehensible that it did not resign before initiating this application. If the

96 FSCO Policy W100-102 (December 2004). This policy does not address MEPPs and jointly-sponsored plans where the employer's obligation to contribute is fixed in a collective agreement, or situations involving a claim against the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund (PBGF).

97 See, for example, *PBA*, s. 76, which provides that the pension fund of a pension plan that is wound up continues to be subject to the *PBA* and regulations until all the assets of the pension fund have been disbursed.